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ARTICLES
CASE STUDIES, COUNTERFACTUALS, AND
CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS
GREGORY MITCHELLt
This Article critically examines the use of single-observation case studies to
develop causal explanations for significant legal events, detailing the evidentiary
and inferential problems inherent in this methodology. Most significant among
these problems is that focus on a single case necessitates the use of counterfactual
thought experiments to test causal hypotheses. The pitfalls of such thought ex-
periments are illustrated through the discussion of the recent attempts to explain
the collapse of Enron Corporation using this approach. Application of a set of
normative criteria to the products of these Enron thought experiments reveals
the suspect nature of causal explanations and policy prescriptions drawn from
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single-observation case studies. The Article closes with a discussion of the tension
in legal scholarship between political relevance and epistemic humility.
The Enron matter will prove to be a very important event in the history
of American shareholder capitalism.
While many of the events are dramatic, their implications do not neces-




What should the legal system learn from the collapse of Enron
Corporation?3 Quite a bit, if the volume of scholarship is any guide.
Within two years of Enron's bankruptcy, legal scholars have offered a
dizzying array of views on the meaning of Enron for the legal system's
regulation of corporations, securities and energy markets, gatekeepers
and facilitators of these markets, taxes, bankruptcy, employee benefits,
4the environment, and even the mapping of the human genome.
I Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1249 (2002).
William H. Beaver, What Have We Learned from the Recent Corporate Scandals That
WeDid Not Already Know?, 8 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 155, 156 (2002).
3 Enron Corporation sought the protection of the bankruptcy court on December
2, 2001. Voluntary Petition for Enron Corporation at 9, In re Enron Corp., 302 B.R.
455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 01-16034), available at http://www.elaw4enron.com/
download.asp?DocID=8&FileID=1012&FileName=0001.pdf. At the time, Enron repre-
sented the largest company (in terms of assets) ever to declare bankruptcy within the
United States. Within a year, however, an even larger company, WorldCom, Inc., filed
for bankruptcy. See Rupert Cornwell, WorldCom Pledges to Emerge from Chapter 11, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), July 23, 2002, at 17 ("The $107bn of assets listed by World-
Com eclipses the previous record of $63bn listed by Enron when it sought bank-
ruptcy protection last December."); see also BankruptcyData.com, The Largest Bankruptcies
1980-Present, at http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2004) (listing the largest bankruptcy filings since 1980 by company name,
filing date, and amount of total assets).
4 Within a relatively short time period, law professors, law students, and practitio-
ners have produced a staggering amount of scholarship on Enron. Indeed, as Profes-
sor Jonathan Lipson recently wrote, "[t]he Enron case has already spawned a cottage
industry among legal academics." Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors' Duties to Creditors:
Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1194 n.6
(2003). For a sampling of the diverse views being offered about the causes and impli-
cations of Enron's demise, see Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127 (2002); Douglas G. Baird
& Robert K Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787
(2002); Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination
of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357 (2003); Margaret
M. Blair, Directors'Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 885 (2003); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value,
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Many of these ruminations on Enron offer interesting explanations of
what went wrong, some suggest creative solutions for the future, and a
few may even influence the legislators and judges who must deal with
the political and legal fallout from recent corporate failures. We may
76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid, "57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corpo-
rate Laryer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUs. LAW. 143 (2002); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows,
57 Bus. LAW. 1421 (2002); Victor B. Flatt, The Enron Story and Environmental Policy, 33
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,485 (July 2003); Victor Fleischer, Enron's Dirty Little
Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 94 TAX NOTES 1045 (2002); Louise W. Floyd,
Enron and One. Tel: Employee Entitlements After Employer Insolvency in the United States and
Australia (Australian Renegades Championing the American Dream?), 56 SMU L. REV. 975
(2003); Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black Enron
Cloud, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 547 (2002); Dennis R. Honabach, Curbing Misuse of Genetic In-
formation in Light of the Enron Debacle A Comment on Dean Partlett's Proposa 42
WASHBURN L.J. 535 (2003); Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of
Invincible Ignorance: MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business After Enron, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 717
(2002); Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation
Plans, 35J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487 (2002); Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron
Experience: Will It Be Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 J.
CORP. L. 69 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-
Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
968 (2002); Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead
or Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 101 (2002); AnthonyJ. Luppino, Stopping the En-
ron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35; Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflec-
tions on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671
(2002); Burnele V. Powell, The Lesson of Enron for the Future of MDPs: Out of the Shadows
and into the Sunlight, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291 (2002); Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic,
and The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul
D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9 (2002); Larry E. Rib-
stein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on US Law, 3J. CORP. L.
STUD. 299 (2003); Janis Sarra, Rose-Colored Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, and Inves-
tor Blues: Enron as Con and the Vulnerability of Canadian Corporate Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 715 (2002); Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities
Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002); Steve Stein, Taxes, Dividends, and Distor-
tions, POL'Y REV., June-July 2002, at 59; Norman Stein, Three and Possibly Four Lessons
About ERISA That We Should, but Probably Will Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 855 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corpo-
rate Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371 (2002); Cheryl L. Wade,
Comparisons Between Enron and Other Types of Corporate Misconduct: Compliance with Law
and Ethical Decision Making as the Best Form of Public Relations, 1 SEATTLEJ. FOR SOC.
JUST. 97 (2002); Hunter Carpenter, Comment, Special-Purpose Entities: A Description of
the Now Loathed Corporate Financing Too4 72 MISS. L.J. 1065 (2003); Bradley P. Rothman,
Note, 401 (k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Debacle, 54 FLA. L. REV. 921 (2002); Marissa P.
Viccaro, Comment, Can Regulation Fair Disclosure Survive the Aftermath of Enron?, 40
DuQ. L. REv. 695 (2002); Edward J. McCaffery, Remove a Major Incentive to Cheat, WALL
ST.J.,July 9, 2002, at B2.
5 For example, law professors seem to have successfully influenced the drafting of
a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7245 (Law. Co-op.
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ask, however, whether these Enron autopsies truly help us understand
when business and regulatory failures are likely to occur and how we
6might prevent them in the future.
Supp. 2003), which requires attorneys to report information about securities law viola-
tions. See Rachel McTague, Law Professors Urge SEC to Require Lawyers to Disclose Securities
Violations to Directors, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 431 (Mar. 18, 2002) (dis-
cussing how some law professors believe that securities lawyers should be legally re-
quired to report clients' violations of securities laws); Rachel McTague, SEC Required to
Mandate That Lawyers Report Corporate Clients' Securities Offenses, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 30, at 1227 (July 29, 2002) (describing the "sweeping new auditing and
corporate governance legislation"); see also Cramton, supra note 4, at 179 n.147 (dis-
cussing the advocacy efforts of Professors Susan Koniak and Richard Painter prior to
the enactment of the Corporate Reform Act); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUs.
L. REV. 77, 87 (2003) ("The [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act reflects efforts by three specific
groups. First, there are the academic reformers who, since the 1930s, have called for
increased federal regulation of corporate governance." (footnote omitted)). Further-
more, law professors testified to Congress about the implications of Enron for a variety
of legal topics. See The Legislative History of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Re-
form and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 534-50 (2002)
(statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Professor of Law, Colum. Univ. Sch. of Law) (reiter-
ating previous testimony advocating for the creation of a new self-regulating organiza-
tion forauditors), available at http://banking.senate.gov/02-03hrg/030502/coffee.htm;
id. at 550-53, 573-82 (statement of Joel Seligman, Dean and Professor of Law, Wash.
Univ. Sch. of Law) (arguing for a new auditing self-regulatory organization), available
at http://banking.senate.gov/02_03hrg/030502/seligman.htm; Accountability Issues:
Lessons Learned from Enron's Fall: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 46-47 (2002) (statement of Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston Univ. Sch.
of Law) (suggesting that the laws regarding suits against lawyers for fraud should
be amended), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=1 49&witid
=135; id. at 30-34 (statement of Nelson Lund, Professor of Law, Geo. Mason Univ. Sch.
of Law) (commenting on the accountability issues that arose in connection with En-
ron's bankruptcy), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print.testimony.cfm?id=149
&witid=139; The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before the U.S.
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 56-58, 93-102 (2002) (testimony and
statement ofJohn H. Langbein, Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch.) (proposing imposed
diversification in defined contribution plans where employees bear the risk), available
at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/0124021angbein.htm; id. at 58-74, 103-34 (tes-
timony of Frank Partnoy, Professor Law, San Diego Sch. of Law) (arguing that the de-
rivatives market should be more regulated), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-
affairs/012402partnoy.htm; The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the
Gatekeepers Keep Silent?: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
107th Cong. 10 (2001) (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor of Law, Colum.
Univ. Sch. Law) (arguing for the creation of a new, self-regulating organization
for auditors), available at http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/121801Coffee.
pdf.
6 Technically speaking, Enron Corporation is not yet dead; it remains in bank-
ruptcy while it reorganizes and attempts to start again. However, the Enron known as
the "innovative powerhouse on the verge of reshaping the world" surely is dead. Kurt
Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted from
Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at Al.
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Accordingly, rather than offer yet another opinion on the legal
lessons of Enron, this Article instead considers how we should go
about learning these lessons. More specifically, this Article critically
examines how causal stories are created to explain significant legal
events such as Enron's demise and how these stories are used to gen-
erate policy prescriptions. In a causal story, which is a type of single-
observation case study, the author constructs a story to explain why an
event occurred and then uses this causal explanation to argue about
why the law should or should not be reformed For instance, Profes-
sor Lynne Dallas composes a story about Enron's corporate climate
that reveals a "culture [that] did not encourage and support ethical
behavior."" She then assigns causal significance to this unethical cor-
porate climate in order to support a regulatory agenda: "It is... clear
that given Enron's climate it was only a matter of time before Enron
would have imploded. Congress, the SEC, and other regulatory or-
ganizations are, therefore, justifiably directing attention to codes of
ethics and ethical climates."9
While Professor Dallas and other legal scholars tell interesting and
plausible stories to explain how the law failed with respect to Enron
7 For a discussion of how legal scholars' causal stories about Enron fit within the
case study research approach, see infra Part II.
8 Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their
Directors and Officers for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS
L.J. 1, 53 (2003). Professor Dallas constructed her story primarily from journalists' re-
ports, id. at 45, and identified within Enron a host of cultural features said to encour-
age or permit unethical and even illegal behavior: (1) "The officers and employees of
the company viewed laws and company rules as something to get around or change
if they did not serve the company's purpose of making money." Id. (2) "Enron sup-
ported and encouraged unethical/illegal behavior by maintaining a reward system
that was highly political and by failing to consider the manner in which employees
booked profits." Id. at 46. (3) "The system assured that the powerful players would not
be held accountable." Id. at 47. (4) "Unthinking loyalty, homogeneity, and the rejec-
tion of outsiders characterized the system." Id. at 49. (5) "The reward system, which
ranked employees against each other and which offered substantial bonuses, did not
encourage team work or caring among employees." Id. at 50. (6) "Enron attracted
individuals who wanted to make a lot of money fast." Id. at 51.
9 Id. at 64. To bolster the general import of her causal story, Professor Dallas also
alludes to the significance of corporate culture in the WorldCom case and in the pre-
vention of future failures. See id. ("By focusing on ethical climates, the organization
can take steps to decrease the likelihood of unethical/illegal decisions that, as Enron,
World Coin and other corporations amply demonstrate, have devastating conse-
quences for employees, shareholders, creditors, and the economy as a whole."). Fur-
thermore, Professor Dallas offers a host of recommendations about possible reforms,
including changes to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, the federal sentencing
guidelines, and disclosure and fiduciary duty requirements. See id. at 58-63 (detailing
such suggested regulatory changes).
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and to support their views on reform, reader engagement and plausi-
bility are poor guides to the validity of causal explanations.0 In fact,
10 Causal stories about Enron fit within the "causal relevance model of explanation."
W. H. Newton-Smith, Explanation, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
127, 129 (W. H. Newton-Smith ed., 2000). "Reflections on the role of causation in
explanation have given rise to the causal relevance model of explanation .... On this
model explanations are not arguments. It is the causal features of the world, aspects of
the causal mechanisms in the world, which explain." Id. Causal explanations "draw
attention to what in the world is in part at least causally responsible for what we want
to explain," id., and causal explanations are "[p]robably the most fundamental form
of explanation." William F. Brewer et al., Explanation in Scientists and Children, 8 MINDS
& MACHINES 119, 125 (1998). Moreover, others have stated that "[i]n all branches of
social science, the identification of genuine causes is accorded a high priority because
it is viewed as the basis for understanding social phenomena and building an explana-
tory science. Causaljudgments are made to explain the occurrence of events, to under-
stand why particular events occur." Margaret Mooney Marini & Burton Singer, Causal-
ity in the Social Sciences, 18 SOC. METHODOLOGY 347, 347 (1988). Indeed, Jon Elster
contends that causation plays an ultimate role in all explanation. See JON ELSTER,
NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3 (1989) ("To explain an event is to give an
account of why it happened. Usually, and always ultimately, this takes the form of cit-
ing an earlier event as the cause of the event we want to explain, together with some
account of the causal mechanism connecting the two events.").
Some philosophical and psychological debate surrounds the nature of explana-
tion, and the causal relevance model of explanation is not the sole account offered
by philosophers or psychologists. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Discovering Explanations,
8 MINDS & MACHINES 7, 9 (1998) ("In contrast to the general (although not universal)
agreement that explanation is central to science, there has been much less agreement
as to just what constitutes an explanation of empirical phenomena."). For a sampling
of different approaches to the topic of explanation, see ERNEST NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 15-28
(1961); Peter Achinstein, The Pragmatic Character of Explanation, 2 PSA: PROC. BIENNIAL
MEETING PHIL. SCI. ASS'N 275 (1984); Michael Bradie, Ontic Realism and Scientific Ex-
planation, 63 PHIL. SCl. S315 (1996); Clark Glymour, Explanations, Tests, Unity and Neces-
sity, 14 NOs 31 (1980); Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification, 48 PHIL. SCI. 507
(1981); Peter Railton, Probability, Explanation, and Information, 48 SYNTHESE 233 (1981);
Fritz Rohrlich, Scientific Explanation: From Covering Law to Covering Theory, 1 PSA: PROC.
BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. SCI. ASS'N 69 (1984); Bas C. van Fraassen, Salmon on Explana-
tion, 82J. PHIL. 639 (1985). Nevertheless, it appears that a great number of legal ex-
planations involve, to some degree, causal explanations because causal claims are cru-
cial to policy prescription, which is central to much academic legal scholarship.
Indeed, Professor Edward Rubin identifies prescription as the central feature of stan-
dard legal scholarship, which he defines as "work which frames recommendations, or
prescriptions, to legal decision-makers":
In some cases the work critiques an existing judicial decision, statute, regula-
tion, or constitution, and the recommendation is simply that the decision-
maker should act differently. Less commonly, it merely offers a recommenda-
tion .... Most often, the work combines a critique of an existing decision
with a prescription .... for a different approach. And sometimes it even sug-
gests that the decision-makers are doing exactly the right thing. All this work,
however, is characterized by its normative quality and the direct engagement
of its recommendations with identifiable legal decision-makers.
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the methodological problems associated with the causal story approach
are so severe that many social scientists avoid this approach if at all
possible. Social scientists would argue that causal stories provide, at
best, innocently misleading portraits of the causes of behavior and, at
worst, unavoidably partial stories biased by the writer's preexisting be-
liefs and values."
Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 521, 522.
11 See, e.g., ROBYN M. DAwES, EVERYDAY IRRATIONALITY: How PSEUDO-SCIENTISTS,
LUNATICS, AND THE REST OF US SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO THINK RATIONALLY 114
(2001) (noting that stories "are often selected to prove a point, rather than forming a
basis of a statistical generalization ... or a causal inference, and [i]t is the generaliza-
tion or inference that leads to the selection of the story in the first place-with the re-
suits that the story provides absolutely no new information."); GARY KING ET AL.,
DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 211
(1994) ("In general, the single observation is not a useful technique for testing hy-
potheses or theories."); Tim Bfithe, Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the
Use of Narratives as Evidence, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 481, 489 (2002) ("[D]ue to the lim-
ited truth claims of narratives, those who use historical narratives as empirical evidence
for a causal explanation will probably fail to assess alternative explanations and, if they
try, will fail to convince skeptics."); Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in
Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 803, 805 (noting social
scientists' complaint that an anecdote is an unsatisfactory source of evidence not be-
cause it is nonempirical, but because it is a weak form of empirical evidence, and that
"it typically is presented without information about how the particular instance de-
scribed in the anecdote was selected, how accurately it is being described, and how
representative it is of the population of occurrences the author is using it to illus-
trate"); Arend Lijphart, The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research, 8 COMP.
POL. STUD. 158, 160 (1975) ("Case studies ... are intensive but uncontrolled examina-
tions of single cases that cannot directly result in empirical generalizations and cannot
even be used to test hypotheses."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Does Literature Work as
Social Science? The Case of George Orwell, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 987, 1002-10 (2002) (dis-
cussing problems with inferring general behavioral patterns and explanations from the
personal experiences and preferences of the writer); Dean Keith Simonton, Qualitative
and Quantitative Analyses of Historical Data, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 617, 628 (2003)
("Many psychologists believe that quantitative analyses are far more scientific-more
objective and rigorous-than qualitative analyses. Moreover, this belief enjoys some
support in the empirical (quantitative) research on human information-processing ca-
pacities."). For a discussion of the use of a "one-shot case study" when "it is all that we
have," see Donald T. Campbell, "Degrees of Freedom" and the Case Study, 8 COMP. POL.
STUD. 178, 179 (1975). Professor Donald Campbell, however, seems to have in mind
not single-event studies, but rather, single-culture studies. Id. at 186-88. He also writes
that "[w]ith a single observation at hand, it is impossible to separate the subjective and
objective component" of the observation. Id. at 189 (citation omitted).
With respect to the ideological bias point from the text, consider the hypothesis
offered by the political psychologist Philip Tedock that, were we to substitute the fail-
ure of Enron with the failure of Amtrak, we likely would see a role reversal in causal
storytelling. Instead of market skeptics drawing broad regulatory lessons from the fall
of an erstwhile free market paragon, while fiscal conservatives downplay the regulatory
lessons to be learned, we likely would see conservatives drawing broad, deregulatory
lessons from the failure of a government-sponsored monopoly, while advocates of such
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This Article analyzes treatments of the Enron matter using this
causal story approach to illustrate (1) the evidence-selection and ana-
lytical problems that arise in the construction of causal stories; (2) the
necessary reliance in this approach on thought experiments and
counterfactual causal reasoning, modes of analysis highly susceptible
to inferential bias and fallacy; and (3) the indeterminacy of causal ac-
counts offered under this approach. Although these problems are
substantial, the causal story approach does not need to be entirely re-
jected. A more constructive approach is to consider ways to improve
the use of causal stories. To this end, this Article proposes a set of
normative criteria that may be used to evaluate causal stories. Al-
though the Enron causal stories often fail to satisfy one or more of
these normative criteria and thus should be given little or no prescrip-
tive weight as presently constructed, the criteria point to ways in which
the stories may be improved.
The purpose of this Article is to draw attention to the unavoidable
methodological and interpretive problems associated with the use of
causal stories in the law and to argue that stringent normative criteria
should guide the use of these modes of analysis. Causal stories about
Enron serve as the focus of this discussion not because they represent
particularly egregious examples of this genre, but because they pro-
vide good and prominent examples of the methodological hazards
that arise employing this approach. Moreover, consumers of these
stories may benefit from a discussion of ways to evaluate and adjudi-
cate among conflicting causal accounts. Causal storytelling in the law
is not unique to Enron, nor is the application of counterfactual
thought experiments unique to causal storytelling. 2 The dangers of
government programs would downplay the deregulatory lessons to be learned. E-mail
from Philip Tetlock, Lorraine Tyson Mitchell Chair II in Leadership and Communica-
tion, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, to Gregory Mitchell,
Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Nov. 28, 2002,
09:11 PST) (on file with author).
12 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 808 (1993) ("Reliance on case studies and
other narratives is hardly new to legal scholarship."). The terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, for instance, have served as fodder for causal storytelling. See Kent
Greenfield, September 11th and the End of History for Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1409,
1411-14 (2002) (analyzing the causal story that September 11th resulted from lax secu-
rity at the airport). In one instance, Enron and the attacks of September 11th were
combined to tell a legal story. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the
Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1579
(2002). Other events, like the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, the Bill Clinton impeachment
trial, and the case of Bush v. Gore, likewise provoked reflection on whether these cases
are symptomatic of larger problems in the legal and political systems and, if so,
COUNTERFACTUALS AND ENRON
these methods extend beyond the creation of causal explanations for
business failures.
Furthermore, the Enron stories do not serve as departure points
because they necessarily get the story wrong. In fact, given the multi-
ple, conflicting stories, some accounts surely get the story right. In-
deed, implementing the reforms suggested by some of the Enron
scholars might turn out well in the end. The simple point argued
here is that these causal stories, as currently constituted, provide little
justification for the reform of our laws or legal theories. While some
causal stories are better than others, scrutiny of these stories reveals
that even the best causal stories provide, at most, a starting point for
more rigorous analysis of the causes of business and regulatory fail-
ures.
The Article proceeds by illustrating in Part I the range of causal
stories used to explain Enron's collapse and to argue for and against
particular legal reforms. These causal stories are then situated within
the broader category of empirical approaches to causal inference to
demonstrate that the stories present special problems when used to
develop singular causal explanations for Enron's failure or general
causal explanations for business failures.
Part II then details specific evidentiary and inferential problems
with the Enron causal stories and promulgates a set of evaluative crite-
ria that may be used to separate the better stories from the worse in
future research. The Article concludes by considering reasons why le-
gal scholars may choose the causal story approach over more rigorous
forms of causal analysis and generalization.
whether there are possible cures. For discussions of the significance of these cases, see
Peter Arenella, O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233 (1996); Erwin Chemerinsky, How
Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2002); Christopher
B. Mueller, O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System on Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
727 (1996); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001).
Prominent recent examples of counterfactual thought experiments about the law
include the essays in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001), and Constitutional Commentary's 1999 symposium, The Sound
of Legal Thunder: The Chaotic Consequences of Crushing Constitutional Butterflies, in which
legal scholars were asked to erase some development from American constitutional
law and then "describe all the consequences, desirable or not, that flow from the
stomping of the unlucky constitutional butterfly." Jim Chen, Introduction: The Sound of
Legal Thunder: The Chaotic Consequences of Crushing Constitutional Butterflies, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 483, 484 (1999).
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I. TELLING ENRON STORIES
Many legal scholars mark the fall of Enron as a momentous event
in our legal and economic history. They have described it in various
ways, including as "an occasion for moral lament";13 evidence that
"[w] hat is needed today, short of perhaps a wholesale change in mod-
em capitalism, is a new SEC";14 proof of "the inability of government
regulation and criminal law to prevent the widespread dislocations
caused by corporate misconduct";1 and, most strikingly, along with
the September 11th terrorist attacks, as "the product of unchecked,
antidemocratic fanaticism" reflecting a "deep hostility to the norms
and values embodied in the notion of the secular 'rule of law.""1
6
Given the significance assigned to Enron, it is not surprising that
many legal scholars would seek to understand the underlying reasons
in hopes of preventing future collapses. 17
13 Norman W. Spaulding, Where Were the Lawyers? Enron and Legal Ethics, BOALT
HALL TRANSCRIPT, Fall/Winter 2002-03, at 32.
14 Michelle Chan-Fishel, After Enron: How Accounting and SEC Reform Can Promote
Corporate Accountability While Restoring Public Confidence, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,965, 10,977 (Aug. 2002) (footnote omitted).
15 Jill E. Fisch, Taking Action Against Auctions: The Third Circuit Task Force Report, 74
TEMP. L. REv. 813, 819 (2001).
:6 Kahn, supra note 12, at 1599.
7 Professor Faith Stevelman Kahn explains why so many legal scholars may be in-
terested in the cause of Enron's demise:
In performing the autopsy of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, it
makes sense to consider what makes a body corporate powerful or weak,
moral or corrupt, responsible or exploitative? Relatedly, what can be done
through law reform to promote equality and meritocracy within corporate
and securities law and elsewhere in economic regulation? These are not ques-
tions commonly addressed within academic corporate law, but they are-as
American-style economic institutions and legal standards are becoming ever
more globally influential--questions that could not be more important or
timely.
Id. at 1638. It is important to note here that legal scholars cannot be faulted for seek-
ing explanations of a significant legal event such as Enron's failure. Indeed, the psy-
chologist Alison Gopnik sees explanation as playing such a fundamental, formative
role in the development of understanding of the world that she likens the drive to ex-
plain to the drive to procreate:
My hypothesis will be that explanation is to cognition as orgasm is to repro-
duction. It is the phenomenological mark of the fulfillment of an evolution-
arily determined drive. From our phenomenological point of view, it may well
seem to us that we construct and use theories in order to achieve explanation
or have sex in order to achieve orgasm. From an evolutionary perspective,
however, the relation is reversed[;] we experience orgasms and explanations
to ensure that we make babies and theories.
Alison Gopnik, Explanation as Orgasm, 8 MINDS & MACHINES 101, 102 (1998). Thus,
from the legal scholar's viewpoint, explaining a significant event like Enron's collapse
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In this endeavor, legal scholars offer a wide range of explanations
for Enron's demise and draw diverse and, at times, inconsistent, les-
sons from Enron. These Enron postmortems necessarily involve in-
ferences about the causes of Enron's collapse. Any diagnosis of the
conditions leading to the corporate failure or any prescription to pre-
vent future failures requires a set of beliefs about the causes of past
failures. Even broad forecasts about the historical significance of En-
ron require a set of beliefs about how past events will alter future
events-that is, a set of beliefs about causal relations in the world. As
the following examples illustrate, the stories being told about Enron
vary in their specificity about the causal processes supposedly at work
and the complexity of the causal story being told.
The most basic explanations for Enron assign greed or character a
causal role: "It was the perceptions of greed that largely resulted in
the demise of Enron and its tax advisors." 8 Professor Victor Flatt simi-
larly sees an uncontrolled acquisitive drive as Enron's undoing:
In order to understand why Enron's actions and subsequent collapse
were inevitable, we must focus on the basic primal principle of "taking"
what is available. Property rights and accompanying moral codes must
be seen as a derogation of what exists "naturally" before this time, and
what exists in most animal species. That is, humans take whatever they
can, in any way they can, without restraint, at least from noncooperating
family or tribal units. This suggests that humans will work around any
prohibition that is not clear, or will be tempted to take anything of value
if the taking is not explicitly prohibited.'l
Professor Nancy Rapoport settles on character as a key causal fac-
tor: "If we are to believe that there is a single root cause of the Enron
mess (an arguable point at best in such a complicated situation), fail-
ure of character gets my nomination. 20  She then posits that both a
lack of moral interdependence and the effects of cognitive dissonance
as precursors to this lack of character ostensibly caused Enron's attor-
neys to turn a blind eye to the ongoing problems:
may be quite satisfying both professionally and intellectually, for the explanation may
influence other academics as well as the legal system and may be the seed that gives
birth to other ideas or even a broader theory. The question this Article addresses is
not whether legal scholars should seek explanations for significant legal events, but
rather, how they might best go about formulating them.
18 Harold S. Peckron, Watchdogs That Failed to Bark: Standards of Tax Review After
Enron, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 853, 913 (2002).
19 Flatt, supra note 4, at 10,492.
20 Rapoport, supra note 4, at 1379.
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If the lawyers saw themselves as morally independent from Enron, rather
than morally interdependent, then they might well have believed that it was
Enron's job, not theirs, to ensure follow-through. A more complex ex-
planation is that cognitive dissonance.., prevented the lawyers from
seeing some of these deals more clearly. My hunch is that both con-
cepts-a mistaken belief in moral independence, rather than interde-
pendence, and the effects of cognitive dissonance-played a part in any
failures by the gatekeepers.
... Enron's collapse wasn't due to a "perfect storm" of mere coinci-
dence-the collapse was caused by humans and their hubris. We need
to ensure that hubris doesn't blind us to the first rule of leadership: It's
all about character.'
Professor Rapoport draws from her character-based Enron story a
fairly simple solution that, if implemented, is unlikely to upset greatly
the legal status quo: to encourage greater diligence and influence
on the part of attorneys by reminding them that their professional
livelihood and reputations are tied to the livelihood and reputations
of their clients.22 In contrast, Professor Flatt's Hobbesian view of
21 Id. at 1384-85, 1394-95. Professor Rapoport notes that at least one in-house at-
torney did raise some questions about Enron's deals (Sherron Watkins apparently
wrote a letter to CEO Kenneth Lay expressing concern about Enron's accounting prac-
tices), but Rapoport suggests that this attorney did not follow through sufficiently in
the face of resistance by senior officers. Id. at 1380-82. Rapoport further maintains:
Watkins wasn't the lone voice questioning Enron's deals; others, including
Enron Global Finance's General Counsel Jordan Mintz, were concerned about
the structure and disclosure of the various deals. Apparently, [CFO Andrew]
Fastow and [former CEOJeffrey] Skilling didn't brook disagreement willingly.
Those who objected often found themselves the subject of pressure, down-
right abuse, and exile.
Id. at 1383 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1391 ("Lawyers need to behave as true
counselors to their clients, rather than as hired guns who are just following orders.
Society needs us to take on the role of the social conscience (or, if that sounds too
darn highfallutin', the role of the grease that helps society run).").
2 See id. at 1394 (describing a proposed new rule of professional responsibility
that would make lawyers "morally accountable for their conduct as lawyers" (footnote
omitted)). Professor Rapoport suggests that a new model rule of professional respon-
sibility might encourage a greater sense of moral interdependence:
So how do we encourage lawyers to withstand peer pressure and client
pressure, especially in those grey areas in which the lawyer gives advice akin to
"it's an aggressive interpretation of the law" and the client chooses to use that
aggressive interpretation, even at the risk of later litigation?...
Personally, I like Russ Pearce's idea that we create a new Model Rule 1.0.
His Model Rule 1.0 would provide that "lawyers are morally accountable for
their conduct as lawyers." That rule hits the question of moral interdepend-
ence head on, and it provides a powerful reminder that "just following orders"
is the weakest of excuses.
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corporate behavior would lead to a wholesale reconsideration of the
reliance placed on self-regulation in the securities market and a
reluctance to further deregulate energy markets.23
In perhaps the most influential analysis of Enron to date, Profes-
sor William Bratton reaches a similarly skeptical view of self-regulation
and the power of market forces to constrain corporate misdeeds,
through a different route than Professor Flatt.2 4 Whereas Professor
Id. (footnotes omitted). While not arguing for changes in the law, Professor Rapoport
does hope to upset the professional and educational status quo. She contends that
improvements in legal ethics must start "from the top, with judges, partners, bar asso-
ciations, and other senior lawyers all singing the same tune," and not solely with the
ineffectual preachings of law professors to students. Id. at 1391. Professor Harold
Peckron likewise refrains from drawing intrusive lessons from Enron but writes that the
example of Enron itself may deliver a useful wake-up call to accountants:
So if in the post-Enron planning world the typical tax advisor has become
more circumspect and exercises greater due diligence in the review of pro-
posed tax shelter transactions, can this be an entirely bad outcome? Perhaps
now tax lawyers and accountants will consider anew how much they can lose
and how much they can win.
Peckron, supra note 18, at 915-16.
23 Flatt, supra note 4, at 10,495. Along these lines, Professor Flatt uses Enron to
argue against market-based environmental policies that would involve significant self-
regulation:
Self-regulation cannot be counted on, and if government regulation is too ex-
pensive or difficult, the savings of the "market" program may be illusory. The
Enron story allows us to see what will happen in complex trading schemes and
self-regulation in the face of opposing incentives. It is the story of human be-
havior itself. This lesson must be learned in formulating environmental pol-
icy. A large-scale market-based strategy, involving acid rain deposition, has
worked, but it is the exception, not the rule. Enron is the rule. This is the
legacy for environmental policy of the collapse of Enron.
Id.
I 24 See Bratton, supra note 4, at 1337 ("Enron, then, reminds us that the monitor-
ing model assures us of little."); id. at 1340 ("But, then, if Enron teaches us anything, it
is to question the reasonableness of reliance on any corporate monitor.").
Several legal scholars rely on Professor Bratton's article as a key source of informa-
tion about the Enron affairs. See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle? Shareholder
Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK., 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 976, 976 n.1
(2002) (referring to Professor Bratton's article as an "exceptionally helpful account" of
Enron's fall); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man's Burden, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 944, 953 n.51 (2002) (referring the reader to the Bratton article
for "an excellent discussion of the notorious Enron collapse"); Langevoort, supra note
4, at 973 n.14 (noting that the Bratton article served as one of the sources for his ac-
count of the Enron affair); Gregory A. Mark, The Legal Histoy of Corporate Scandal: Some
Observations on the Ancestry and Significance of the Enron Era, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1073, 1073
n.1 (2003) (referring the reader to the Bratton article for "a comprehensive account of
what occurred inside Enron and a discussion of the merits of corporate governance
reforms as a response to the corporation's collapse"); David Millon, Enron and the Dark
Side of Worker Ownership, 1 SEATTLEJ. FOR SOC. JUST. 113, 113 n.2 (2002) (describing
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Flatt tells a fairly simple causal story that invokes human nature
to explain Enron, Professor Bratton's story is more complicated.
He first reviews the apparent facts of Enron to evaluate "four
causation stories 2 5 that might explain Enron's collapse: (1) "Enron
as [c]onventional [m]arket [r]eversal, ' 26 (2) "Enron as [d]erivative
[s]peculation [g]one [w]rong,




and (4) "Enron as a [b]ank [r]un. ' '29 Professor Bratton finds some
truth in each of these stories but proposes an underlying causal
Bratton's article as "a thorough exposition of the problems at Enron and a highly in-
sightful analysis of their policy and theoretical implications"); Marleen A. O'Connor,
The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1233, 1233 n.2 (2003) (di-
recting the reader to the Bratton article for a "detailed history and examination of the
causes of the fall of Enron"); MARGARET M. BLAIR, POST-ENRON REFLECTIONS ON
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Geo. Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No.
316663, 2002) (relying on the Bratton article for his description of the Enron climate
as one in which "a group of grand masters of the U.S. system constructed increasingly
complex and opaque transactions designed... to deceive them by moving the cups so
quickly and cleverly that investors could no longer figure out which cup had the actual
penny under it").
25 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1286. Professor Bratton relies on media reports and
editorials; the Powers Report, WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF INVES-
TIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
ENRON CORP. (2002) [hereinafter POWERS REPORT], available at 2002 WL 198018; an-
nual reports and other SEC filings by Enron; and testimony at congressional hearings
to write his causation stories.
Note that the psychologist Robyn Dawes's description of the structure of a story
accords with Bratton's notion of a "causation story": "The structure of a story is that it
consists of a single sequence of events often linked with a set of hypothesized causal in-
fluences." DAWES, supra note 11, at 112.
26 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1299. This story examines the role of "erroneous busi-
ness judgment and bad luck on the part of managers." Id. at 1302. Professor Bratton
asserts that "these causes were necessary but not sufficient for [Enron's] collapse, at
least on the present state of the record." Id.
27 Id. Professor Bratton argues that risky and undisclosed derivatives trading can-
not explain why Enron failed when it did. "[D]erivatives trading very well may have
brought Enron down in 2002 or thereafter. But in 2001, when Enron filed for bank-
ruptcy, none of the foregoing was known to the financiers and related actors who de-
termined Enron's fate. Strictly speaking, then, a malfunctioning derivatives operation
did not bring Enron down." Id. at 1304.
28 Id. at 1305. This story focuses primarily on the role of self-dealing by Enron in-
siders and potential fraud in the reporting of financial information for the personal
enrichment of officers. Id. at 1305-20. Once such self-dealing and potential fraud
were disclosed, Enron suffered a "credibility deficit" in the market that "in time could
have brought down the firm. As to that we can only speculate, for independent rea-
sons brought about Enron's collapse before the implications of its [Special Purpose
Entity (SPE)] accounting could be assimilated fully." Id. at 1320.
29 Id. This story focuses on the adverse effect of credit rating downgrades and
creditor demands on Enron following key financial disclosures in 2001. Id. at 1320-25.
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theme founded upon a tournament metaphor, a win-at-any-cost men-
tality that he contends informs all of these other subplots. 30
Professor Bratton views this tournament mentality, which ostensi-
bly led to a disastrous outcome in Enron when the other causal forces
aligned themselves, as "inseparable from shareholder value maximiza-
tion, for the big scores in the stock market come from firms run by
entrepreneurs rather than by conventional managers. On the down-
side, however, it can lead to errant decision making."
3'
Although Bratton eschews fundamental reforms to the securities
market and corporate monitoring system, his understanding of Enron
and its corporate culture leads him to three lessons that convey an
overall message strongly in favor of stepped-up governmental over-
sight and greater skepticism about the powers of self-regulation and
market discipline:
First, Enron collapsed the same way banks routinely collapsed in the days
before deposit insurance. It did so because it had largely succeeded in
realizing UJeffrey] Skilling's vision of becoming a financial institution.
Huge financial institutions present special regulatory problems and are
subject to special requirements. . . . Emerging financial institutions
should be brought into the system in the ordinary course.
30 Professor Bratton does not pick any particular story as the most compelling, but
rather, states that "[aill four of the preceding stories figure into the final account of
Enron's collapse." Id. at 1326. He does say, however, that "[w]e can pare down the
account by coupling the crisis of confidence and the hidden $4 billion of additional
obligations as primary causes." Id. He then supplements these stories with his own,
primarily social-psychological account of hubris and motivations gone awry, to form
one apparently encompassing causation story. See id. at 1332 (referring to his discus-
sion of how the four causation stories form one story). He views Enron's downfall as a
result of this hubris and win-at-any-cost mentality:
Enron fell because it pursued winning to excess. At Enron, winning was
everything and everything became a tournament.
... To keep their victory lap going, Enron's managers invented winning
value numbers, crossing the line to fraud.
Enron's managers, with a belief system biased toward winning, lost touch
with both hard economic constraints and the rules of the game.
As Enron's leaders stepped across the line to fraud, their belief system
trumped reality. So as to avoid confronting their own failures, they averted
their eyes from the manifest implications of their own actions. They acted out
the role of the tournament winner right up to the end.
Id. at 1329-32 (footnote omitted).
31 Id. at 1331. Professor Bratton describes this mentality as a type of cognitive bias:
"The optimistic entrepreneur labors under a cognitive bias, which underweights down-
side risk and overweights both the probability of upside gain and the entrepreneur's
own abilities and contributions." Id.
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Second .... [Enron] highlights the limits on what self-regulation
and market incentives can achieve. Sovereign mandate and punishment
remain the bedrock of capitalism.
Third .... we should treat with utmost skepticism actors who preach
market discipline from positions of safety behind the shields of corpo-
rate entities.s2
Professor Donald Langevoort builds on this story to suggest that
"the social forces and selfish norms that emerge fairly naturally in
highly competitive settings ... dominate as behavioral influences over
anything but high-powered legal controls., 33 He sees Enron as repre-
sentative of such highly competitive firms, where these strong, coun-
terproductive behavioral tendencies may emerge.3 Simply "tweaking"
the law to improve corporate conduct will not prevent future Enrons.'
32 Id. at 1360-61. As to lesson two, he writes that "if Enron teaches us anything, it is to
question the reasonableness of reliance on any corporate monitor." Id. at 1340. As to
lesson three, Professor Bratton concludes that cases like Enron are unavoidable conse-
quences of our choice of entrepreneurial system:
Enron shows that the incentive structure that motivates actors in our self-
regulatory governance system generates much less powerful checks against
abuse than many observers believed. This point does not by itself validate any
particular regulatory corrective. The costs of any regulation can outweigh the
compliance yield, particularly in a system committed to open a wide field for
entrepreneurial risk taking. Such a system can no more break the iron law of
risk and return than could Michael Milken and his junk bonds. If we seek
high returns, we must discount for the risk that rationality and reputation will
sometimes prove inadequate as constraints.
Id. at 1288. However, he does believe that the system could be improved with respect
to the quality of gatekeeping provided in particular by auditors. In this respect, he ad-
vocates for a "complete separation of auditing from consultancy" for accounting firms.
Id. at 1358; see also id. at 1356 (suggesting that the big accounting firms "be unbundled
and auditing firms... perform only one function").
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 968.
Professor Langevoort writes that the "paradigmatic examples" of highly com-
petitive firms "are knowledge and service-based firms in markets with relatively low
barriers to entry and high rewards for innovation. Enron clearly was one of these." Id.
He then explicates the possible behavioral process at work within Enron:
The [Enron] culture quickly identified itself as special and uniquely compe-
tent, believing that special skill rather than luck (or just being first) was re-
sponsible for the early victories. That self-definition then set a standard for
how up-and-coming people acted out their roles: Enron was a place for win-
ners. With this-and the stock market's positive feedback-the company's as-
piration level rose.
This aspiration level required a high level of risk-taking by the firm, though
like many egocentric people, key decision-makers were probably overconfi-
dent in their ability to manage these risks, and thus underestimated
them.... Enron harshly penalized the laggards at the firm, which, on average,
tends to lead to herding behavior (risk aversion). To counteract this, the
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On the opposite side of the regulatory divide, Professor Larry
Ribstein sees little reason for more governmental monitoring or new
regulations, but good reason for greater reliance on the market:
Markets are capable of responding more quickly and precisely than
regulation to corporate fraud, as long as regulation does not impede or
mislead them. Although markets will remain imperfect, the potential for
a market response, combined with the likely costs of regulation, make
the case for additional regulation dubious.3 6
Indeed, Professor Ribstein argues that additional regulation might
have the perverse effect of causing investors to ignore market signals
and place unfounded faith in the regulators.
Other scholars focus less on general flaws in human nature, the
market, or the self-regulatory scheme of corporate and securities gov-
ernance and more on fairly specific features of the legal landscape
that supposedly enabled Enron's failure. Of particular interest under
this approach has been the question of whether reliance on overly
technical and specific accounting rules permitted Enron to hide its
true financial condition from the market and regulators. 3
company had to magnify the reward structure considerably for those who
ended up as stellar performers-a winner-take-all kind of tournament.
Presumably this worked, and key people gradually placed more and more
risky bets in a variety of fields, increasingly outside of the firm's core compe-
tence. And predictably, many of these turned bad.... In sum-and in previ-
ous work I've called this the "optimism-commitment whipsaw"-their overcon-
fidence commits them to a high-risk strategy; once committed to it, they are
trapped.
Id. at 973-74.
35 See id. at 968 (noting with skepticism the suggestion that tweaking current law to
reduce investor pressure on managers can change unhealthy corporate behavior).
36 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatoiy Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2002).
Id. at 25. Professor Jerry Markham has similarly argued that SEC regulation it-
self was to blame for the Enron collapse by leading investors into a false sense of secu-
rity:
Indeed, the Enron and telecom implosions that grew from the accounting
fraud on [SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's] watch were nurtured by the full dis-
closure environment he was so vigorously advocating and expanding. Inves-
tors were led to believe, falsely, that they were protected by, and assured of,
full disclosure under the federal securities laws. They received no such thing.
To the contrary, they were simply cheated by their government's totally unre-
alistic and false promises of such protection.
Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policeman: Rethinking the Federal Securities
Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 765 (2003).
See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Princi-
ples Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1040 (2003) ("Misleading treatments of
off-balance sheet entities lie at the Enron scandal's core. Dissatisfaction with the
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The most notable work in this area is Professor John Coffee's
analysis, which assigns prime causal significance to the "rule-based"
system of accounting and assigns greater blame to auditors and other
gatekeepers than to Enron's board of directors: "None of the watch-
dogs that should have detected Enron's collapse-auditors, analysts or
debt rating agencies--did so before the penultimate moment. This is
the true common denominator in the Enron debacle, the collective
failure of the gatekeepers."39 Professor Coffee argues that the rule-
based system of accounting "asks the gatekeeper to certify the issuer's
compliance with an inventory of highly technical rules-without the
auditor necessarily taking responsibility for the overall accuracy of the
issuer's statement of its financial position."4  Therefore, he argues
that "Enron is more about gatekeeper failure than board failure."4'
applicable rules and their form-over-substance approach has been widespread.").
Professor Bratton himself does not agree with the emphasis being placed on the role
of rules versus standards in Enron's collapse:
The story is accurate in one respect-the rules respecting accounting for
transactions with SPEs are badly drafted and incomplete. But in all other re-
spects the story is nonsense. Enron, in fact, did not follow the rules. Had it
done so, the substance of all of its questionable dealings with SPEs would have
been disclosed in its financial statements. It follows that the rules did not fail.
This is a case less of regulatory arbitrage than of strategic evasion. The failure
lay with actors at Enron and its auditor, Arthur Andersen.
Id. at 1041 (footnote omitted).
39 Coffee, supra note 4, 1408-09. Professor Coffee defines gatekeepers as "reputa-
tional intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors."
Id. at 1405. "Lawyers can also be gatekeepers when they lend their professional reputa-
tions to a transaction, but ... the more typical role of lawyers serving public corpora-
tions is that of the transaction engineer, rather than the reputational intermediary."
1d.
Professor Coffee considers two explanations for why the gatekeepers failed to pre-
vent Enron's risky or illegal behavior: the "deterrence explanation" (or, rather, "the
underdeterred gatekeeper" explanation) and the "irrational market story" (or the
bursting market bubble story). Id. at 1409-13. He concludes that both the legal and
market explanations hold some truth:
Reasonable persons can always disagree what reforms are desirable. But the
starting point for an intelligent debate is the recognition that the two major,
contemporary crises now facing the securities market (i.e., the collapse of En-
ron and the growing controversy over securities analysts, which began with the
New York Attorney General's investigation into Merrill, Lynch) involve at bot-
tom the same problem-both are crises motivated by the discovery by inves-
tors that reputational intermediaries upon whom they relied were conflicted
and seemingly sold their interests short. Neither the law nor the market has
yet solved either of these closely related problems.
Id. at 1419-20.
40 Id. at 1416. Professor Coffee also moves from Enron to the legal profession at
large: "[T]he same 'commodification' of professional services that reshaped the ac-
counting profession has also impacted the legal profession. Thus.... as auditing firms
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Though generally skeptical of the lessons being drawn from En-
ron,42 Professor Coffee is willing to draw one prescription from his
view that audit failure occurred: Auditors should be required to cer-
tify the compliance of financials with "a meaningful substantive stan-
dard," rather than with "an inventory of highly technical rules" that
may bear little relation to the "overall accuracy of the issuer's state-




Professor William Widen also finds in Enron an "'ethic of techni-
cal compliance"' over substantive accuracy 44 and argues broadly for a
move to standards over rules:
In crafting rules governing conduct and mandating disclosure, the
better course is to employ general principles rather than to draft rules of
a technical and complex nature. Compliance with technical rules has an
insidious tendency to replace more general notions of right and wrong.
In contrast, general rules and principles constantly challenge those seek-
ing to comply to look to themselves for guidance when making difficult
decisions rather than finding refuge in a technical safe harbor. If it is
not possible for a person to "forget" what is right and wrong, we never-
theless would do well to enact regulatory structures that do not distract
45persons from this useful form of introspection.
Others, however, doubt the causal role of this putative ethic of techni-
cal compliance. Professor Neil Aronson tells us, for instance, that,
evolved from offering a single professional service into a shopping center of profes-
sional services, they lost internal control.... [T]he same fate could face lawyers." Id.
at 1417-18.
41 Id. at 1419. Professor Coffee supplements his comparison of the deterrence
and irrational market stories with a consideration of the influence of four other factors
that lead to gatekeeper failures: (a) "the increased incentive for short-term stock price
maximization"; (b) "the absence of competition"; (c) "observability"; and (d) "princi-
pal/agent problems." Id. at 1413-16. For his data, he relies on media reports; state-
ments by present and former government officials, such as Alan Greenspan and Stan-
ley Sporkin; the Powers Report, supra note 25; publicly filed documents; and
congressional statements and testimony.
Professor David Millon shares the Coffee view that gatekeepers played an impor-
tant causal role in Enron's failure. See David Millon, Who "Caused" the Enron Debacle?,
60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 309, 311 (2003) ("Enron's auditor, the securities analysts who
followed its fortunes, and the rating agencies that downgraded its creditworthiness all
failed to discover and reveal the chicanery. ... In this sense, these gatekeepers share
the blame for the Enron debacle.").
42 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1403 ("Major debacles of historical dimensions-
and Enron is surely that-tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case,
the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commen-
tator can see evidence confirming what he or she already believed.").
43 Id. at 1416-17.
44 William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAw. 961, 965 (2003).
45 Id. at 1002.
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"[i]n the final analysis, few can deny that the demise of Enron and
WorldCom was primarily caused by financial fraud rather than the in-
adequacy of audit principles."46 Professor William Beaver also doubts
that a change to accounting principles over rules alone will do much
good:
The form of the accounting standard along the bright line/concept-
based dimension is unlikely to be the major determinant of the amount
of discretion exercised. The basic issue, which is omitted from the
"bright lines" versus "concept-based" discussion, is this: what are the in-
centives to exercise discretion in financial reporting? The way to alter
discretion in financial reporting is to affect those incentives in a manner
that increases the cost of opportunistic discretion.47
Yet, other scholars focus on the fiduciary duties of officers and di-
rectors as the weak point in the Enron structure, contrary to the ar-
gument that Enron was more a case of gatekeeper than board failure.
Indeed, Professor Cheryl Wade offers an Enron story that counters
not only Professor Coffee's view, but also that offered by Professor Ra-
poport. She argues that blame lies with the managers, and that law-
yers of greater character would not have mattered.4 8 She states that
proposals calling for greater guidance by attorneys in steering direc-
tors and managers toward ethical decision making are naive, since
"[i]nvestigations of the Enron crisis revealed that managers failed to
follow advice of counsel. 49
In Professor Wade's view, a failure of communication between of-
ficers and directors, aided by insufficient incentives for officers to
Aronson, supra note 4, at 137; see also Bratton, supra note 4, at 1354 ("If GAAP is
not fundamentally flawed, then the solution to the Enron problem lies on the en-
forcement side, where we encounter some highly problematic institutional arrange-
ments.").
47 Beaver, supra note 2, at 166; see also George Mundstock, The Trouble With FASB,
28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 813, 838 (2003) (arguing that principles are merely
mushy prose designed so that the auditor will take more responsibility, but in reality,
they make matters much worse).
The "ethic of technical compliance" view offered by Professors Coffee and Widen
and others seems to be carrying the day at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Notwithstanding concerns such as those of Professors Beaver and George
Mundstock, the SEC recently recommended to the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) that it "write more principles-based standards-standards that are 'ob-
jectives-oriented' and less based on rules." Steve Burkholder, SEC Staff Urges FASB to
Write Principles-Based Accounting Standards, CORP. AccOUNTABILITY & FRAUD DAILY, July
28, 2003, available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/cad.nsf/is/AOA7B9A9C1.
48 Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial Duty of Care, 76
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 767, 778 (2002).
49 Id.
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communicate matters to the board and for board members to ask the
tough questions, holds more causal importance for Enron's collapse
than the role of corporate counsel. 5° Thus, for Professor Wade, put-
ting more bite into officers' and directors' duties of care holds greater
promise than prescriptions focused, for instance, on lawyers' duties.5'
As a final example, which also serves as a sign of just how much
has already been written about Enron, Professor Frank Partnoy offers
a "revisionist" view of Enron's unraveling:
[W]hat seems to be emerging as the "conventional story" of Enron, in-
volving alleged fraud related to Special Purpose Entities (SPE), is incor-
rect.... Enron is largely a story about derivatives-financial instruments
such as options, futures, and other contracts whose value is linked to
some underlying financial instrument or index.... To the extent SPEs
are relevant to understanding Enron, it is the derivatives transactions be-
tween Enron and the SPEs-not the SPEs themselves-that matter.
Even more important were Enron's derivatives trades and transactions
other than those involving the SPEs. 2
This view, which assigns central importance to the opacity of many
of Enron's derivatives transactions, leads Partnoy to argue for "a stan-
dards-based regime designed to capture more disclosure of financial
contingencies related to derivatives.
Several other causal stories could be described here, for Enron's
collapse has provided a canvas onto which many complaints about the
50 See, e.g., id. at 772 (stating that "[t]he one thing that seemed apparent almost
immediately was that Enron's board was not adequately informed about the company's
business affairs"); id. at 785 (calling for greater involvement and oversight of manage-
ment's activities by the board and especially independent directors).
51 Id. at 768-69. This is not to say that Professor Wade rejects the view that lawyers
have a positive role to play in corporate governance, but she sees this role as difficult to
fulfill at times. See id. at 780 ("Lawyers can help corporate managers respond more
appropriately to inevitable allegations of wrongdoing. Corporate lawyers who give
their clients advice about how to pursue ethically and socially responsible paths must
carefully choose the most appropriate strategies for advising managers who often resist
this kind of guidance.").
52 Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May, "48 VILL.
L. REV. 1245, 1245-46 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
53 Id. at 1262. Recall that one of Professor Bratton's "causation stories" to which
he assigned some importance was the "Enron as derivatives speculation gone wrong"
story. Supra text accompanying note 27. Professor Partnoy reviews the Enron matter
and essentially concludes that Professor Bratton and others give this story too little
weight. See Parmoy, supra note 52, at 1262 ("In sum, the story of Enron's collapse is
not what at first appears. The firm was a highly-leveraged derivatives trading firm and
it collapsed when its credit rating finally reflected that fact. The scholarly and regula-
tory response to Enron's collapse should reflect this understanding.").
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current mix of law and economics can be painted. Or, as Professor
Lawrence Cunningham puts it:
Enron's cacophonous commentators share the trait of the proverbial
man with a hammer, to whom every problem looks like a nail. Advocates
of stricter auditing standards see a system-wide breakdown in audit qual-
ity; devotees of corporate social responsibility cite Enron to support their
cause. Those on the left use it to bolster their case that more regulation
is needed, while those on the right point to insufficient market competi-
tion as the cause of the failure.
54
Whichever causal story is chosen, the point of the storytelling is the
same: to influence the debate about whether and how the law should
be changed in light of the causal factors that allegedly gave rise to En-
ron and other recent corporate scandals.
Within these stories, an important but hardly discussed transfor-
mation occurs at the point where the Enron story is tied to the larger
policy debate. The scholar transforms her specific explanation for
the isolated event into a general explanation for a class of potential
54 Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1422 (footnote omitted); see also Robert Prentice,
Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 417 (2003) ("People see what
they want to see in the Enron (Global Crossing/WorldCom/etc.) corporate corruption
scandal. Conservatives see a triumph of capitalism. Those of a more liberal persuasion
see stark limitations of capitalism. Republicans blame the scandal on the Democrats.
Democratic leaders, unsurprisingly, blame it on Republicans." (footnotes omitted)).
Even the appropriate metaphor to describe Enron is in dispute. Professor Marianne
Jennings likens Enron to The Perfect Storm scenario played out in Sebastian Junger's
popular book of that title. See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from A
Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39
CAL. W. L. REv. 163, 167 (2003) ("As in The Perfect Storm, an Enron, with its full creative
accounting scenario could not have occurred ifjust one of the three legs of the stool
had functioned differently."). But Dean Rapoport tells us that the Enron disaster is
really more akin to the Titanic disaster. See Rapoport, supra note 4, at 1375 ("Enron's
demise was a synergistic combination of human errors and hubris: a 'Titanic' miscal-
culation, rather than a 'perfect storm."').
See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 4, at 1281-82 (noting that Enron provides an attrac-
tive basis for argument between supporters of deregulation and those favoring greater
regulation of the markets); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1416 (arguing that what one be-
lieves are the causal factors underlying Enron's demise shapes one's view on what
steps, if any, should be taken to prevent future Enrons);Jennings, supra note 54, at 167
("An examination of the confluence of these three separate storms provides insight
into the types of reforms, regulatory and otherwise, that might prevent other unprece-
dented collapses or perhaps provide the means of intervention before the three com-
ponents merge."); Parmoy, supra note 52, at 1280 ("The reasons for Enron's collapse
should affect the normative conclusions of scholars ....").
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events, and it becomes a prediction for future problems. In other
words, the authors switch from singular to general causal accounts.56
Thus we find that even Professor Coffee, who expresses caution
about reading too much into Enron from a corporate governance
perspective, nevertheless draws from it generalizations about the unre-
liability of gatekeepers. He cautions against the use of Enron "as an
indication of any systematic governance failure" because of its unique
organizational structure. 7 Enron's distinctive governance precludes
drawing broad conclusions as to boards in general. It "is an anecdote,
an isolated data point that cannot yet fairly be deemed to amount to a
trend."58 Despite this warning, Professor Coffee contends that the En-
ron disaster does, in fact, send a general message to the market that
professional gatekeepers are not to be trusted "to filter, verify and as-
sess complicated financial information." 9
Similarly, Professor Bratton draws from Enron a broad lesson
about the inadequacy of market forces to deter "shabby" behavior:
That the firm with the seventh largest market capitalization and also the
firm that preached market discipline the most loudly turned out to be
the shabbiest of shops with the cooperation of outside directors, outside
auditors, and institutional investors, highlights the limits on what self-
regulation and market incentives can achieve.
6 0
56 See, e.g., John T. Addison et al., Causation, Social Science and Sir John Hicks,
36 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 2 (1984) (noting "the distinction between the causation
of a particular single phenomenon individuated by unique spatial and temporal
parameters and the causation of any particular instance of a given kind of event");
Jessica Wilson, Causality, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer eds., forthcoming Apr. 1, 2005) (manuscript at 2, on
file with author) ("[C]ausal relations may be singular (Socrates's drinking hemlock caused
Socrates's death) or general (Drinking hemlock causes death). ), available at http://
www-personal.umich.edu/-jwils/Causality%20Entry.pdf.
In recognition of the interest of others in drawing general understandings from
the specific understanding of Enron, Professor Langevoort expressly delimits the situa-
tions for which he seeks to generalize from the Enron collapse. See Langevoort, supra
note 4, at 968 (viewing Enron as a "new economy" company like the knowledge- and
service-based firms that reward productivity and innovation, rather than as a monopo-
listic public utility or a firm with entrenched market power and high rates of free cash
flow). Of course, the question remains of how representative the behaviors of Enron
players are for officers and directors of other "new economy" firms.
57 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1403.
Id. at 1404.
59 Id. at 1404-05.
60 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1360. But see RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., WHAT WORKS IN
SECURITIES LAw? 22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9882, 2003)
(finding evidence that tough securities law enforcement and punishment do not affect
the strength of a securities market as much as extensive disclosure requirements and
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As further examples of the move from the singular to the general,
Professor Widen reports that the "cultural problem revealed by En-
ron" is that "corporate and legal culture has lost all sense of right and
wrong., 61 Professor Flatt tells us that the "Enron story allows us to see
what will happen in complex trading schemes and self-regulation in
the face of opposing incentives. It is the story of human behavior itself"
62
In these assertions, the specific explanation becomes endowed
with lawlike properties, and the causal relation posited for the Enron
matter is presumed to hold in other corporate settings as well. This
occurs with little or no demonstration of the applicability of this ex-
planation for other events occurring under different circumstances.
Although many scholars widely apply the conclusions they draw from
63Enron, they do so with little more than bald assertions or limited an-
ecdotal evidence to support their generalizations.6
procedures to facilitate investor loss recovery), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w9882.
Another example of unsupported generalization is found in Professor Bratton's
suggestion that Enron exhibited pathologies common to corporations today. See Brat-
ton, supra note 4, at 1360 ("Every other critical detail [of Enron], including aggressive
treatments, auditor capture, and the cognitive biases that facilitated the fatal step to
fraud, implicates a well-known business pathology and a concomitant and well-worn
regulatory discussion." (footnote omitted)). This reference to "cognitive biases" lead-
ing to fraud, while fashionable, is particularly troubling because it subscribes to the
growing but questionable view among many legal academics that cognitive processes
are riddled with bias and error, and it assumes the easy identification of the operation
of such biases. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwar-
ranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907
(2002) (discussing boundary conditions on psychological research into rationality that
make application of the research to the law treacherous); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (using empirical evidence on individual and
situational variability in rational behavior to show that the concept of rationality lies
between perfect rationality and equal incompetence).
61Widen, supra note 44, at 962-63.
62 Flatt, supra note 4, at 10,495 (emphasis added).
63 Many of these broad claims resemble what Professor Paul Meehl calls "fireside
inductions," which he defines as "common-sense empirical generalizations about hu-
man behavior which we accept on the culture's authority plus introspection plus anec-
dotal evidence from ordinary life." Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some
Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, in PAUL E. MEEHL: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL PAPERS 440, 440 (C. Anthony Anderson & Keith Gunderson eds.,
1991). Professor Meehl calls for healthy skepticism regarding both fireside inductions
and the empirical research that claims to contradict them. Id. at 468.
64 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 4, at 1283 (explaining that his article reviews the
particulars of the Enron case and emphasizes the similarities between it and respect-
able firms); id. at 1287 (stating that similar Enron-like situations of auditor capture
are "ubiquitous in America's corporate landscape"); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1407
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For the scholar inclined to make policy recommendations, this
inductive leap must occur because, while singular causal stories about
specific events are of great interest to trial judges, juries, and the
parties involved in a particular lawsuit, they are of little interest to
the lawmaker, who enacts laws with broad behavioral implications be-. 65
yond the specific case in mind. Unless the causal explanation ex-
tends beyond Enron to provide a more general explanation of how
certain behaviors and corporate and regulatory failures are related,
then specific explanations for Enron provide little insight for lawmak-
ers. Stated differently, if Enron is an aberration or the product of
unique forces unlikely to be seen again, then why bother with "sweep-
ing legal reforms"?66 The focus should instead be placed on criminal
(acknowledging that his evidence of erosion of gatekeeper independence is substan-
tially "anecdotal, but striking").
Professor Coffee does offer, in support of some of his contentions, suggestive evi-
dence drawn from data on earnings restatements and buy/sell recommendations. Fur-
thermore, he notes that the claims he derives from this data are tentative, given that
the data is subject to multiple interpretations. Id. at 1407-08; see also id. at 1412 n.41
(citing a study providing evidence of a relationship between earnings management
and the purchase of nonauditing services from accounting firms).
Michael Saks states that the danger posed by reliance on anecdotal evidence is that
it "permits only the loosest and weakest inferences about matters a field is trying to
understand. Anecdotes do not permit one to determine either the frequency of oc-
currence of something or its causes and effects." Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147,1159 (1992).
65 This push to go beyond the specific case and say something of general import is
particularly well-illustrated in Professor Widen's recent article. Most of his article fo-
cuses on how officers, directors, and lawyers for Enron might be held criminally liable,
and hence, the article could be valuable to judges, regulators, prosecutors, and de-
fense lawyers involved in the Enron litigation or similar cases. Widen, supra note 44, at
973-99. Professor Widen goes further, however, and labels Enron as evidence of a "cri-
sis in capitalism," offering only assertion and anecdotal references to support this view.
See id. at 1001-02 ("The Enron case, more than other recent well-publicized cases of
fraud, illustrates the general structure of a crisis in capitalism because of the direct in-
volvement of the board of directors and lawyers in approval and structuring of criminal
acts.").
66 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Re-
form (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 917 (2003) (discussing how the
president, the SEC Chairman, and other "participants and observers" of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act frequently referred to is as "sweeping reform"). Professor Cunningham
questions just how "sweeping" the legal reforms so far put in place really have been,
despite public rhetoric to that effect. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 987
(2003) (noting that, with the exception of the funding of the auditing oversight board
and accounting standard-setters, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "not major reform, but
patches and codifications and further study"). But see Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated
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punishment, civil liability, and reparations for the players in the En-
ron case alone.
The claim here is not that legislation is never directed at specific
cases or problems, or that holdings in specific cases do not at times
have broad behavioral implications. Certainly some laws are designed
to redress specific issues or serve special interests, and court decisions
may affect persons beyond the immediate parties. Indeed, the need
to 'just do something" in response to Enron-either to try to restore
faith in the markets or for political reasons-may well have been a
motivating factor in the reforms. This assertion is merely that law-
makers would most likely be unmoved by specific explanations for En-
ron that included a caveat stating that "this story has nothing of sig-
nificance to say about the securities market in general or about any
other corporation." However, to the extent that, for political pur-
poses, lawmakers need to take some action in response to Enron, legal
scholars provide the putative empirical or analytical cover needed.
These general explanations, derived from the unique causes of Enron,
provide the hook upon which to hang legislative hats, regardless of
their validity.
We see, then, that legal scholars who draw prescriptive lessons
from Enron really tell two stories in response to the Enron matter.
First, a singular causal story is offered to explain the specific events
surrounding Enron. Second, a more general causal story about mar-
ket failures, corporate misconduct, regulatory shortcomings, or pro-
fessional malpractice is drawn from the specific story. These stories
67
raise questions of internal and external validity. In creating these
Equilib7ia in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 2
(2002) (arguing that the scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "sweeping and dramatic").
67 See, e.g.,JOHN BREWER & ALBERT HUNTER, MULTIMETHOD RESEAT: A SYNTHESIS
OF STYLES 158 (1989) ("Research to generate and test causal hypotheses is usually
judged in terms of two standards: internal and external validity.").
Professors Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell define internal validity as "the ap-
proximate validity with which we infer that a relationship between two variables is
causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the absence of cause." THOMAS D.
COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES
FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37 (1979); see also JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY & EUGENE B. ZECH-
MEISTER, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 25 (1985) (defining internal validity as
arising when independent variables are not "allowed to co-vary simultaneously," mak-
ing it "possible to determine which variable is responsible for any served difference in
performance"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and Regulatory Competition: Can They Co-exist?,
80 TEX. L. REv. 1729, 1729 (2002) (referring to "the problem of multi-collinearity that
usually confounds efforts to infer causation from correlation" (footnote omitted)).
Cook and Campbell define external validity as "the approximate validity with
which we can infer that the presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and
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stories, to what extent have the authors considered, and appropriately
eliminated, alternative credible explanations for Enron (i.e., is the
singular causal story internally valid)? Furthermore, to what extent
are the authors' extrapolations from Enron to other cases or circum-
stances warranted (i.e., is the general causal story externally valid)?
Invalidity in either respect undercuts the prescriptive force of the ex-
planations drawn from Enron.
II. SINGLE-OBSERVATION CASE STUDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Wittingly or unwittingly, when scholars write causal stories about
Enron, they engage in a form of single-observation case study re-
search.6s  "The case study is a research strategy which focuses on
understanding the dynamics present within single settings."69  In
across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different types of persons,
settings, and times." COOK & CAMPBELL, supra, at 37; see also SHAUGHNESSY & ZECH-
MEISTER, supra, at 25 ("The internal validity of a study must be distinguished from the
study's external validity. External validity involves the extent to which research results
can be generalized to different populations, settings, and conditions.").
68 While most of the Enron scholars do not explicitly label their works as case stud-
ies, a few do. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) ("[T]he
following [c] ase [s] tudy [of Enron] shows in concrete terms how private justice could
have made a difference in one instance of massive wrongdoing."); Floyd, supra note 4,
at 984-99 (presenting a case study of Enron for comparison with the collapse of an
Australian company and arguing that American law should be reformed); O'Connor,
supra note 24, at 1238 (using "social psychology to build a case study for how the En-
ron Board may have been affected by a significant impediment to group deliberation
called 'groupthink"').
I employ the term "causal story," rather than "case study," because Professor Brat-
ton, in probably the most prominent case study of Enron to date, specifically refers to
the creation of "causation stories," Bratton, supra note 4, at 1286, and because many of
the discussions of Enron provide a narrative causal account of the undoing of Enron.
In addition, to the extent any legal scholars sought to use their accounts of Enron
more for political than truly empirical purposes, such analyses of Enron would seem to
fit well within Deborah Stone's definition of "causal stories" that are used for political
influence purposes. Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,
104 POL. SCI. Q. 281 (1989). I return later to Professor Stone's notion of causal stories
in relation to the Enron stories. Infra note 215 and accompanying text.
69 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theories from Case Study Research, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 532, 534 (1989) (citation omitted). Other scholars have noted, however,
that the term "case study" lacks a standard usage. Martyn Hammersley & Roger Gomm,
Introduction to CASE STUDY METHOD: KEY ISSUES, KEY TEXTS 1, 1 (Roger Gomm et al.
eds., 2000). But Professor Kathleen Eisenhardt's definition captures the case study
emphasis on understanding behavior and events in context. See, e.g., PERVEZ GHAURI &
KJELL GRONHAUG, RESEARCH METHODS IN BUSINESS STUDIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 171
(2d ed. 2002) ("In business studies, case study research is particularly useful when
the phenomenon under investigation is difficult to study outside its natural setting
and also when the concepts and variables under study are difficult to quantify."). The
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single-observation case studies (i.e., research employing a sample size of
one, or N = 1), there is no opportunity to develop a range of data
points on the dependent variable or to study several instances of the
phenomenon to be explained. Instead, one outcome or event, such
as the collapse of Enron, serves as the focal point."70
leading expert on the case study methodology, Robert Yin, gives a definition similar to
that of Professor Eisenhardt. See Robert K. Yin, The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers, 26
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 58, 59 (1981) ("As a research strategy, the distinguishing characteristic of
the case study is that it attempts to examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-
life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident."). Kin further elaborates on the case study methodology in
writing:
The case study inquiry
* copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be
many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
* relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to con-
verge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
* benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to
guide data collection and analysis.
ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 13-14 (3d ed. 2003)
(emphasis omitted). For a historical discussion of the development and uses of the
case study approach, see Jennifer Platt, "Case Study" in American Methodological Thought,
40 CURRENT SOC. 17 (1992).
70 Salient examples of single-observation case studies outside the law can be
found within MBA programs and history scholarship. See, e.g., VIRTUAL HISTORY (Niall
Ferguson ed., 1997) (providing case studies describing the circumstances that would
have resulted if nine different historical events had occurred differently); Yuen Foong
Khong, Confronting Hitler and Its Consequences, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT Ex-
PERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECIIVES 95, 95 (Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin eds., 1996) (analyzing the sin-
gle event of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at
Munich to determine its causal effects on World War II); Donald C. Langevoort, Teach-
ing Problem Solving: An Academic's Perspective, BUs. LAW TODAY, July-Aug. 1999, at 33, 37
(noting the emphasis in MBA programs on "richly detailed case studies"). In fact, pro-
fessors at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion have already developed a case study on Enron for use in classes. Darden Sch. of
Bus. Admin., Univ. of Va., Enron; 1986-2001, http://it.darden.virginia.edu/preview/
enron (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). For a debate on the merit of using case studies for
teaching purposes within business schools, compare Chris Argyris, Some Limitations of
the Case Method: Experiences in a Management Development Program, 5 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
291, 291 (1980) (arguing that "the case method of instruction may unintentionally re-
inforce individual and organizational forces against double-loop learning," a sophisti-
cated type of problem solving that is usually the responsibility of managers and poli-
cymakers), with Michael A. Berger, In Defense of the Case Method: A Reply to Argyris, 8
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 329 (1983) (responding to Argyris's criticism of the case method by
pointing out the methodological and conceptual flaws of Argyris's study and emphasiz-
ing the positive features of the case method).
Single-observation case studies should be distinguished from comparative case
studies (or multiple-case designs), in which two or more cases are compared, often for
the purpose of isolating differences in potential causal variables or testing a theory
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Single-observation case studies can provide rich descriptions of
an event and, like any good story, can personalize and highlight the
wrongs suffered in particular settings.7' If the Enron scholars offer up
their stories simply as cautionary tales to illustrate what could go
wrong in certain corporate settings, then the stories would be subject
to scrutiny only for their descriptive accuracy and narrative persua-
siveness. 72 The Enron stories, however, go beyond mere description
and actually prescribe ways to avoid similar outcomes in the future.
Once the Enron scholars offer causal explanations or generalize from
Enron to other cases, we should ask not only whether they accurately
describe the facts of the Enron story, but also whether they employ
sound means of causal and inductive reasoning. If not, then the
with contrasting cases. See Martyn Hammersley et al., Case Study and Theory, in CASE
STUDY METHOD, supra note 69, at 234, 239 ("Comparative method requires that data
be available from more than one case, perhaps from a substantial number, such that
the effects of various candidate causal factors can be controlled or assessed."). For a
useful discussion of the limits of comparative case studies, albeit in the context of ra-
tional deterrence theory in political science, see Christopher H. Achen & Duncan Sni-
dal, Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 143 (1989).
71 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1345-46
(2002) (-Narratives often provide a level of eloquence, passion, and immediacy that
conventional forms of scholarship rarely duplicate. Vivid, personalized accounts are
likely to be especially memorable and especially effective in evoking empathic re-
sponses." (footnotes omitted)). Many anecdotes found within the law have a personal
experience element and are used to demonstrate the supposed effects of some event,
policy, or practice without focusing on underlying causes. See e.g., Marc Galanter, Real
World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1098 (1996) (noting the use
of anecdotal "atrocity stories" to support arguments for tort reform); Douglas A. He-
din, On Losing, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 107, 109 n.9 (2002) (noting the use of personal
experience anecdotes to support employment discrimination claims); see also David A.
Hyman, Do Good Stories Make for Good Policy?, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1149, 1149
(2000) (discussing the use of anecdotes that have an atrocity-story quality to them to
influence health care legislation); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 (1992)
(arguing that the outcry against punitive damage awards is based on out-of-context an-
ecdotes and misleading statistics and that any legislative reform of the practice must
have a firm empirical foundation). For an argument that the vicarious experience
permitted by single-case studies is one of the prime benefits of this research approach,
see Robert Donmoyer, Generalizability and the Single-Case Study, in CASE STUDY METHOD,
supra note 69, at 45, 60-65.
72 That is, how accurately does the story relate to the underlying facts and does the
story achieve the desired effect? In some cases, of course, the goals of accuracy and
persuasion may be at odds. For a discussion of litigation as a competition between
competing narratives, using the Microsoft antitrust case as a case study, see Joshua A.
Newberg, The Narrative Construction of Antitrust, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 181 (2003).
Professor Newberg suggests that the government sacrificed accuracy and rigor for per-
suasiveness in its case against Microsoft. Id. at 216.
73 Supra Part I.
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stories should only be used cautiously for explanatory, predictive, or
prescriptive purposes.
As it turns out, for the reasons discussed in the succeeding
sections, causal stories drawn from single-observation case studies
inevitably lead to causal conclusions of suspect internal and external
validity. Accordingly, causal stories typically offer little guidance to
causal connections in the world.7 4 "Unfortunately, good stories are so
compelling to us when we take the role of psychologist or social
analyst that we do not realize that at best they constitute just a starting
point for analysis.,' 75 By examining the flaws with the causal story
approach, however, we may move beyond this commonly flawed
starting point to perform better analyses of significant legal events like
Enron's collapse.
A. Sources of Internal Invalidity
1. The Problem of Extreme Restriction of Range on the Dependent
Variable (and Why Enron Stories Remain Problematic Even
When Characterized as "Crucial Case" Studies)
The validity of one's causal inferences depends, initially, on
the nature and quality of the evidence gathered to test one's causal
76
hypotheses. If evidence is poorly selected to test a hypothesis, then
74 To be clear, the claim is not that single-observation case studies are useless.
Such studies may be valuable first steps toward theory development, explanation, and
prediction, but they should not be the only step. In general, we should consider
whether case studies are being used to the best of their advantages. See, e.g., William F.
Dukes, N = 1, 64 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 78 (1965) ("Problem-centered research on only
one subject may, by clarifying questions, defining variables, and indicating approaches,
make substantial contributions to the study of behavior. Besides answering a specific
question, it may... provide important groundwork for the theorists."). For a discus-
sion of the practical value of case studies, which also acknowledges many of the limita-
tions of the case study approach, see John S. Odell, Case Study Methods in International
Political Economy, 2 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 161 (2001); Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Earl
D. McCoy, Applied Ecology and the Logic of Case Studies, 61 PHIL. SC. 228 (1994). See also
ELSTER, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that causal explanations are distinct from storytel-
ling because the former accounts for what happened, while the latter speculates what
might have happened). Professor Elster notes that storytelling could "suggest new,
parsimonius explanations." Id. He cautions, however, that storytelling can be harmful
if the-speculation is mistaken for explanation. Id. at 8.
" DAWES, supra note 11, at 138. For an example of the lasting and misleading ef-
fects that "good" but false stories may have on the legal system, see Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 119, 146-47 (2002).
76 For instance, Professor Peter Achinstein emphasizes the importance of evi-
dence-selection procedures over whether the evidence is being used for explanatory
or predictive purposes (i.e., whether the test is backward- or forward-looking) when
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even the most elegant test will be worthless. Thus, for example, a
technically competent regression analysis of a large data set intended
to test the relationship between judicial ideology and case outcomes
provides at best limited information about this relationship if the ide-
ology variable is poorly operationalized or unreliably coded for use in
the regression analysis.77
When legal scholars select only the Enron case as evidence of why
corporate calamities occur, they make it difficult, maybe even
impossible, to conduct any serious test of a causal hypothesis about
business failure or to construct a valid causal explanation for Enron.
This shortcoming arises from what has been called the "Fundamental
Problem of Causal Inference"-that a causal inference can only be
drawn from observing the value of a dependent (or response) variable
in the presence and absence of an independent (or putatively causal
evaluating the strength of evidence and the stringency of a test of a hypothesis.
Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight, 2 PSA: PROC.
BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. SCI. Ass'N 156, 161 (1994); see also Eisenhardt, supra note 69,
at 536-37 ("Selection of cases is an important aspect of building theory from case stud-
ies.... [S]election of an appropriate population [of case studies] controls extraneous
variation and helps to define the limits for generalizing the findings."); Marini &
Singer, supra note 10, at 348 ("Regardless of the research approach taken, the degree
of belief in a causal hypothesis depends on the strength of evidence available to sup-
port it.").
A reader of an earlier draft of this Article raised the question of whether this Arti-
cle itself falls prey to such evidential problems (i.e., has the evidence been poorly se-
lected to make the argument that case studies raise serious methodological prob-
lems?). The answer is "no" because this Article does not seek to test causal hypotheses
or describe problems beyond those associated with single-observation case studies used
for causal analysis and generalization purposes. In other words, the goal of the Article
is to heighten awareness of the methodological dangers associated with the use of sin-
gle-observation case studies, as found in several legal scholars' causal stories about En-
ron, rather than to address all legal discussions of Enron itself or to address all pur-
poses for which case studies may be used. Cf Jennifer Platt, Cases of Cases. . . of Cases,
in WHAT IS A CASE? EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY 21, 49 (Charles
C. Ragin & Howard S. Becker eds., 1992) (using cases to demonstrate how authors use
cases, not to draw substantive conclusions about the topic).
77 Compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 83-
99 (2002) (discussing the importance of using reliable measurement and coding tech-
niques of facially valid measures of a variable and criticizing the variable of judicial
ideology as an example), with Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship,
69 U. CHI. L. REv. 169, 180-83 (2002) (responding to Lee Epstein and Gary King re-
garding the ope rationalization of judicial ideology). On the relation between reliabil-
ity and validity, Professor Christopher Slobogin properly notes that, "[i]f reliability is
low, validity is suspect as well, because a lack of agreement between two raters means
that at least one of them is wrong." Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psy-
chiatricAnecdata as a Case Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 919, 921 (2000).
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or explanatory) variable.78  Because a dependent variable cannot
simultaneously hold two values, it is logically impossible to draw a
causal inference from a single observation. Scientists usually resolve
the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference using scientific (i.e.,
experimental) or statistical (i.e., quantitative) solutions in which
either multiple measurements of the same unit are made over time
or multiple measurements of different units are aggregated.79 These
78 The statistician Professor Paul Holland noted that causal inference is frustrated
by the inherent fact of observational life, which he termed the "Fundamental Problem
of Causal Inference." Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT.
ASS'N 945, 947 (1986). He defined the problem as the impossibility "to observe the
value of Y,(u) and K (u) on the same unit and, therefore, it is impossible to observe the
effect of t on u." Id. The notations refer to the value of a variable, u, in the presence
of a causal factor, Y,, and, in the absence of it, the control condition, Y.
This fundamental inferential problem is why the number of observations must be
greater than the number of explanatory variables studied or why there must be positive
"degrees of freedom" in any test of a cause-effect relationship. See James D. Fearon,
Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, 43 WORLD POL. 169, 172 n.6
(1991) (defining degrees of freedom as "the number of cases minus the number of
explanatory variables minus one").
Professors King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba argue strongly against studies
of single cases that do not include any effort to compare the case to other cases or to
break the case down into subparts that may allow intracase comparisons for causal test-
ing purposes. See KING ET AL., supra note 11, at 211 (concluding that single observa-
tion case studies are "not a useful technique for testing hypotheses or theories," unless
they are "part of a research program" and can be compared with other single observa-
tions).
79 Professor Holland describes the scientific and statistical solutions to the Fun-
damental Problem of Causal Inference as follows:
There are two general solutions to the Fundamental Problem, which for the
sake of convenience I will label the scientific solution and the statistical solution.
The scientific solution is to exploit various homogeneity or invariance as-
sumptions. For example, by studying the behavior of a piece of laboratory
equipment carefully a scientist may come to believe that the value of Y(u)
measured at an earlier time is equal to the value of Y(u) for the current ex-
periment. All he needs to do now is to expose u to t and measure Y,(u) and he
has overcome the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference. Note, however,
that this hypothetical scientist has made an untestable homogeneity assump-
tion. By careful work he may convince himself and others that this assump-
tion is right, but he can never be absolutely certain ....
The statistical solution is different and makes use of the population Uin a
typically statistical way.... The important point is that the statistical solution
replaces the impossible-to-observe causal effect of t on a specific unit with the
possible-to-estimate average causal effect of t over a population of units.
Holland, supra note 78, at 947; see also Marini & Singer, supra note 10, at 367 (noting
that "covariation may be exhibited either cross-sectionally [across the population] or
longitudinally [based on a specific member of the group]"). An illustration from the
field of psychology may help. When psychological researchers use within-subjects re-
search designs, in which multiple subjects participate in each of the experimental con-
ditions and then averaged measures on a dependent variable are compared across
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solutions, however, are not available to the researcher performing a
case study involving a sample of only one or a few cases.
In performing a case study of Enron, the researcher who eschews
experimental and quantitative approaches to causal hypothesis testing
is left with only two ways to test her causal hypotheses: (1) by compar-
ing the Enron case to similar real cases that resulted in like and unlike
outcomes in order to try to isolate common or differential causal fac-
tors across the cases (the structured, focused comparison approach to
case studies uses this method °) or (2) by engaging in a counterfactual
thought experiment in which one imagines whether changes in back-
ground conditions would have led to other outcomes.81 Each of these
alternative approaches presents problems.
conditions, the researcher is taking advantage of both scientific and statistical solutions
to the causal inference problem. Measurements on the same unit are taken over time
across different treatment conditions, but these measurements are taken from a cross-
section of a population (combining a weak form of the scientific solution's invariance
assumption with the statistical solution's estimates of average causal effects in a popula-
tion).
80 See, e.g., Achen & Snidal, supra note 70, at 146-50 (providing a critical analysis of
comparative case studies, particularly the structured, focused comparison approach).
For another example of a systematic approach to causation using case studies, see
Larry J. Griffin, Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical
Sociology, 98 AM. J. Soc. 1094, 1105-08 (1993). Professor Arend Lijphart calls this
method the "comparable-cases strategy," and explains that it directs the researcher to
select cases "in such a way as to maximize the variance of the independent variables
and to minimize the variance of the control variables." Lijphart, supra note 11, at 163-
64 (emphasis omitted). The comparable-cases strategy falls within the category of
multiple case designs and is synonymous with the comparative case study method. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text (distinguishing single-observation case studies
from comparative case studies).
81 See Fearon, supra note 78, at 171 (describing a counterfactual case as hypothe-
sizing whether, absent the causal factor, the same event would have occurred); see also
Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Counterfactual Thinking: A Critical Overview, in WHAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACrUAL THINKING 1, 12
(NealJ. Roese &James M. Olson eds., 1995) (arguing that causal conclusions can be
derived from a "counterfactual simulation in one's head" just as from a comparison of
two parallel factual occurrences).
David Collier argues that the small-sample researcher might also usefully employ a
Millian "'method of elimination,' which can exclude causal factors if they are consis-
tently not present when a given outcome occurs." David Collier, Translating Quantita-
tive Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
461, 464 (1995) (citation omitted). This method of elimination, like the actual case
comparison approach discussed by James Fearon, presumes a systematic comparison
of some small sample of cases. Moreover, as Professor Stanley Lieberson points out,
there are a host of analytic problems with using the Millian eliminative approach to
causation. Stanley Lieberson, More on the Uneasy Case for Using Mill-Type Methods in
Small-N Comparative Studies, 72 Soc. FORCES 1225, 1225-34 (1994).
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The obvious problems of comparing Enron to other real cases
(the comparative case study approach) are (1) the difficulty of finding
comparable cases that differ in only a few relevant but discernible re-
spects, and (2) the difficulty of knowing with any certainty whether all
of the causally relevant facts are known about the cases studied.82 The
obvious problem with the counterfactual approach is that one's coun-
terfactual comparisons and conclusions will always remain highly de-
batable because, given the absence of a reality metric, no one can be
813right or wrong in a counterfactual world . The less obvious problems
One other option when studying a single case is to conduct intracase comparisons
over time to try to discern causal relations (e.g., to make repeated measurements on
the same experimental subject under various experimental conditions). Like an
eliminative induction approach, however, an intracase approach requires more than
one observation of the dependent variable of interest. See DAVID H. BARLOW &
MICHEL HERSEN, SINGLE CASE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS: STRATEGIES FOR STUDYING
BEHAVIOR CHANGE 37 (2d ed. 1984) ("The basis of this search for sources of variability
is repeated measurement of the dependent variable or problem behavior.").
82 See, e.g., Lijphart, supra note 11, at 163 (noting that the comparative method is
challenging because it is not easy to identify comparable cases and, even if its possible,
the cases are likely to have similar confounding background variables, which should be
controlled or operative).
I am not aware of any legal scholars who have employed a systematic case study
approach in which Enron is carefully compared to similar other cases for causal analy-
sis purposes. In a few instances, scholars have made reference to Enron in light of
other cases, but in a very informal or unsystematic way, without any sustained effort to
compare and contrast possible causal forces in the different cases. For instance, Pro-
fessor Partnoy briefly compares Enron to the Long-Term Capital Management deba-
cle, but his analysis did not take the form of a structured, focused comparison. The Fall
of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 107th Cong. 1-2 (2002) (testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law,
San Diego Sch. of Law). Professors Cunningham and Millon also compare Enron to
several corporate scandals, but similarly do not engage in systematic or focused and
structured case comparisons. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1423-30 (laying out a
brief history of corporate scandals from the 1960s through the 1990s); Millon, supra
note 41, at 310-11 (mentioning other scandals that occurred following Enron). Profes-
sor Louise Floyd does conduct a comparative case study involving Enron and an Aus-
tralian company as part of a comparative law analysis, but her primary purpose is not to
identify the cause(s) of Enron's collapse. See Floyd, supra note 4, at 984-99 (discussing
the similarities and differences between Enron and an Australian company to argue for
legal reforms in American law).
83 If one employs a correspondence theory of truth, then by definition in a coun-
terfactual world (i.e., a "contrary to fact" world), there is no "there" to which proposi-
tions can correspond. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 59
(1999) ("[T]he root idea of the correspondence approach is that truth involves a rela-
tion to reality. I would add another ingredient, namely, that items are candidates for
truth only if they (purport to) describe reality.").
This is not to say necessarily that all counterfactual assertions are equally debatable
or equally useful in theory development. "The utility of a particular explana-
tion.., depends on the plausibility of its implied counterfactual. If the counterfactual
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with the counterfactual approach involve a host of specific analytical
deficiencies that are taken up below.
8 4
By choosing a method that confines itself to a qualitative review of
historical evidence, the Enron scholars reject the scientific and
statistical solutions to the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference.
By selecting for study only a single case of corporate failure-thus
neglecting cases of corporate success that may be factually similar in
many respects (e.g., that may involve the same gatekeeper
organizations; may have had the same mix of independent and insider
board members; may have had equally mendacious or reputable
officers; or may have operated under the regulation of the same SEC
officials in the same markets at the same times)-the Enron scholars
likewise reject the comparative case study approach, which requires a
systematic comparison of at least two actual cases. Therefore, the
Enron scholars who conduct single-observation case studies are left
with only counterfactual thought experiments to reach causal• 85
conclusions. The comparisons and manipulations necessary to reach
world necessarily posited by an explanation is not plausible, the explanation should
not have been advanced." Griffin, supra note 80, at 1101 n.5 (citations omitted). For
discussions of what makes some counterfactual comparisons "better" than others, see
the essays collected in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS,
supra note 70. See also Fearon, supra note 78, at 189-94 (mentioning problems that
arise when using counterfactuals to analyze a situation); Robert N. Strassfeld, If... :
Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 339, 397-402 (1992) (addressing ways
to focus counterfactual inquiries about causation in litigation settings). This topic of
evaluating alternative counterfactual comparisons is discussed further in Part II.C.
84 Infra Part II.A.2 (describing specific problems in counterfactual thought ex-
periments).
85 To make this causal inference problem more concrete, imagine entering a hotel
room in which the only light fixture in the room is unilluminated, and there is an elec-
trical panel on the entryway wall that has two switches in the "off' position. How might
one draw inferences about which electrical switch controls the light in the room? An
experimental approach would favor systematically manipulating the two switches while
controlling other factors in the room (and, of course, on entering a strange room,
most people take this experimental approach to find the proper switch). A quantita-
tive approach would favor sampling all similar rooms in the hotel to obtain data on the
association between the light actually being off/on and the off/on positions of
switches I and 2 or, alternatively, passively taking measurements from the single room
over time to examine the association. On the other hand, a small-N comparative case
study approach might favor, for example, going into a few of the rooms on the same
floor to try to determine from these other rooms whether switch 1 or switch 2 seems to
control the light (i.e., one would look for similarly designed rooms with the light on
and the two switches in different positions that might allow one to eliminate one of the
switches as the likely causal candidate in one's own room).
In a single-observation case study, none of these conventional empirical ap-
proaches to causal inference is possible. And note that, even among these empirical
approaches, some will lead to more dependable causal inferences than others. See, e.g.,
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causal conclusions must occur mentally, rather than through some
explicit, replicable process in which the effects of hypothesized causal
variables on dependent variables are assessed using experimental
testing, quantitative analysis of actual cases, or qualitative comparisons
of real cases.
If we return to our Enron stories, we see that this is indeed
how the scholars go about inferring causality. They compare the real
world in which Enron failed to some counterfactual world in which
Enron did not fail due to some hypothetical change in a causal candi-
date. "Ifs" and "should haves" typically signal the approach of a coun-
terfactual thought experiment in the Enron stories.
Mark Klock, Finding Random Coincidences While Searching for the Holy Writ of Truth: Speci-
fication Searches in Law and Public Policy or Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc ?, 2001 Wis. L.
REV. 1007, 1036 ("Even if one had Olympian knowledge that there were no missing
variables causing both of the associated variables to move together, a statistical rela-
tionship still does not prove causality."). Since only a single passive observation of the
relationship of the light's status to the position of the two switches is made in such a
case study, one cannot manipulate the experiment, nor can one examine other similar
rooms or return at different points in time to the same room to observe the positions
of the switches in relation to the status of the light. Therefore, the only method of
causal inference that remains available in this case is to use counterfactual thought ex-
periments in which the two switches are systematically turned on and off in one's
mind, and the effect of these manipulations on the light is imagined. These thought
experiments might introduce other extrinsic knowledge about light switches from
other situations one has encountered as well as other observable evidence in the room
that might suggest which light switch is the better causal candidate. In the end, how-
ever, there is no way to be sure that the counterfactual thought experiment leads to
the correct conclusion about which switch controls the light.
One should note that in a case such as the above example, where the likely cause-
effect relation will be direct, simple, and noncontroversial, a historical approach might
also yield very good information about which switch likely controls the light. For in-
stance, perhaps a review of the architectural plans and wiring diagrams would help an-
swer the question, or an interview of the hotel management would provide insight into
which switch causes the light to turn on. As the causal relations become more com-
plex, causal candidates proliferate, and the historical record becomes more incom-
plete or debatable. Eventually, the historical approach becomes as indeterminate and
impotent as the counterfactual approach, and the historian who seeks causal explana-
tions will actually have to resort to counterfactual reasoning to try to choose between
possible causal candidates for historical events. See, e.g., James D. Fearon, Causes and
Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy Between Cellular Automata and His-
torical Processes, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS, su-
pra note 70, at 39, 40 (acknowledging the need for using a counterfactual approach to
determine the causal explanation for a historical event); Richard Ned Lebow, What's So
Different About a Counterfactual?, 52 WORLD POL. 550, 553 (2000) (noting that in analyz-
ing historical events, the difference between counterfacts and facts is fairly small be-
cause historians often must infer the actors' motives, since historical documents rarely
establish causation and actors' statements and recollections are viewed with skepti-
cism). Problems with the historical record in a complex, recent case such as Enron are
discussed below. Infra Part II.A.3.
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Professor Coffee argues, for instance, that none of the corporate
watchdogs that should have detected problems at Enron did so in
a timely fashion. s  Implicit in this conclusion is a comparison of the
real world to an alternative, counterfactual world: If one of these
watchdogs had barked, then shareholders and others would have been
spared the bite from Enron's collapse. Through this counterfactual
thought process, gatekeeper failure is assigned prime causal signifi-
cance in Professor Coffee's analysis.8'
Professor David Millon likewise assigns causal responsibility to the
gatekeepers through a more explicit counterfactual route:
If the gatekeepers had done their work properly, it seems quite likely
that Enron would not have flown as high as it did and would have expe-
rienced a much swifter return to earth. Even under a stricter proximate
cause standard, it seems reasonable to conclude that the gatekeepers'
failures contributed significantly to Enron's ability to get away with its• . 88
fraudulent activities for as long as it did.
Professor Bratton uses an implicit counterfactual comparison to
assign causal force to the actions of Enron's officers:
[T]he principals saw themselves as players in a tournament. Theirjob
was not just to make money, but to make the most money-to be the su-
perstar firm. For a superstar firm, success did not mean merely doing
better than the next firm. It meant destroying the next firm and much of
industrial organization along with it and always delivering good numbers.
This single-minded pursuit offirst-place competitive victory caused Enron's man-. 89
agers to destroy their firm.
86 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1408.
87 Evidence of Professor Coffee's confidence in his own counterfactual-based con-
clusion is found in the subtitle to his article: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid. Coffee,
supra note 4, at 1403.
88 Millon, supra note 41, at 327 (emphasis added). A few scholars, like Professor
Millon, make the counterfactual comparisons used in their thought experiments fairly
explicit, but in most cases the counterfactual comparison remains implicit. Professor
Stephen Cohen provides another example from the former camp, as he is quite ex-
plicit in imagining an alternative world in which the Supreme Court issues different
opinions relevant to accounting fraud and how these differences might have affected
behavior in the Enron case. See Stephen B. Cohen, Even Before Enron: Bank Regulators,
the Income Tax, the S&L Crisis, and Deceptive Accounting at the Supreme Court, 5 GREEN BAG
2D 387, 392 (2002) (noting that, even as a bystander, the Court had a responsibility in
earlier cases to point out "dishonesty and dereliction" in financial accounting prac-
tices, which may have influenced the subsequent behavior of Enron's managers and
accountants).
89 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1286-87 (emphasis added).
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Thus, a counterfactual thought experiment tells us that without this
single-minded pursuit of victory, the managers' conduct would not
have caused the firm to fail.
After assigning primary blame to those Enron executives aiming
to be superstars, Bratton allocates secondary responsibility to Arthur
Andersen LLP, again through a counterfactual:
Secondary blame attaches to Enron's auditors, who manifestly should
have refused to give a favorable opinion on Enron's financials. Here
arise the case's strong regulatory implications. It is clear that Enron had
captured its auditor, denuding the relationship of its necessary adversary
aspect. Similar situations of capture are ubiquitous in America's corpo-
rate landscape.9o
Here, Bratton imagines another counterfactual world in which
Enron would not have collapsed because Arthur Andersen was not
captured by Enron and refused to sign off on Enron's financials. This
counterfactual leads Bratton to assign proximate cause and blame to
Andersen's actions. Notice, as well, the importance of Bratton's un-
supported generalization about client capture of auditors-that such
capture is "ubiquitous in America's corporate landscape"-and the
assumption of correctness in his version of the facts. In short, his tell-
ing of the story makes Arthur Andersen's blame "manifestly" clear. A
90 Id. at 1287 (emphasis added). Bratton also imagines the effect of different dis-
closure standards:
[T]he monitoring process can lose its way under stacks of technical reports.
Accordingly, the process mandate needs to confront moments at which the
managers and directors make critical judgments and force them to disclose
not only the result and its justification but the competing variables and coun-
terfactuals. By implication, had Enron been forced to this higher level of dis-
closure it would have followed less aggressive accounting policies. Or, alterna-
tively, much of the accounting would have stayed the same, but Enron would
have been forced to make additional pro forma disclosures, which would have
revealed all the debt or showed how earnings might have been lower if all of
the SPE's were consolidated.
Id. at 1336 (emphasis added). ProfessorJanis Sarra engages in similar counterfactual
reasoning when she argues that "[i] f Enron directors had been required to disclose the
estimated social and economic costs of the risky SPE transactions to investors, the
transactions would never have been approved. The directors would have known that
investor confidence would plummet and capital would flee the corporation." Sarra,
supra note 4, at 744; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sar-
banes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling
Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 334 (2003) ("Unfortunately, one of the object lessons in
the Enron collapse is that every component in this complex corporate governance in-
frastructure is fundamentally broken. If but one of these components had worked
properly, Enron would not have been able to deceive the investing public in the way
that it did.").
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counterfactual analysis of our own reveals that if auditor capture is not
ubiquitous or if Bratton has some of his crucial facts wrong, then Brat-
ton's "strong regulatory implications" disappear.
The causal inference process in the Enron stories, thus, generally
takes the following counterfactual form: If [insert here one or
more of your preferred scapegoat(s)-e.g., Arthur Andersen, Vinson
& Elkins, the Audit and Compliance Committee of the Enron Board,
the SEC, analysts, the laws put in place by Congress, etc.] had been
tougher or more exacting, then the collapse of Enron would have
been avoided.9 1 In these thought experiments, the supposedly known
91 This counterfactual causal reasoning process is on the surface quite similar to
the "but for" test of causation found within tort and criminal law. See David Hamer,
'Chance Would Be a Fine Thing.- Proof of Causation and Quantum in an Unpredictable World,
23 MELB. U. L. REv. 557, 567-71 (1999) (pointing out the parallel reasoning between
the "but for" test of causation and the counterfactual analysis through two tort cases).
There may be significant differences, however, between trying mentally to undo a rela-
tively tight sequence of events in assessing "but for" causation in a litigation setting and
trying mentally to undo a complex and lengthy sequence of events leading up to the
collapse of a corporation such as Enron, which played controversial and innovative
roles in so many fields. As Robert Strassfeld explained:
The factfinder need not confront a limitless array of antecedents; the negli-
gence inquiry (or the definition of the defect in a strict products liability case)
defines the tortious element of the past that needs to be removed in framing
the antecedent.
We similarly bound the set of legally relevant consequents .... Our screens
of legal relevance make the counterfactual inquiry more manageable, but our
choice of antecedent inevitably raises questions regarding relevant conditions
or cotenability.
Strassfeld, supra note 83, at 398-99 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, in criminal and
civil litigation, there is no choice but to engage in a single-observation case study (ex-
cept perhaps in mass tort or class action cases), and it appears that jurors often do cre-
ate causal stories to explain a case. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar,
Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857, 1861-62 (2001) ("Consis-
tent with the story model, jurors do not simply record and store the evidence for later
use as they receive it. Rather, they actively select and organize the trial evidence to
construct a story about what happened."); see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 192-213 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (describing and present-
ing empirical research to support a model of story construction on the part ofjuries in
criminal trials). For a discussion of why the law accepts necessarily incomplete causal
stories in the litigation context, see StephenJ. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of Causation
and Results, 88 CAL. L. REV. 879, 894 (2000). In positive lawmaking settings, however,
where the law acts in a forward-looking way and legislates for more than a single case,
the legal system is not confined to retrospective case studies to draw causal inferences.
Nevertheless, as David Hyman discusses, anecdotes and narratives often carry significant
weight in legislative debates, despite their ability to mislead. See David A. Hyman, Lies,
Damned Lies, and Narratives, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 802 (1998) ("Courts have historically em-
braced anecdotal evidence ... although there have recently been some encouraging
signs of increased skepticism. Legislatures-populated by lawyers and exceedingly
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facts of Enron are compared to an imagined set of facts in which the
value of the hypothesized causal variable (the antecedent) is changed
from its real-world value, and the outcome (the consequent) in this
altered world then is imagined to determine whether a change in the
hypothesized causal variable would have led to a different outcome. If
a different outcome would have resulted, the hypothesized variable is
assigned causal force.9
It is no way around this reliance on counterfactual causal reasoning
to contend that the Enron case serves as a "critical" empirical test of
some theory or causal hypothesis-for example, a hypothesis that mar-
ket forces will ensure adequate corporate compliance with legal norms
to prevent massive fraud or major failure.93 A "critical" or "crucial"
attuned to public pressure-are enthusiasts of anecdotal evidence. Members of the
executive branch, regardless of political affiliation, share the same sentiments." (foot-
notes omitted)).
92 This description presents a simplified and stylized account of a counterfactual
thought experiment. The precise nature of the psychological processes used in causal
inference is the subject of much study and debate. See generally Patricia W. Cheng,
From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory, 104 PSYCHOL. REv. 367 (1997)
(discussing various psychological approaches to causal inference). In the context of
legal storytelling, a counterfactual or "but for" description that can be used to justify a
causal conclusion may be necessary to make the story compelling. This holds true
even in cases when the author reaches the causal inference in an alternative way,
whether it be through a mental simulation of events, through covariation detection
paired with induction, and/or through application of a preexisting causal schema or
understanding of cause-effect relations to a new set of facts. In any case, some sort of
mental comparison or matching process is likely to occur. Indeed, cognitive scientist
Mark Turner goes so far as to say that "there seems to be no form of causal inference in the
social sciences that does not depend upon counterfactual reasoning." MARK TURNER,
COGNrrIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 78 (2001); see also Lebow, supra note 85, at
558 ("Counterfactuals are an essential ingredient of scholarship."). Causal inference
using a "mental simulation heuristic" most closely approximates the prototypical image
of a counterfactual thought experiment:
To test whether event A caused event B, we may undo A in our mind, and ob-
serve whether B still occurs in the simulation. Simulation can also be used to
test whether A markedly increased the propensity of B, perhaps even made B
inevitable. We suggest that a test of causality by simulation is involved in ex-
amples such as "You know very well that they would have quarreled even if she
had not mentioned his mother."
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201, 202-03 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).
93 Professor Bratton, for instance, makes statements suggesting that Enron should
be seen as a critical failure for advocates of free markets and reduced governmental
regulation (i.e., that Enron provides strong negative evidence against this view), but
he is also careful to note that Enron does not necessarily point the way to a fraud-free
environment (i.e., Enron does not provide positive evidence in support of any
particular new regulation). Bratton, supra note 4, at 1281-82. Bratton divides Enron
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case study seeks to find "a case that must closely fit a theory if one is to
have confidence in the theory's validity, or, conversely, must not fit
equally well any rule contrary to that proposed., 94 In this view, the
outcome in the crucial case must be as predicted, or rather
postdicted, by the theory or the theory fails. Viewed as a crucial test
case of a theory about the power of the market to encourage proper
disclosure and discourage fraud, the outcome in Enron might serve to
test a range of other possible theories about the causes of Enron's
collapse or, at least, to falsify or refute this particular causal theory.
This analysis proceeds without recourse to true experiments or
counterfactual thought experiments in which the causal relation of
independent and dependent variables is subjected to actual or mental
testing, or to statistical analyses drawing on a number of real cases to
assess the association between independent and dependent variables.
The crucial case study approach cannot perform satisfactorily
even this limited negation function, however, for two reasons: a fun-
damental analytical shortcoming and the lack of clear standards for
separating crucial from noncrucial cases. First, the analytical problem
is that a crucial case study cannot falsify a probabilistic theory of cau-
sation, as a moment's reflection on the definition of probabilistic cau-
sality should reveal. A probabilistic theory of causation assigns positive
causal relevance to an event when the presence of that event increases
scholars into two camps: one supporting deregulation, viewing the scandal as manage-
able by existing regulation, the other supporting increased government oversight of
the market, viewing Enron as "an especially attractive basis" for reform proposals. Id.
He identifies with the second camp. Id. Although he recognizes that the potential
benefits of a regulation can be outweighed by its costs, Bratton maintains that the grand
narrative of the Enron scandal is a story about the failure of self-regulation. Id. at 1288. He
writes:
That the firm with the seventh largest market capitalization and also the firm
that preached market discipline the most loudly turned out to be the shabbi-
est of shops with the cooperation of outside directors, outside auditors, and
institutional investors, highlights the limits on what self regulation and market
incentives can achieve.
Id. at 1360.
94 Harry Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in CASE STUDY METHOD,
supra note 69, at 119, 148. Eckstein provides an alternative definition of crucial case
studies that "focus[es] inquiry on 'most-likely' or 'least-likely' cases-cases that ought,
or ought not, to invalidate or confirm theories, if any cases can be expected to do so."
Id. at 149. What Eckstein calls "crucial" case studies, Yin calls "critical" case studies. See
YIN, supra note 69, at 40 ("One rationale for a single case is when it represents the criti-
cal case in testing a well-formulated theory (again, note the analogy to the critical ex-
periment). '.
2004] 1557
1558 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152:1517
the probability of another event. 9 Put simply, in a probabilistic causal
theory, one event does not always have to cause another event in a de-
terminate manner, but rather, the first event only has to increase the
likelihood of the second event's occurrence. (In general causation
terms, an event of type C increases the probability of an event of type
E.) As should be apparent, then, a single-observation case study,
which utilizes only one measurement point on the dependent vari-
able, cannot disprove a probabilistic causal relationship. This is be-
cause we cannot know whether a nonpairing of putative cause and ef-
fect in this one instance is evidence of no causal relationship or is just
an instance of the conditions not being right for the first event to pro-
vide sufficient force or effect to cause the second event.96
95 Probabilistic approaches to causation differ in their particulars, and the simpli-
fied version presented in the text is closest to a statistical-relevance approach, as op-
posed to a view that would treat only high probability relations as causal. See, e.g., Peter
Menzies, Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis, 56 PHIL. SC.
642, 642-43 (1989) ("[P]robabilistic theories of causation do not require that a cause
confer a probability of 1, or indeed even a high probability, on the occurrence of the
effect."); David Papineau, Probabilities and Causes, 82 J. PHIL. 57, 57 (1985) ("On the
standard view, the connection between probabilities and causal explanation is simple:
one event explains another just in case the former gives the latter a high probability.
The higher the probability, the better the explanation." (footnote omitted)); id. at 59
("An alternative to the standard view is the view that the explanation of one event by
another does not require that the former give the latter a high probability, but simply
that it make it more probable than it would otherwise have been." (footnote omitted));
Wesley Salmon, Introduction to STATISTICAL EXPLANATION AND STATISTICAL RELEVANCE
3, 11 (1971) ("An explanation is an assembly of facts statistically relevant to the ex-
planandum, regardless of the degree of probability that results." (emphasis omitted));
Michael Strevens, Do Large Probabilities Explain Better, 67 PHIL. SCi. 366, 366 (2000)
("[In] the last twenty-five years[,] ... [we have seen a] move from accounts where only
high probabilities explain to accounts where all probabilities can explain ...
96 Charles Kegley states that:
[A] case study does not permit the analyst to conduct a meaningful test of a
general theory, because the case under examination might comprise an ex-
ception to the general pattern that the theory seeks to explicate. A single ex-
ception or deviant case does not disconfirm a general theory, it only dimin-
ishes the extent to which its predictive and explanatory power is potent.
Charles W. Kegley,Jr., How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy, 38 MERSHON
INT'L STUD. REV. 11, 32 (1994); see also Stanley Lieberson, Small N's and Big Conclusions:
An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Case Studies Based on a Small Number of
Cases, in CASE STUDY METHOD, supra note 69, at 208, 211 ("[E]xcept for probabilistic
situations which approach I or 0 (in other words are almost deterministic), studies
based on a small number of cases have difficulty in evaluating probabilistic theories."
(emphasis omitted)). Stanley Lieberson further notes:
The implications of this are seen all the time in social research. In practice,
for example, it is very difficult to reject a major theory because it appears not
to operate in some specific setting. One is wary of concluding that Max Weber
was wrong because of a single deviation in some inadequately understood time
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Therefore, unless one takes the untenable position that advocates
of deregulated (or less regulated) markets posit a deterministic causal
relationship between market forces and self-compliance with legal
norms (i.e., unless one contends that market forces must always pre-
vent shabby behavior for the theory of self-regulated securities disclo-
sure to have any validity), the crucial case study cannot truly falsify this
theory. Stated more generally, to believe that a single case can falsify a
causal theory, the advocate of the crucial case study approach must as-
sume that causal relations are deterministic, but such an assumption
cannot be maintained credibly for many, if not most or all, phenom-
ena studied within the social sciences.
or place. In the same fashion, we would view an accident caused by a sober
driver as failing to disprove the notion that drinking causes automobile acci-
dents.
Id. at 212; see also James Lee Ray & Bruce Russett, The Future as Arbiter of Theoretical
Controversies: Predictions, Explanations and the End of the Cold War, 26 BRIT. J. POL.
Sci. 441, 466 (1996) ("Since social science is necessarily a probabilistic rather than a
deterministic exercise, the failure to produce an accurate forecast about one particular
event is not sufficient to discredit any theory in any field .... ").
97 See Lieberson, supra note 96, at 212 ("[T]he formal procedures used in the
small-N comparative, historical and organizational analyses under consideration here
are all deterministic in their conception. Indeed, small-N studies cannot operate ef-
fectively under probabilistic assumptions, because then they would require much
larger Ns to have any meaningful results.").
Probably the dominant view within social science is that causal theories about so-
cial phenomena have a probabilistic character, or that the best we can achieve are
probabilistic causal explanations. Cook and Campbell provide an example of this
dominant view:
[I]n the social sciences the causal explanations we will be dealing with will be
molar and contingently causal rather than ultimately micromediational and
inevitable. We are also reconciled to the belief that, where any one of the
contingent conditions is not as assumed, manipulating the cause may not
produce the effect. Given the difficulties in conceptualizing and testing all
the relevant contingent conditions, many genuine effects will appear to occur
sporadically. Only later will the conditions become clear under which the
cause more frequently leads to the effect. As a result, the evidence supporting
molar causal laws will usually be probabilistic; it is probably the case that the
more molar the causal assertion and the longer and more unspecified the as-
sumed micromediational causal chain, the more fallible the causal law and the
more probabilistic its supporting evidence.
COOK& CAMPBELL, supra note 65, at 33; see also Stanley Lieberson, Einstein, Renoir, and
Greeley: Some Thoughts About Evidence in Sociology: 1991 Presidential Address, 57 AM. Soc.
REV. 1, 7 (1992) ("Since there is such a wide array of conditions affecting an outcome,
it is naive to think that a correct theory will predict or even explain the outcome in any
given circumstance."); Michael E. Sobel, Causal Inference in the Social Sciences, 95 J. AM.
STAT. ASS'N 647, 648 (2000) ("[T]he relationships that scientists study rarely hold in
every instance. Thus it seems reasonable to entertain notions of causation that allow us
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Second, the question of whether a particular case truly provides a
"critical" test of a theory will usually remain debatable because there is
no easy or objective way to determine criticality:
[I]n a crucial case it must be extremely difficult, or clearly petulant, to
dismiss any finding contrary to theory as simply "deviant" (due to
change, or the operation of unconsidered factors, or whatever "devi-
ance" might refer to other than the fact of deviation from theory per se)
and equally difficult to hold that any finding confirming theory might
just as well express quite different regularities. One says difficult and
petulant because claims of deviance and the operation of other regulari-
ties can always be made. The question is therefore not whether they are
made but how farfetched or perverse the reasons for them (if any) are.98
Enron itself illustrates the difficulty of finding that incontrovertible
critical test case of a theory. As Professor Bratton notes, even while
the advocates of greater regulation herald Enron as evidence of mar-
ket failure, the advocates of deregulated markets point to Enron's
comeuppance as an example of the market's genius.'
In short, a single-observation case study cannot tell us that a prob-
abilistic causal theory failed some crucial test, nor can we even be sure
to speak of causation in individual instances and/or that feature so-called 'probabilistic
causation.'").
The probabilistic nature of causal relations in the phenomena studied by social
scientists is one reason why Elster favors the search for causal mechanisms, rather than
the causal laws of behavior:
It is sometimes said that the opposite of a profound truth is another profound
truth. The social sciences offer a number of illustrations of this profound
truth. They can isolate tendencies, propensities and mechanisms and show
that they have implications for behavior that are often surprising and
counterintuitive. What they are more rarely able to do is to state necessary
and sufficient conditions under which the various mechanisms are switched
on. This is another reason for emphasizing mechanisms rather than laws.
Laws by their nature are general and do not suffer exceptions. One cannot
have a law to the effect that "if p, then sometimes q." Mechanisms, by contrast,
make no claim to generality. When we have identified a mechanism whereby
p leads to q, knowledge has progressed because we have added a new item to
our repertoire of ways in which things happen.
ELSTER, supra note 10, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
98 Eckstein, supra note 94, at 148. Another way to understand this problem is to
ask how we can know whether a case really provides a severe test of a hard-core as-
sumption of a theory or, instead, an auxiliary assumption that must accompany the
theory in order to operationalize the theory and make it potentially falsifiable.
9' See Bratton, supra note 4, at 1281-82 (noting that deregulation supporters pres-
ent Enron's collapse as evidence of free market success while advocates of greater
market regulation view Enron as further evidence of the need for increased restric-
tions); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (exhibiting that Enron can be in-
terpreted in many different ways).
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that the case studied provides a crucial test of any theory. In the end,
any causal statements made on the basis of a single-observation case
study will depend more on the researcher's supposition and counter-
factual reasoning than on empirical observation and experimental or
statistical testing.
2. Biases, Fallacies, and Dead Ends in Counterfactual
Thought Experiments
At first blush, the use of counterfactual reasoning to analyze En-
ron may not strike one as particularly troubling because the causal
conclusions of many Enron scholars seem obviously right: if the gate-
keepers, directors, or officers of Enron had acted sufficiently differently
for some reason, then surely a different outcome would have occurred. 00
But are all of these counterfactual worlds reconcilable, and if not,
why select one particular counterfactual world over another?'0 ' Moreo-
ver, what do these counterfactual arguments really tell us about the
exact cause(s) of Enron's collapse and the specific conditions or legal
policies that could likely have led to a different outcome? Finally, is
100 For more on these and other Enron stories, see supra Part I.
101 Innumerable alternative counterfactual worlds can be constructed. Supra Part
I. Indeed, simply changing the timing of events could lead to drastically different out-
comes. For example, Bratton acknowledges that, if market conditions had differed,
then very different results may have transpired for Enron, see Bratton, supra note 4, at
1301-05 (detailing and analyzing the conditions leading to Enron's downfall), perhaps
leading to an earlier collapse before some of the apparent fraud occurred or perhaps
even leading to no collapse at all. Or if a law firm other than Vinson & Elkins had
been retained to investigate the Watkins letter, see supra note 21 (explaining Watkins's
role within Rapoport's causal story), perhaps the outcome would have been different.
Or if Enron and other energy companies had not successfully lobbied for regulatory
changes that allowed the considerable expansion of business, perhaps the controversy
would have been avoided. Or if the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.), had not passed, perhaps risk assessments would have been different. Or per-
haps most simply, if only a few persons with different levels of integrity, greed, and/or
fear had been in senior management or on the board-if there had been people with
greater "strength of character" in charge, to put it in Dean Rapoport's terms, Rapo-
port, supra note 4, at 1380; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (relaying Ra-
poport's belief that character flaws caused Enron's collapse)-then perhaps Enron
would not have become the poster child for corporate misconduct.
For a prospective counterfactual about Enron's legacy that seems downright he-
retical in comparison to much of the writing by legal scholars about Enron, consider
an editorial by two business school professors, Samuel Bodily & Robert Bruner, What
Enron Did Right, WALL ST.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at A20 (opining that, despite the legal and
moral questions raised, "Enron has created an enormous legacy of good ideas that
have enduring value").
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facial plausibility even a useful guide for determining the validity of
causal conclusions drawn from retrospective counterfactuals? 
1 0 2
In fact, facial plausibility is not a particularly useful guide because,
in hindsight, it is easy to find numerous explanations to fit the evi-
dence, and it is therefore easy to create a counterfactual world in which
Enron's collapse would supposedly not occur.10 The legal scholar con-
structing a causal story for Enron is free to marshal whatever evidence
will make her counterfactual thought experiment compelling-that
102 I use the term "retrospective counterfactual" to reference thought experiments
in which the past is mentally altered to reach a causal conclusion or to test a causal hy-
pothesis and to distinguish these kinds of thought experiments from conditional fore-
casts about the future or prospective counterfactuals in which alternative futures are
imagined and outcomes are predicted. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Theory-Driven Reason-
ing About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 749 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)
(discussing conditional forecasts of the future and retrospective reasoning about coun-
terfactual worlds). I refer to predictions about future worlds as "prospective counter-
factuals."
103 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Prediction and Hindsight as Confirmatory Evidence, 22
PHIL. Sci. 227, 229 (1955) ("It is always easier to find ad hoc hypotheses-those with
many degrees of freedom-to fit a body of evidence, than to find simple or parsimoni-
ous hypotheses to fit the same evidence.... Hence the confidence to be attached to
any one of these [ad hoc hypotheses] is low."); Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Ned Le-
bow, Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Cognitive Styles and Historical Reason-
ing, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 829, 833 (2001) ("It is easy to extract lessons from history
that reinforce our ideological or theoretical stance, and it is difficult to avoid the temp-
tation of selection bias and theoretically self-serving reasoning in defense of that
stance." (citations omitted)).
This problem is sometimes referred to as the "Cleopatra's Nose Problem": Would
the course of history have changed dramatically if Cleopatra's nose had been unattrac-
tive, causing Antony not to fall for her? See Fearon, supra note 78, at 190 (claiming that
the Cleopatra's Nose Problem represents the following concern: If the statement "[i]f
A had not occurred, [then] B would not have occurred" were true, then would one be
committed to saying that A caused B? (emphasis added)). The problem is used to
point out the difficulty of selecting, on a principled basis, from among the enormous
number of mutations to history that could lead to an alternative outcome on the de-
pendent variable in a counterfactual thought experiment.
The "goodness of fit" between the imagined antecedent and the consequent serves
as a particularly weak measure of internal validity in thought experiments because no
quantitative measure of degree of fit is possible in this qualitative approach to causal
inference. In quantitative tests of theories, as in regression models and most experi-
ments, a statistical assessment of fit is possible using measures such as percentage of
variance explained-although goodness of fit remains a very weak test of a theory even
when such statistical measures are used. See Seth Roberts & Harold Pashler, How Per-
suasive Is a Good Fit? A Comment on Theory Testing, 107 PSYCHOL. REv. 358, 361 (2000)
("[S]howing that a theory fits data is not enough.... Because of the flexibility of many
theories, the variability of measurements, and the simplicity of most psychological data
functions, it is often quite possible that the theory could fit any plausible outcome to
within the precision of the data.").
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will, in effect, confirm her preferred causal story. Causal stories thus
risk becoming "intuition pumps," rather than fair-minded efforts to
evaluate causal hypotheses.
0 5
Once freed from the constraints imposed by real-world experi-
ments or quantitative analyses of real data, the legal scholar acting as
thought experimenter is left to her own psychological devices in imag-
ining supportive evidence and causal connections as needed to con-
firm her "pet theory."'06 Therefore, from a psychological perspective,
104 "The problem is that there is a many-many relationship between antecedents
and consequences in the course of human life. As we retrospect, in contrast, we can
create many-one relationships." Robyn M. Dawes, Prediction of the Future Versus an Under-
standing of the Past: A Basic Asymmetry, 106 AM.J. PSYCHOL. 1, 16 (1993). "Our common
attributional procedures.., create many-one relationships between antecedents and
consequence through selectively choosing antecedents once we have observed the con-
sequence." Id. at 16-17.
5 Daniel Dennett coined the phrase "intuition pump," referring to thought ex-
periments designed more to suggest particular conclusions or insights than to rigor-
ously test propositions:
A popular strategy in philosophy is to construct a certain sort of thought ex-
periment I call an intuition pump. Such thought experiments (unlike Galileo's
or Einstein's, for instance) are not supposed to clothe strict arguments that
prove conclusions from premises. Rather, their point is to entrain a family of
imaginative reflections in the reader that ultimately yields not a formal con-
clusion but a dictate of "intuition." Intuition pumps are cunningly designed
to focus the reader's attention on "the important" features, and to deflect the
reader from bogging down in hard-to-follow details. There is nothing wrong
with this in principle. Indeed one of philosophy's highest callings is finding
ways of helping people see the forest and not just the trees. But intuition
pumps are often abused, though seldom deliberately.
DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 12
(1984) (citation omitted).
A story may hold intuitive appeal regardless of the logical or empirical validity of
the story's propositions or conclusions. Gopnik and Eric Schwitzgebel offer a defini-
tion of intuition that emphasizes how mysterious an intuition's origins may seem:
We will call any judgment an intuitive judgment, or more briefly an intuition,
just in case that judgment is not made on the basis of some kind of explicit
reasoning process that a person can consciously observe. Intuitions are judg-
ments that grow, rather, out of an underground process, of whatever kind,
that cannot be directly observed.
Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel, Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway? The Role of Philo-
sophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology, in RETHINKING INTUITION: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITION AND ITS ROLE IN PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 75, 77 (Michael R. DePaul &
William Ramsey eds., 1998).
106 See ROY A. SORENSEN, THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 263 (1992) (warning of "pet
theory bias" in thought experiments). Roy Sorensen simultaneously warns that
[a]ll theoreticians must guard against question-begging and wishful inter-
pretations of their data. What makes the problem especially acute for thought
experiment is the greater pliability of the data.... In the case of thought ex-
periment... there is less external constraint on interpretation. We only have
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a particular concern with thought experiments is the potential biasing
influence of preexisting theories, values, and beliefs; what one hopes
to find may strongly influence what one ultimately finds.0 7 Indeed,
rules of experimentation are designed to guard against such confir-
mation and assimilation biases by forcing the experimenter to formu-
late and state testable hypotheses, to subject these hypotheses to tests
that present at least a risk of falsification, to apply generally accepted
standards for evaluating the evidence to determine whether falsifica-
tion has occurred, and to report these results publicly so that others
may scrutinize the study for confirmation bias or other biasing influ-
ences. In counterfactual thought experiments, the risk of confirma-
tion and assimilation bias increases because most of these safeguards
disappear: (1) empirical falsification is, of course, not possible (be-
cause, by definition, the propositions are contrary to fact), and hence
all one needs to do is generate some confirmatory evidence; (2) the
mental testing process cannot be directly observed and replicated; (3)
often the counterfactual theorist will fail to state clearly her hypothe-
ses and the counterfactual comparisons used to test them; (4) the his-
torical record that serves as the starting point for the counterfactual
analysis may be disputed and open to competing interpretations; and
(5) no set of normative criteria is generally accepted for evaluating
counterfactual thought experiments (though a possible set of such
criteria can be assembled, as discussed below).'08
an intangible imaginary scenario. Interpretation can wander, because it is no
longer tethered to a public data base.
Id.
107 See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 195 (3d ed. 2000) ("Peo-
ple tend not to look for evidence against what they favor, and, when they find it any-
way, they tend to ignore it. David Perkins has named these two characteristics 'myside
bias."' (quoting D. N. Perkins et al., Learning to Reason (1986) (unpublished manu-
script))). A paper by Charles Lord and his colleagues provides an additional example:
[T]here is considerable evidence that people tend to interpret subsequent
evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs. The biased assimilation proc-
esses underlying this effect may include a propensity to remember the
strengths of confirming evidence but the weaknesses of disconfirming evi-
dence, to judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable but disconfirm-
ing evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence
at face value while scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercritically.
Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2099 (1979).
108 See infra Part II.C (outlining normative criteria that would help determine the
most sound causal stories).
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Similar concerns led Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, in a review
of counterfactual thought experiments used in political science schol-
arship, to state that "[p]erhaps the most lethal threat to the validity
of counterfactual thought experiments comes.., from theory-driven
thinking." 9 The desire to confirm one's own theory and refute op-
posing theories may lead to shifting burdens of proof: "People often
succumb to the temptation of applying strong tests to dissonant ar-
guments and weak tests to consonant ones-a temptation that may be
especially pronounced when the arguments invoke possible worlds
that no one can ever enter and that can never be decisively discon-
firmed.""0 Thus, we should not be surprised that Professor Bratton
finds cause for regulatory concern from Enron after he announces
that he is "predisposed to draw regulatory inferences from business
disasters.'. Nor should we be surprised that Professor Coffee sees
109 Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Poli-
tics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT
EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 70, at 3, 34. Matthew Crawford and Sean
McCrea provide an experimental demonstration of how preexisting attitudes may bias
counterfactual thoughts:
The results of the studies supported our contention that attitudes can bias
counterfactual thought. Attitudes toward social issues biased both the content
of generated counterfactuals (Study 1) and the number of counterfactuals
generated (Study 2) in response to the scenarios. Together with the work re-
ported by Tetock... and Visser, the studies provide strong support for the
notion that counterfactual reasoning is influenced by attitudes, and that coun-
terfactual generation, as well asjudged plausibility, can be theory-based.
Matthew T. Crawford & Sean M. McCrea, Wen Mutations Meet Motivations: Attitude Bi-
ases in Counterfactual Thought, 40J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 65, 72 (2004) (citing
Philip E. Tetlock, Close-Call Counterfactuals and Belief-System Defenses: I Was Not Almost
Wrong but I Was Almost Right, 75J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 639 (1998); Philip E.
Tetlock & Penny S. Visser, Thinking About Russia: Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures,
39 BRIT.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 173 (2000)).
"0 Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 34. Dawes refers to this problem as one of
"pseudodiagnosticity":
The main problem here is that hypotheses are not compared; instead, sin-
gle hypotheses are evaluated in terms of the degree to which evidence is "con-
sistent with" them; in addition, evidence is often sought in terms of its consis-
tency with..."favorite hypotheses"-rather than in terms of its ability to
distinguish between hypotheses.
Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 533 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); see also
DAwEs, supra note 11, at 114 ("[S]tories ... are often selected to prove a point, rather
than forming a basis of a statistical generalization ... or causal inference. It is the
generalization or inference that leads to the selection of the story in the first place-
with the results that the story provides absolutely no new information.").
ill Bratton, supra note 4, at 1282. Bratton may well be right that supporters of de-
regulation are predisposed, on the other hand, not to draw regulatory inferences from
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gatekeepers as the primary problem with Enron, given his prior em-
phasis on the importance of gatekeepers in securities markets,"1 2 or
that Professor Partnoy focuses on the role of derivatives regulation,
given his prior emphasis on the importance of this 
topic.1" 3
Bratton's admitted tendency to see importance in business disas-
ters highlights another concern of psychologists with regard to retro-
spective counterfactuals: the overweighting of vivid, anecdotal evi-
dence relative to drab, statistical, or actuarial data." 4  One of the
better-documented findings in psychology is that, while actuarial data
itself may not be a particularly good predictor of behavior,"' it gener-
ally leads to better predictions than clinical or anecdotal data."6 This
overemphasis on vivid data seems particularly strong when the out-
come of interest is negative: "Perhaps the primary 'engine' for coun-
terfactual thinking is a negative outcome. Indeed, negative outcomes
command more intense and effortful attention in a variety of ways
than do positive outcomes..' ' u 7 Thus, salient, spectacularly bad events
business disasters, id. at 1281, which would support the point that one should be wary
of theory-driven biases in counterfactual thought experiments concerning charged po-
litical and legal matters. Bratton asserts that
[o]n one side stand supporters of deregulation, many of whom once touted
Enron and now find it more than a little embarrassing. Its collapse, they tell
us, should be taken as an exemplar of free market success. If Enron was a
house of cards, it was free market actors who blew it down, with a free market
administration keeping its hands off.
Id. (footnote omitted).
112 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on
Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAw. 1195, 1232 (1997) ("The recurrent themes in
this Article have involved gatekeepers and intermediaries. The gatekeeper has played
a critical role in the history of securities regulation.").
13 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
PITT. L. REv. 741, 807-17 (2000) (discussing the role of derivatives investments and
other factors in the downturn in Asian markets during the latter half of the 1990s);
Frank Partnoy, Playing Roulette with the Global Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at
A17 ("[I]f our markets are going to crash, the most likely spark will be hedge funds
and derivatives....").
114 This greater attention to salient evidence may lead to illusory causation: "Illu-
sory causation occurs when people ascribe unwarranted causality to a stimulus simply
because it is more noticeable or salient than other available stimuli." G. Daniel Las-
siter et al., Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs, 13 PSYCHOL. Sci. 299, 299 (2002).
115 See Dawes, supra note 110, at 528 ("Another problem that arises is that both
predictions [from clinical and statistical evidence] tend to be rather low.").
116 See id. at 527-29 (reviewing the professional literature that demonstrates the
superiority of prediction based on statistical, rather than clinical, evidence).
117 James M. Olson et al., Psychological Biases in Counterfactual Thought Experiments, in
COUNTERFAcrUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 70, at 296,
299 (citation omitted).
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such as Enron's collapse may assume much greater importance in the
mind of a counterfactual theorist than statistical evidence about the
infrequency of corporate collapses or the prevalence of corporate
fraud, even if the salient events are unrepresentative of the category of
behavior or outcomes in question.1  A corporation operating in the
same economic and legal environment as Enron, but committing no
apparent illegalities and only providing investors with "adequate" re-
turns, prompts few to imagine counterfactual scenarios in which these
adequate returns become pitiful. Yet, if counterfactual thought ex-
periments are going to approximate true experiments in their ap-
proach to hypothesis testing, then both negative and positive retro-
spective counterfactuals should be run.19
Further, retrospective review of the events and circumstances lead-
ing up to Enron's bankruptcy bestows a sort of omniscience that may
also bias our considerations of how the bankruptcy could have been
avoided. Though it may appear quite obvious, given what we now
know-that Enron's board of directors had sufficient reason to in-
quire further into many of Enron's related-party transactions involving
the chief financial officer and other officers (i.e., it seems obvious that
118 This greater attention to negative as opposed to positive events seems indicative
of a general tendency for bad events to have greater psychological impact than good
events. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL.
323, 323-24 (2001) ("In general, and apart from a few carefully crafted exceptions,
negative information receives more processing and contributes more strongly to the
final impression than does positive information. Learning something bad about a new
acquaintance carries more weight than learning something good, by and large."); id. at
355 (describing "the greater impact of bad than good" as "extremely pervasive").
11 The Enron scholars should imagine, therefore, how their proposed legal re-
forms would impact the behavior and output not only of companies that have failed,
but also of companies that have succeeded in the present factual world. This sugges-
tion is not as far-fetched as it may initially sound. In fact, political scientists and
economists often employ computer simulations of counterfactual worlds to examine
(i.e., to imagine in a more systematic way) how changes in political and market condi-
tions might affect world security and firm performance or otherwise play out over time.
See, e.g., Leonard A. Coad & Cornelis Van De Panne, Computer Simulation for Supply-
Demand Interaction, 29 CAN. J. ECON. S308, S308-12 (1996) (using computer simulation
to model the interaction of individual agents); Henry G. Grabowski &John M. Vernon,
Pioneers, Imitators, and Generics-A Simulation Model of Schumpeterian Competition, 102 Q.J.
ECON. 491, 491-516 (1987) (using computer simulation to study competition in "R&D-
oriented industries"); V. M. Sergeev et al., Interdependence in a Crisis Situation: A Cogni-
tive Approach to Modeling the Caribbean Crisis, 34J. CONFLICT RESOL. 179, 192-96 (1990)
(using computer simulation to explore alternative scenarios in the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis); Richard J. Stoll, System and State in International Politics: A Computer Simulation of
Balancing in an Anarchic World, 31 INT'L STUD. Q. 387, 392-402 (1987) (using computer
simulation to explore the consequences of states acting solely in their own self-
interests).
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the board should have asked more and better questions)-what we now
know may be quite different from what Enron's board then knew or
was even capable of knowing. Likewise, what we now know may be
quite different from what Enron's accountants, attorneys, and analysts
knew. The danger here, for the legal scholar imagining a world in
which Enron avoids bankruptcy, is what Roy Sorensen calls "[t]he
[b] lindspot [f] allacy":
°
120
There is a difference between what the characters within a thought
experiment can know and what the audience can know. Generally, peo-
ple on the outside of the story have the advantage of being able to know
everything on the storyteller's word. The characters within the hypo-
thetical cannot rely on this stipulative source. Indeed, sometimes the
depicted situation will be epistemically inaccessible to the character.
2
1
Thus, when we endow our counterfactual world with the information
that is presently known, we may well ignore the many inevitable or
hard-to-overcome "blindspots" that confronted the actual players in
the real-world drama, but not the hypothetical players in an alterna-
tive drama.
22
Just as the lack of constraints on imagination may bias our coun-
terfactual thought experiments in that one's predispositions and be-
liefs may determine the features of the other worlds imagined, the
limits on our imagination may also degrade our mental simulations of
causality. Consider the problem of chance events. Just as chance
120 SORENSEN, supra note 106, at 273.
121 Id.
122 This "curse of knowledge" in thought experiments, which may lead to a disre-
gard of blindspots that likely arose in a historical sequence of events, is akin to the
"curse of knowledge" associated with the "hindsight bias," which may make it difficult
for persons with outcome knowledge to recreate or simulate the judgments of persons
without outcome knowledge. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in
Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1247 (1989) ("The
curse of knowledge suggests that informed subjects will be unable to ignore the infor-
mation they have that the uninformed subjects lack, causing a bias in their predic-
tions.").
123 By "chance events" I mean events having extremely small probabilities of oc-
currence such that it becomes difficult to have great faith in any particular outcome's
occurrence. The intended meaning incorporates the colloquial sense of unantici-
pated, random, accidental, or very-hard-to-predict events/outcomes. My intended
meaning is not quite that espoused by Jerome Manis and Bernard Meltzer because I
need not take as strong a position as they do on the absence of cause and regularity:
"Chance, as we use it here, refers to events that possess the following overlapping
features: 1) absence of cause, 2) absence of predictability, and 3) absence of regularity
in the sequence of the action and its antecedent conditions." Jerome G. Manis & Ber-
nard N. Meltzer, Chance in Human Affairs, 12 Soc. THEORY 45, 45 (1994). Chance
events might also include events for which all possible outcomes are equally probable,
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plays a role in the factual world, it surely should play a role in counter-
factual worlds, but chance events and their effects, by definition, can-
not be predicted in counterfactual worlds. 2 4 The only way to know
what random events will occur is to experience their effects. Attempts
at imagining random events that might have changed the course of
Enron's history lead us down a multitude of avenues that meet in an
analytical dead end because we cannot imagine all possible chance
events and we lack the means to evaluate the probability of those truly
chance events that we do imagine. 25 Thus, chance as a causal force
must remain an inestimable source of variance in our counterfactual
thought experiments.
Of course, one could dismiss this limitation on thought experi-
ments, claiming that real-world experiments cannot control or account
for all chance events either. This claim is true, although the experi-
mentalist can obtain some estimates of error variance and can seek to
minimize the influence of chance through random assignment to ex-
perimental conditions. However, once over this hurdle, proponents
as in the flipping of a fair, two-sided coin. However, this type of chance event, with fi-
nite and well-defined but uncertain outcomes, presents fewer problems for the coun-
terfactual thought experimenter, as a mental simulation containing each of the possi-
ble outcomes could be run.
124 For interesting discussions concerning the role of chance events in social and
historical theory, see David S. Landes, What Room for Accident in History?: Explaining Big
Changes by SmallEvents, 47 ECON. HIsT. REv. 637, 637-54 (1994); Manis & Meltzer, supra
note 123, at 52-54.
125 Professor Steven Ramirez suggests that former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay's ties
to President George W. Bush may have contributed to a feeling of being "above the
law," which perhaps enabled a culture of greed to grow at Enron. See Steven A. Rami-
rez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42
WASHBURN L.J. 31, 67 (2002) ("No doubt this culture of greed was driven ... by a feel-
ing of being above the law and insulated from.., legal attack. For example, former
Enron CEO Ken Lay was a top donor to the Bush campaign, and he has yet to be in-
dicted as this article goes to press."). So if we imagine a world in which enough of the
hanging chads on ballots in the 2000 presidential election in Florida just by chance fell
off and enough of the Florida voters supposedly confused by the butterfly ballot just
by chance voted for Al Gore, then perhaps Gore would have become president and
Enron would not have gone bankrupt. Or imagine a world in which Andrew Fastow
experiences a close call with death and undergoes an ethical change of heart. When
we begin intentionally imagining chance events, then we return to the problem of our
limitless imagination, for any number of chance events can be posited that would have
altered the outcome in Enron-that is, we encounter again the Cleopatra's Nose Prob-
lem, supra note 103. But we also confront the problem that, if the chance event can be
imagined, then it is not sufficiently a chance event in our counterfactual world.
126 Elliot Aronson, Timothy Wilson, and Marilynn Brewer provide the standard
(idealized) view of randomization's benefits:
Random assignment is the great equalizer: as long as the sample size is suf-
ficiently large, researchers can be relatively certain that differences in the
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of counterfactual thought experiments confront a more serious ana-
lytical indeterminacy resulting from a severe problem of underdeter-
mination of hypotheses by the data: "if data cannot unequivocally pick
out hypothesis H over alternatives, then the hypotheses are underde-
termined by evidence.'
1 27
While some researchers such as Willard Van Orman Quine assert
that this methodological underdetermination problem also exists to
some extent in experimental approaches to causation (the practical
bite of this assertion remaining debated with regard to the empirical
128sciences), the problem is particularly severe in counterfactual thought
experiments because the data in thought experiments are so weak and
controvertible given their imaginary status and because there is no gen-
erally agreed upon (and applied) set of standards for evaluating the
quality of evidence generated by thought experiments.' 29 This lack of
clear norms for evaluating thought experiment data leaves only weak
norms, such as patent absurdity (the obverse of facial plausibility) or
personalities or backgrounds of their participants are distributed evenly across
conditions. Any differences that are observed, then, are likely to be due to the
independent variable encountered in the experiment ....
Elliot Aronson et al., Experimentation in Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 110, at 99, 104. For discussions regarding error measure-
ment, see Charles M. Judd & Gary H. McClelland, Measurement, in 1 THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 110, at 180, 203-06; David A. Kenny et al., Data
Analysis in Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note
110, at 233, 262.
127 DEBORAH G. MAYO, ERROR AND THE GROWTH OF EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE
174 (1996).
128 For a helpful discussion of Quine's underdetermination thesis and other ver-
sions of this thesis, see Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination, in 14 MINNESOTA
STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 267 (C. Wade Savage
ed., 1990). Larry Laudan concludes on a cautiously optimistic note about the status of
science:
None of this involves a denial (a) that theory choice is always deductively
underdetermined ... or (b) that the nonuniqueness thesis may be correct.
But one may grant all that and still conclude from the foregoing that no one
has yet shown that established forms of underdetermination do anything to
undermine scientific methodology as a venture, in either its normative or its
descriptive aspect. The relativist critique of epistemology and methodology,
insofar as it is based on arguments from underdetermination, has produced
much heat but no light whatever.
Id. at 291-92.
129 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (addressing the difficulty of de-
finitively attributing particular results to specific causes in thought experiments). For
suggestions about what more "severe" normative criteria should look like, see infra Part
I.C.
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narrative ridiculousness, to do the work of data evaluation and hy-
pothesis selection.
This methodological underdetermination leads to causal overde-
termination (in an epistemological sense), meaning that counterfac-
tual thought experiments may be very good for nominating causal
candidates but very bad for selecting among these candidates. An un-
surprising consequence of this analytical deficiency, therefore, is the
proliferation of competing causal accounts for any phenomenon of
even passing historical interest, as we see in the scholarship on Enron.
Another consequence is the practice that the political scientist James
Fearon calls "'loading up of explanatory factors"': "The researcher
lists several causes for the phenomenon being explained, all of which
were present in the cases where the phenomenon occurred. In for-
mal terms, the researcher has a multicollinearity problem." 30 Lacking
any good means to choose among competing causal candidates, the
scholar resorts to combining all of the causal candidates into one
overarching causal story.
We see this "loading up" practice occurring in some of the Enron
stories. For instance, to his credit, Professor Bratton sought to test
four alternative causal stories that might explain Enron, but his inde-
terminate, single-case method predictably found evidence to support
all of these causal stories and resulted in multiple causation stories.13
By loading up on these explanatory factors, Bratton turns a negative
analytical trait into an attractive portrait of complexity and nuance.
Rather than focus on the inability of the chosen mode of analysis to
distinguish causal relationships from spurious relationships (i.e., to
choose among confounded causal candidates), Bratton provides us
with multiple causation stories that are read by a receptive audience as
"a thorough exposition of the problems at Enron and a highly insight-
ful analysis of their policy and theoretical implications.'
3 2
130 Fearon, supra note 78, at 186.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (recognizing that Bratton's conclu-
sion rests on a theme applicable to all four subplots). Of the four causation stories
Bratton first tells, he is willing to settle on two primary causes, to which he then adds a
corporate culture cause. See Bratton, supra note 4, at 1326 ("We can pare down the
account by coupling the crisis of confidence and the hidden $4 billion of obligations as
primary causes."); id. at 1332 (adding the corporate culture/"Machiavellian" mentality
to the causal story mix).
132 Millon, supra note 24, at 124 n.2. Professor Coffee provides another example
of loading up on explanatory factors. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1403 (noting the "ex-
cess of explanations" apparent in many "debacles of historical dimensions"); supra text
accompanying note 59 (quoting Coffee's statements about Enron's anecdotal nature
yet potential for generalized significance).
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Rather than view this loading up of explanatory factors as an ana-
lytical weakness, one may see this practice as an acceptable move to-
ward conjunctural explanation. "Conjunctural explanation empha-
sizes that a particular combination of structural causes and events, in a
particular time and place, may create unique outcomes that will not
necessarily be repeated in other contexts." 33 From this perspective,
the explication of multiple explanatory factors would be understood
as a statement of the unique conjunction of forces leading to Enron.34
Another way to understand the methodological underdetermination problem and
its resultant "loading up of explanatory factors" is in terms of a single case study's in-
ability to separate necessary causal conditions from sufficient causal conditions. As W.
S. Robinson showed many years ago, studying only those cases in which the phenome-
non of interest occurred (as will always be the situation in a single-observation case
study) "gives only the necessary and not the sufficient conditions for the phenomenon
to be explained." W. S. Robinson, The Logical Structure of Analytic Induction, 16 AM. Soc.
REV. 812, 814 (1951), reprinted in CASE STUDY METHOD, supra note 69, at 187, 190. Ab-
sent the consideration of cases in which the phenomenon of interest did occur and
cases in which the phenomenon did not occur (e.g., public companies audited by Ar-
thur Andersen that did fail and that did not fail under similar market conditions), it is
impossible to separate sufficient from necessary causal conditions. In a single case of
corporate failure, all of the conditions leading to the failure appear to be necessary to
that failure, and only empirical study of additional cases can reveal which of these fac-
tors are sufficient, but not necessary, causal conditions.
133 Jeffery M. Paige, Conjuncture, Comparison, and Conditional Theory in Macrosocial
Inquiry, 105 AM. J. Soc. 781, 782 (1999). Conjunctural explanation is similar to the
notion that "causes are often disjunctions of conjunctions," Marini & Singer, supra
note 10, at 349, which leads to probabilistic, rather than deterministic, views of causa-
tion in the social sciences. "Because the traditional notions of necessity and sufficiency
in causation pertain to complex scenarios, often involving a disjunction of conjunc-
tions that we rarely, if ever, know fully, our elliptical understanding of these scenarios
results in the observation of probabilistic regularities between identifiable 'causes' and
their effects." Id. at 356; cf Howard S. Becker, Cases, Causes, Conjunctures, Stories, and
Imagery, in WHAT Is A CASE? EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY, supra
note 76, at 205, 208 ("Another approach ... suggests.., that causes are effective when
they operate in concert. Variable X, has an effect, but only if variables X2 and X, and
X, are also present. In their absence, X, might as well have stayed home." (italics
added)). This "disjunction of conjunctions" view of causation flows fromJ. L. Mackie's
notion of "INUS conditions" in causal relations:
The central idea in Mackie's conception of causation is that a cause of an
event is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of that event, although
it is a condition of a sort closely related to it. Briefly, a cause is often "an insuf-
ficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient
for the result"; Mackie calls a condition of this kind an "INUS condition."
Jaegwon Kim, Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation, 68J. PHIL. 426, 427 (1971) (quot-
ingJ. L. Mackie, Causes and Conditions, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 245, 245 (1965)).
134 Historians often favor such conjunctural explanations over attempts to find a
few powerful causes for events or developments:
There is also the trap of monism-the search for the one explanatory fac-
tor. This is a particular and persistent temptation for economists, who worship
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However, this position would seem untenable to scholars who want to
portray Enron as symptomatic of larger problems. 135 Those who raise
general alarm or arguments for reform based on a banner case can
hardly concede that the outcome in the banner case arises from a
confluence of historical forces unlikely to recur. 16
The methodological underdetermination problem is exacerbated
by what may be called the thought experiment's "bias against com-
plexity": the counterfactual thought experiment seems best suited to
examining simple and direct causal relationships (in which the inde-
pendent variable takes on only two values and has a main effect on the
dependent variable), rather than probabilistic, contingent, and com-
plex causal relationships (in which the independent variable may take
137
on a range of values and may interact with other causal variables).
By way of illustration, consider how Professor Stephen Cohen ap-
proaches a counterfactual involving the Supreme Court and Enron.
Instead of imagining exactly how Supreme Court precedent would
have needed to differ in order to prevent the collapse of Enron, as
what they call parsimony and like to remind us that one good reason is
enough. But it has to be good. Historians tend to be suspicious of simplicity;
they see it less in events and developments than in the eye of the beholder.
Large processes of historical change are not likely to hinge on single causes;
many pieces have to come together. Hence, the presence or absence of par-
ticular features in other places should not lead us to expect or preclude paral-
lel and simultaneous processes of development.
Landes, supra note 124, at 653; see also John Lewis Gaddis, History, Theory, and Common
Ground, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1997, at 75, 80 ("Historians know... that every con-
cept is embedded in a context. We doubt that even the most rigorous definitions fix
phenomena in quite the manner that amber freezes flies.").
135 See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text (discussing the uniqueness of En-
ron's organizational structure and the difficulty such uniqueness causes those who at-
tempt to glean general insights from the Enron situation).
136 Consider on this point the statements of ProfessorJoshua Ronen:
Sifting through all these causes can be a nightmare to any diagnostician. It
may be tempting to suggest that all have contributed to the situation in vary-
ing degrees, but such a sweeping conclusion offers no constructive policy
remedies. Effective crisis resolution requires sharp distinctions: which of the
implicated circumstances are truly harmful, and which are benign, possibly
even salubrious when considered in isolation? Among the potentially baneful
conditions, which can be cured by reform and which are resistant to legislative
or regulatory intervention? Finally, considering those ills that are susceptible
to effective treatment, who would be the savior, government or the free mar-
ket?
Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8
STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39, 40 (2002).
1.7 According to Sorensen, this "[blias against complexity" means that "[p] rocesses
that turn on high degrees of complexity and detail get left out" of thought experi-
ments. SORENSEN, supra note 106, at 266.
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well as the multiple factors that might interact with a change in prece-
dent to affect behavior, Cohen simply imagines that a switch from an
uncritical to a critical tone in a key Supreme Court opinion involving
deceptive accounting might have mattered greatly:
We can even imagine what might have happened if the Court had
criticized the Federal Reserve for condoning deceptive accounting in its
earlier opinion in Frank Lyon. The [Federal Home Loan Bank Board]
might have been less eager a few years later to encourage the deceptive
accounting that covered up the S&L crisis. Even Enron's managers and
accountants, two decades later, might not have made such egregiously
false financial claims.1
3 8
Here the counterfactual comparison switches the valence of a sin-
gle historical feature nominated as a causal candidate to imagine how
this switch might have affected the outcome. There is no effort to
consider the complex ways in which other historical conditions might
have changed had the Supreme Court written this opinion differently,
nor to consider what specific changes in precedent would have been
necessary to deter Enron's managers and accountants. 139 This prefer-
ence for tests of gross, either/or types of causal relationships is under-
standable because more fine-tuned analyses of hypothesized causal
antecedents would require the running of many different mental
simulations. Each of these simulations would then require fine-grained
alterations in the historical record, and this process would likely end
in a series of complicated contingency statements, rather than in a
good story that provides a definite, but overly deterministic, causal
explanation.
:38 Cohen, supra note 88, at 392.
39 Thus, in addition to dealing with the contemplated precedent changes only in
generalities, Cohen fails to address the "interconnectedness" problem presented by his
counterfactual:
Scholars not infrequently assume that one aspect of the past can be
changed and everything else kept constant....
"Surgical" counterfactuals are no more realistic than surgical air strikes.
Causes are interdependent and have important interaction effects. Even
minimal rewrites of history may alter the context in such a way as to render
the consequent moot or to undercut the chain of events or logic leading to it.
Lebow, supra note 85, at 575.
Cohen also fails to consider second-order counterfactuals that may flow from his
first-order counterfactual: "The problem of prediction is further complicated by the
fact that the clock of history does not stop if and when the hypothesized consequent is
reached. Subsequent developments can return history to the course from which the
antecedent was intended to divert it." Id. at 576.
140 This process might also lead to much less certainty on the part of the legal schol-
ars themselves with respect to the results of their counterfactual thought experiments.
COUNTERFACTUALS AND ENRON
As with other Enron stories, Cohen's argument seems facially plau-
sible; a change in Supreme Court case law certainly could have trans-
formed history in many ways. It could even have altered the outcome
in Enron. But if we are willing to mutate history to this extent in as-
signing some degree of causal force to Supreme Court precedent in
the specific case of Enron, then the limits on which counterfactual
mutations fall out of bounds seem close to nonexistent. This parsing
of a complex past into digestible causal units that our imagination can
handle results in a good story that may have little connection to a
plausible, alternative world. "The limitation of the story to a single
sequence and the essentially ad hoc nature of causal attributions call
into question the whole procedure of using stories as evidence, and of
thinking that they establish causality or patterns of reasons.,141
In sum, the plausibility of a legal scholar's causal story about En-
ron fails as anything other than a weak measure of the validity of the
causal explanation being offered because plausibility may arise inde-
pendently of the empirical or logical validity of the causal claim.142
The histories of the natural and social sciences are littered with exam-
ples of intuitively appealing but invalid hypotheses and theories,
143
Tetlock and Richard Ned Lebow, in a study of experts from the history and political
science fields, show that asking these experts to imagine multiple ways in which history
may have occurred (to consider counter-counterfactuals) and to unpack antecedent
events into their specific component parts (to acknowledge the multiple contingencies
in the string leading to the consequent) can affect an expert's confidence in assigning
an outcome to a general causal theory. See Tetlock & Lebow, supra note 103, at 830
(explaining that experimental studies were designed to test the premise that "the men-
tal processes of imagining specific counterfactual scenarios can induce us to change
our mind and become more circumspect about the power of our favorite causal gener-
alizations to delimit the range of historical possibilities"); id. at 839 (observing that ex-
perimental results are consistent with the theory that, "under [the] unpacking [ma-
nipulation], observers shift from a theory-driven, covering-law mode of thinking to a
more idiographic, case-by-case mode").
141 DAWES, supra note 11, at 113.
See Robyn M. Dawes, A Message from Psychologists to Economists: Mere Predictability
Doesn't Matter Like It Should (Without a Good Story Appended to It), 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 29, 31-32 (1999) ("[A] story, which provides causal information, creates a cohe-
sion among the elements of the inference that can otherwise be lacking, with the result
that some of these elements are underutilized or even ignored completely."). For dis-
cussions regarding the psychological factors that may contribute to faulty intuitions,
see Eldar Shafir, Philosophical Intuitions and Cognitive Mechanisms, in RETHINKING INTUI-
TION, supra note 105, at 59, 71-73; Edward J. Wisniewski, The Psychology of Intuition, in
RETHINKING INTUITION, supra note 105, at 45, 54-55.
143 Consider the following statements byJ. D. Trout:
Some of our favorite stories in the history of science, such as Kekule's fa-
mous "Eureka" episode, feature dramatic journeys to compelling explanations.
In these scenarios, the explanation "felt right." This sense of understanding is
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which is why many natural and social scientists reject intuition and
thought experiments as authoritative guides to learning about the
world.' 4  Free of the discipline inspired by public experimentation
and public demonstration of results, the thought experimenter may
find it hard even to trust herself to conduct a rigorous analysis, as the
Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith suggested recently when explaining his
attraction to experimental, as opposed to wholly theoretical, econom-
ics:
Doing experimental economics has changed the way I think about
economics. There are many reasons for this, but one of the most promi-
nent is that designing and conducting experiments forces you to think
through the process rules and procedures of an institution. Few, like
Einstein, can perform detailed and imaginative mental experiments.145
causally potent. It can be so comforting that explanation stops when this feel-
ing is experienced. I will argue that the psychological sense of understanding
is just a kind of confidence, abetted by hindsight, of intellectual satisfaction
that a question has been adequately answered. Thus this sense of satisfaction
is confidence that one enjoys an accurate description of the underlying causal
factors sufficient (under the circumstances) to bring about the phenomenon
we are examining. But confidence is, notoriously, not an indicator of truth.
... In order to accord explanation the epistemic role it seems to play in
successful theory selection in contemporary science, we must abandon our
sentimental attachment to the comforting sense of understanding, or, at least,
abandon the idea that this sense is a valid cue of truth.
J. D. Trout, Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding, 69 PHIL. Sci. 212, 213-14,
230 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
144 See, e.g., Wisniewski, supra note 142, at 58 ("It is clear that researchers must be
very careful about relying on their intuitions in formulating theories of thought and
behavior. Experimental methods are absolutely essential for determining the validity
of such intuitions."). Even some philosophers reject such means of knowing. For in-
stance, Robert Cummins observes:
Philosophical intuition is epistemologically useless, since it can be cali-
brated only when it is not needed. Once we are in a position to identify arti-
facts and errors in intuition, philosophy no longer has any use for it. Moreo-
ver, the most plausible account of the origins of philosophical intuitions is
that they derive from tacit theories that are very likely to be inaccurate.
Robert Cummins, Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium, in RETHINKING INTUITION, supra
note 105, at 113, 125.
For an excellent consideration of the pros and cons of both scientific experiments
and philosophical thought experiments, see SORENSEN, supra note 106.
145 Vernon L. Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, Prize
Lecture (Dec. 8, 2002), available at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/
smith-lecture.pdf.
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3. Problems in the Construction of the Factual
Component of Causal Stories
The counterfactual approach to causation must assume a particu-
lar factual world against which the counterfactual comparison takes
place, namely, one in which a change in the valence or value of a pro-
posed causal antecedent could reasonably have led to a different out-
come. For example, an argument that accounting standards, rather
than technical accounting rules, would have led to a different result in
Enron (i.e., the ethic of technical compliance argument) presumes
that, in reality, Enron complied with accounting rules but that these
rules failed to constrain or reveal the company's deceptions. If Enron
did not in fact comply with existing accounting rules, then it becomes
hard to argue that a change from rules to standards would make any
positive difference in the outcome. 46 Or if Enron's lawyers did in fact
counsel Enron against certain courses of action that were nevertheless
taken, then counterfactual arguments positing that better legal advice
might have averted economic disaster become less convincing. There-
fore, the accuracy of the factual baseline against which counterfactual
comparisons are made may be crucial to the validity of counterfactual
causal claims. 147
146 For an argument that Enron did not in fact comply with then-existing account-
ing rules, see Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Finan-
cial Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1057 (2003). According to the analysis pre-
sented by Anthony Catanach and Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, little proof exists that an
inadequacy of accounting principles led to Enron's collapse:
While the implications of Enron's accounting errors for its financial posi-
tion are clear, conclusions regarding the adequacy of existing accounting
standards are less apparent. In each of the cases discussed above, Enron vio-
lated existing financial reporting standards and SEC reporting regulations.
Following the collapse of Enron, many argued that inadequate accounting
principles were at fault. Yet, Enron's financial statements did not conform to
existing accounting standards, suggesting that the standards themselves were
not at fault. While the recent focus on financial reporting requirements may
bring about needed changes and improvements in the quality of financial in-
formation provided to investors, current standards should not be blamed for
Enron's failure.
Id. at 1074 (footnote omitted).
147 Of course, to the extent that one relies on the Enron stories for descriptions of
background conditions without regard to the validity of the causal conclusions made
about Enron, factual accuracy matters as well. In other words, factual accuracy is im-
portant whether the Enron stories are used for descriptive or explanatory purposes.
2004] 1577
1578 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA IAWREVIEW [Vol. 152:1517
In constructing the factual component of their causal stories, the
Enron scholars rely heavily on journalists' reports14 and the report of
the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of En-
ron Corp. (Powers Report). 149 Although the means for selecting par-
ticular sources is not typically revealed in any detailed way, 1% the news
sources relied on appear to represent a convenient sample15 1 of stories
148 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 4, passim (citing numerous newspaper and maga-
zine stories as well as editorials for the Enron facts); Dallas, supra note 8, at 45 (report-
ing that "[a] review ofjournalist accounts of Enron" was used to develop a description
of the ethical climate at Enron); Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1427, 1436-37 nn.18-21 (2002) (employing various newspaper stories
as supporting authorities); Lipson, supra note 4, at 114 nn.58 & 61 (referencing news-
paper accounts); Nancy B. Rapoport, Multidisciplinary Practice After In re Enron: Should
the Debate on MDP Change at All?, 65 TEX. B.J. 446, 446 & 447 n.2 (2002) (citing Web
site collections of news accounts regarding Enron); Viccaro, supra note 4, passim (rely-
ing on numerous newspaper, magazine, and television stories, by both reporters and
pundits, as sources of information).
149 POWERS REPORT, supra note 25. This report is often referred to as the "Powers
Report" because the dean of the University of Texas School of Law, William C. Powers,
Jr., served as the chair of the special committee. Examples of scholarly reliance on the
Powers Report include Bratton, supra note 4, passim; Gordon, supra note 148, at 1438
n.22; Kahn, supra note 12, at 1608; Lipson, supra note 4, at 102; Millon, supra note 41,
at 316-19 nn.26-40.
150 In a few instances, the scholars do report that they relied primarily on Pi-ofessor
Bratton's retelling of the story. See supra note 24 (listing scholars who explicitly rely on
Bratton's narrative).
151 The apparently nonrandom selection of sources raises the possibility of evi-
dence selection bias, unless a deliberate, nonrandom strategy was employed to guard
against such bias. This selection problem may be common within the social science
arena. In historical sociology, for example,
[t]he primary methodological problem is... not.., the difficulty of find-
ing necessary information. The more daunting question is how to choose
sources of data without permitting correspondence between the categories
and implicit theoretical postulates used in the chosen sources to ensure posi-
tive answers to the questions being asked about the data. For social scientists
this type of problem-unintended contamination of observations due to the
analyst's disposition to corroborate hypotheses-is not an unfamiliar problem.
Ian S. Lustick, History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and
the Problem of Selection Bias, 90 AM. POL. SCd. REV. 605, 608 (1996).
The danger here is that the researcher, left to her own nonrandom selection of
data, will be theory-driven in her selection of evidence, much like the supposed sharp-
shooter who shoots first and then draws a target around the bullet hole. See J.M.
Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1447, 1461 (1987) (analogizing the action of drawing a target around a bullet hole to
authors' behavior in "trying to get to a certain conclusion ... by constructing an eco-
nomic model that guarantees that [conclusion]" (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987))).
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from preferred publications such as the New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal. 
152
This repeated reliance on a few common sources increases the
risk of error cascades in which "erroneous claims perpetuate them-
selves through repetition." 3 If advocates of particular viewpoints have
a strong interest in perpetuating a particular version of the Enron
facts, then biased factual accounts may appear in the work of even dis-
interested or open-minded scholars through such error cascades.
5 4
152 Reports by Kurt Eichenwald and Diana Henriques of the New York Times seem
particularly popular citations. See, e.g., Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learn-
ingfrom the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALEJ. ON REG. 471, 472 n.1 (2002) ("For a de-
tailed account of Enron's rise and fall, see Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success
Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al."); Powell, supra note 4, at
1293 n.13 (describing a story by Eichenwald and Henriques as a "helpful historical ac-
count of the secret machinations that brought about Enron"); Marisa Rogoway, Recent
Developments, Proposed Reforms to the Regulation of 401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron
Disaster, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 423, 424 n.1 (2002) ("For a thorough treat-
ment of Enron's last year in business, see Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Hendriques
[sic], Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as it Rotted from Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, at 1.").
153 Duane, supra note 152, at 537; cf Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads
and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1264 (2001) ("[I]n law and [elsewhere], ideas
may spread and prosper, not because they are good, but because dozens, hundreds, or
even thousands of imperfectly informed people have fortified the very signals by which
they have been influenced.... [L]ongevity, even for bad ideas, is hardly out of the
question.").
154 In addition to a possible ideological or results-oriented bias in stories about
Enron, such reporting may be affected by what Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei
Shleifer refer to as a "spin" bias, which reflects a newspaper's goal of condensing sto-
ries while making them attractive to readers. SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ANDREI
SHLEIFER, MEDIA BIAS 2 (Harv. Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1981,
2002), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2002papers/2002list.html.
These authors distinguish between two kinds of media bias:
In this paper, we draw a sharp analytical distinction between... two kinds
of biased reporting. We call the traditional left or right bias ideology, and the
less traditional bias-one based on the need to tell a story-spin. We see ide-
ology as coming directly from the preferences of either editors or reporters.
For example, left wing newspapers may simply prefer to report news one way.
We see spin, on the other hand, as coming from a newspaper's attempt to tell
a simple and memorable story. The act of simplication [sic] leads to bias
since some information is necessarily discarded.
Id. When media competition and a lack of diversity of ideological viewpoints on a story
exist, we may see a greater bias toward spinning a story for its effect on readers:
For news that have significant right-left ideological dimensions, such as presi-
dential elections, competitive media are likely to produce accurate reporting,
on average. On the other hand, for news that do not have such a dimension,
such as cases involving law enforcement or many aspects of foreign policy,
spin rather than ideological diversity is likely to shape competitive reporting.
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Even if intentional distortions are absent from the reporting on
the Enron affair, some factual errors should still be expected given
the necessary abstraction and interpretation accompanying historical
records.
All sources used to construct a narrative-oral histories, ethno-
graphies, newspaper accounts, official and personal documents, and
secondary accounts-are abstractions from a myriad of facts. They are
necessarily selective and possibly erroneous owing to the limited infor-
mation contained even in the primary sources, to faulty recall, and even
to deliberate prevarication. Accounts, in brief, are constructions of
events rather than necessarily truthful accounts of what really happened.
Moreover, narratives formulated explicitly by the investigator from any
source, for the purpose of further analysis.., are doubly constructed.
155
Therefore, when dealing with any historical account of an event, but
particularly one involving as many complex legal and business matters
as the Enron affair, errors in the reconstruction and reporting of
the event should be expected. 156 Professor Timothy Duane notes, for
For such stories, competition does not eliminate the media bias, and there is
no good reason to expect accuracy in media.
Id. at 21. The cautionary comments of Simon Hug regarding reliance on secondary
sources complement the conclusions of Mullainathan and Shleifer:
Selection by a third party occurs when a researcher relies on secondary
sources. Often such reliance on secondary sources is unavoidable, as field re-
search is practically impossible. Given that the "creators" or "authors" of the
secondary sources almost by definition select what they wish to report, consid-
erable biases can result .... Unfortunately, it is... well known that media are
subject to selectivity, choosing only particular stories to report. Research
clearly shows that newspapers disproportionately report violent and large
events. Consequently, using data based on newspaper reports can lead to se-
rious selection biases.
Simon Hug, Selection Bias in Comparative Research: The Case of Incomplete Data Sets, 11
POL. ANALYSIs 255, 258 (2003) (foomote and citations omitted).
For discussions about distortions of facts concerning the civil justice system in
general, high profile tort cases-particularly the McDonald's coffee case-and the fre-
quency and size of punitive damage awards, see Daniel S. Bailis & RobertJ. MacCoun,
Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage
of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Recon-
ciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1239 (2002); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the
CivilJustice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Michael McCann et al., Java five: Gene-
alogy of aJuridicallcon, 56 U. MiAMI L. REv. 113 (2002); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Deter-
mining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV.
103, 159-99 (2002).
:55 Griffin, supra note 80, at 1128.
56 Ideally, the case study researcher follows evidence-gathering rules designed to
obtain a diverse sample of perspectives from a variety of sources, and this strategy re-
veals converging evidence. As argued by Professor Yin:
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example, that news stories about the California energy crisis-which
some contend Enron had a hand in creating-regularly contained
factual errors. 157  Professor Partnoy warns more broadly that the im-
portance of Enron's derivatives trading has not been fully appreciated
by legal scholars, leaving existing accounts of Enron's collapse incom-
plete. 158
The use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows an investiga-
tor to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and behavioral issues.
However, the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources
of evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiy .... Thus, any
finding... is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on
several different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode.
YIN, supra note 69, at 98; see also Lustick, supra note 151, at 615-16 (discussing ways of
dealing with the problem that historical accounts cannot be viewpoint or theory neu-
tral when using historical sources to construct a background narrative).
157 Professor Duane noted in particular:
I found four to five factual errors per story in some of the major California
newspapers when rolling blackouts first hit in January 2001, although that
number dropped to just one to two errors per story over the next few months.
Some of those errors-especially the notion that California's restructuring ef-
fort caused California not to build any new generating capacity in the 1990s-
continue to persist today.... One of the fundamental premises of the public
policy debate-that California had not added any new generating capacity in
the 1990s-was therefore simply wrong. Yet, public misperception of the rela-
tionship between supply and demand drove both the policy discourse and the
selected course of action.
Duane, supra note 152, at 537 (footnote omitted).
158 Professor Partnoy contends that a greater understanding of Enron's financial
instruments will lead to a causal story assigning centrality to derivatives:
[T]he key to understanding Enron's collapse is to reframe this discussion in
terms of the complexity of the financial instruments-derivatives and off-
balance sheet transactions-that drove Enron's major businesses. Unfortu-
nately, even after intense media scrutiny, congressional hearings and other
government investigations, most of the firm's derivatives dealings remain un-
penetrated. Even after Enron's bankruptcy, the firm's own officials were un-
able to grasp enough detail to issue an annual report in 2002; even with the
help of a new team of accountants from PricewaterhouseCoopers, they simply
could not add up the firm's assets and liabilities. This Article's claim is that
those details are central. If scholars are to understand the implications of
Enron's collapse, they must begin by revisiting the conventional story about
Enron.
Partnoy, supra note 52, at 1248 (footnotes omitted). He further explains:
The reasons for Enron's collapse should affect the normative conclusions of
scholars, and the standard account of these reasons is incomplete. At its core,
Enron was a derivatives trading firm; it made billions trading derivatives, but it
lost billions on virtually everything else it did. Enron used its expertise in de-
rivatives to hide these losses. For most people, the fact that Enron had trans-
formed itself from an energy company into a derivatives trading firm is a sur-
prise, although there were many clues buried in its financial statements.
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Reluctance to treat the Powers Report as the final word on En-
ron's transactions seems particularly appropriate given the conditions
under which the report was prepared. It was drafted quickly, with the
assistance of counsel, in the midst of litigation, under intense political
scrutiny, and by a committee that included a member of the Enron
board supposedly on watch when the trouble began. 159 The introduc-
tion to the Powers Report itself clearly expresses the report's limited
purpose and acknowledges a basic incompleteness:
We were not asked, and we have not attempted, to investigate the causes
of Enron's bankruptcy or the numerous business judgments and exter-
nal factors that contributed [to] it. Many questions currently part of
public discussion-such as questions relating to Enron's international
business and commercial electricity ventures, broadband communica-
tions activities, transactions in Enron securities by insiders, or manage-
ment of employee 401(k) plans-are beyond the scope of the authority
we were given by the Board.
There were some practical limitations on the information available
to the Committee in preparing this Report. We had no power to compel
third parties to submit to interviews, produce documents, or otherwise
provide information. Certain former Enron employees who (we were
told) played substantial roles in one or more of the transactions under
investigation-including Fastow, Michael J. Kopper, and Ben F. Glisan,
Jr-declined to be interviewed either entirely or with respect to most
issues. We have had only limited access to certain workpapers of Arthur
Andersen LLP[,] ... Enron's outside auditors, and no access to materi-
als in the possession of the Fastow partnerships or their limited partners.
Information from these sources could affect our conclusions.'6
Id. at 1280; see also id. at 1263 ("[M]any market participants have fundamentally mis-
understood Enron's collapse, even more than a year after the company's bank-
ruptcy....").
'-9 The report itself states:
One member of the Special Investigative Committee, Herbert Winokur, Jr.,
was a member of the Board of Directors and the Finance Committee during
the relevant period. The portions of the Report describing and evaluating ac-
tions of the Board and its Committees are solely the views of the other two
members of the Committee, Dean William C. Powers, Jr. of the University of
Texas School of Law and Raymond S. Troubh.
POWERS REPORT, supra note 25, at 6 n.1. Perhaps this partition approach was success-
ful and Winokur had no improper or self-interested influence on the tone, emphases,
or conclusions of the Powers Report, but given the ultimate governing authority of the
board, one wonders how the special committee could have neatly partitioned aspects
of the investigation with possible adverse implications for Winokur from those parts of
the investigation without such implications.
160 Id. at 2.
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The concern here is not that the Powers Report is too hard or soft
on any officers, directors, or outside professionals providing services
to Enron. Rather, the concern is with the use of the report as an
authoritative and unbiased account of the transactions that it does
address (and sometimes as the only source on certain transactions),
instead of as one data point or as an example of how corporations re-
spond to a calamitous event giving rise to considerable potential liabil-
ity for the officers and directors.
4. Summary of Concerns About Internal Invalidity
Serious problems exist with the evidence relied on by the Enron
scholars and the inferences these scholars have drawn from it. Be-
cause the evidence chosen consists of only one case and involves a sin-
gle outcome, it is not possible to use experimental, quantitative, or
comparative case study approaches to discern potential causes of this
outcome. Instead, the Enron scholars must rely on counterfactual
thought experiments in developing their causal explanations for En-
ron's collapse. Counterfactual thought experiments, however, suffer
from a serious methodological underdetermination problem, as well
as a variety of other inferential shortcomings. In addition, man), of
the Enron scholars have not approached the historical data as skepti-
cal consumers who question the accuracy and completeness of their
sources. Instead, the Enron scholars have treated news stories and the
Powers Report as authoritative factual sources and seem to have ex-
pended little independent effort to confirm the sources' accuracy or
find converging evidence. Taken together, these factors raise serious
doubts about the internal validity of the causal stories being told
about Enron.
B. External Invalidity: The Problem of Generalizing from Small Samples
The selection of a single case for study drastically limits not only the
internal validity, but also the external validity of the Enron stories (i.e.,
the validity of inductive inferences drawn from Enron to explain or pre-
dict outcomes in other cases). Because there is simply no way to make
a valid statistical generalization from a single case, a single-observation
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case study can never possess any demonstrated external validity.6  In
short, "[a] single case does not a tendency make."
162
A single-observation case study permits only analytical generaliza-S 163
non. Analytical generalization is synonymous with theoretical inference
161 ProfessorJanet Ward Schofield summarizes the problem well:
Practically speaking, no matter what one's philosophical stance on the impor-
tance of generalizability, it is clear that numerous characteristics that typify the
qualitative approach are not consistent with achieving external validity as it
has generally been conceptualized. For example, the traditional focus on sin-
gle-case studies in qualitative research is obviously inconsistent with the re-
quirements of statistical sampling procedures, which are usually seen as fun-
damental to generalizing from the data gathered in a study to some larger
population. This fact is often cited as a major weakness of the case study ap-
proach.
Janet Ward Schofield, Increasing the Generalizability of Qualitative Research, in CASE STUDY
METHOD, supra note 69, at 69, 70; see also Epstein & King, supra note 77, at 110
("[Riandom selection is the only selection mechanism in large-n studies that automatically guar-
antees the absence of selection bias.... When appropriately applied, random selection pre-
vents bias except by chance, and a large n means that the chance is exceptionally
small.").
162 In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 861, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
163 See YIN, supra note 69, at 10 ("[Clase studies, like experiments, are generaliz-
able to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the
case study.., does not represent a 'sample,' and.., your goal will be to expand and
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statis-
tical generalization)."); id. at 37 ("Survey research relies on statistical generalization,
whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical generalization. In analyti-
cal generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to
some broader theory."); Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, supra note 74, at 239 ("[T]he
single case study and the single experiment face the problem that both can be gener-
alizable to theoretical propositions but not to populations or universes.").
The terms "analytical generalization" and "statistical generalization" are synonyms
for the terms "theoretical inference" and "empirical generalization," respectively:
There seem to us to be just two effective strategies for drawing conclusions
from some smaller set of cases to a larger set. Furthermore, these are the ones
used by experimental and survey researchers....
Theoretical inference involves reaching conclusions about what always
happens, or what happens with a given degree of probability, in a certain type
of theoretically defined situation.... So, the aim in research directed towards
drawing conclusions on the basis of theoretical inference is to identify a set
of relationships among variables that are universal, in the sense of occurring
everywhere that specified conditions hold, other things being equal (that is,
wherever there are not countervailing or overdetermining factors)....
By contrast, survey researchers typically rely on what we shall call empirical
generalization in order to produce general findings. This involves drawing in-
ferences about features of a larger but finite population of cases from the
study of a sample drawn from that population. At its simplest, this amounts to
reaching conclusions about the distribution of particular features within a
population.
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and means only that the researcher distills from her single case study a
causal relationship that she hypothesizes will hold, all other things be-
ing equal, for a larger class of cases. Professor Langevoort provides a
good example of an analytical generalization in describing the class of
cases to which his causal theory about Enron might generalize. 64 The
better analytical generalizations, like Langevoort's, explicitly identify
the cases to which a causal theory should and should not apply.
Even strong advocates of case study research admit that an analyti-
cal generalization, standing alone, proves little about the reach of a
case study's findings.' 66 In moving from an analytical generalization to
a statistical or empirical generalization, additional evidence must be
gathered to show that the causal story being told about Enron applies
to other corporate settings as well. Unfortunately, within the Enron
stories, we find too much reliance on ipse dixit, and too few examples
of additional data that might support generalizations from the Enron
167case.
For instance, when a scholar with the well-earned academic stat-
ure of Professor Coffee tells the reader that "experience over the
1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers do acquiesce in manage-
rial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses seem to dwarf
the gains to be made from the individual client," 68 the reader is ex-
pected simply to accept Professor Coffee's claim given his expertise
and reputation in the field. Coffee offers no proof to back up his
Roger Gomm et al., Case Study and Generalization, in CASE STUDY METHOD, supra note
69, at 98, 102-03.
164 Professor Langevoort limits the application of his causal theory about Enron to
highly competitive firms in the "new economy," and he supplies a more detailed defi-
nition of such firms. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 968 (maintaining that firms of the
",new economy' . . require[] a high rate of creative productivity from a large number
of key managers and employees").
165 See J. Clyde Mitchell, Case and Situation Analysis, in CASE STUDY METHOD, supra
note 69, at 165, 182 ("All cases are necessarily contextualized and generalizations made
from case studies must therefore be qualified .... It is incumbent on the observer to
provide readers with a minimal account of the context to enable them to judge for
themselves the validity of treating other things as equal in that instance.").
166 See YIN, supra note 69, at 37 ("The [analytical] generalization is not automatic,
however. A theory must be tested by replicating the findings in a second or even a
third [case], where the theory has specified that the same results should oc-
cur.... [T]he results might [then] be accepted as providing strong support for the
theory .... ).
167 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (juxtaposing the danger in draw-
ing general conclusions from anecdotal evidence with the prevalence of this reasoning
in establishing Enron causal stories).
]6 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1405.
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claim other than a citation to another article by another authoritative
source, which itself also provides no specific empirical data to support
the generalization made by Coffee.' 69 Likewise, we are expected to ac-
cept on faith Professor Bratton's lesson that, "if Enron teaches us any-
thing, it is to question the reasonableness of reliance on any corporate
monitor,"1 even though Bratton advances this assertion after analyzing
169 Id. at 1405 & n.10 (citing Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 219 (2000)).
While Professor Coffee may have good data to support his claim of gatekeeper acqui-
escence in managerial fraud, this particular citation to Professor Robert Prentice's ar-
ticle and other citations within Coffee's article do not provide it.
Consider as a counterpoint to Professor Coffee's suggestion of significant acquies-
cence statements by Daniel Dooley, a senior partner with PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
at a law school forum on Enron:
On average, there has never been more than 2.9% of the registrants in the
market alleged to have committed a financial fraud over the last ten years. On
average, it is 220 per year. You can run the math. There are roughly 14,900
registered companies. That includes about 10,500 domestic and the rest of
them are foreign that are on the U.S. exchanges.
... So every year, roughly 220 to, in a top year, it was about 325, and that
year was the year they were cleaing out their backlog at Milberg Weiss's firm,
so right before the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")
format.
So what gives here? I know that Bill Lerach is not cutting anybody a break
with respect to bringing litigation. So if, in fact, fraud is rife, how come fraud
only seems to pop up over a ten-year period of time with a frequency of less
than three percent? Ninety-seven percent of the people who file Form 10-Ks
and Form 10-Qs and Form 8-Ks and press releases either are getting away with
murder or they are not committing fraud.
Panel Discussion, Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. SI, S13
(2002) (statement of Daniel Dooley, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) (footnote
omitted); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2001 SECURmTEs LITIGATION STUDY
3 (2002) ("While the percentage of cases alleging accounting violations continues to
grow each year, the number of actual accounting cases has declined for the fourth year
in a row. The 100 accounting cases filed in 2001 are the fewest since 1997."), available at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/gx/cfr/investigations/pwc-securitieslitigationstudy-2001.pdf;
Aronson, supra note 4, at 135 ("In fact, one can find few instances of independent
auditors colluding with companies to defraud investors. Instead, auditors were usually
defrauded in almost all instances."). These statements are not particularly dispositive
because (1) the number of reported cases of alleged fraud does not equal the actual
number of fraud cases, (2) the costs associated with the fraud are important to know
independent of the frequency data, and (3) Dooley, of course, has some self-interest in
underestimating the magnitude of the fraud concern. Nevertheless, these statements
show that informed persons disagree about the seriousness and prevalence of gate-
keeper acquiescence in fraud. In the end, the point is that hard data on the frequency
and costs of accounting fraud need to be advanced in support of the arguments.
170 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1340. It is worth reiterating, however, that Bratton is
skeptical of basing fundamental corporate and securities law reforms on Enron. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining Bratton's view that Enron's collapse
COUNTERFACTUALS AND ENRON
only a single corporate monitoring failure without any attempt to de-
termine the ratio of corporate monitoring failures to successes. Skep-
ticism about this claim increases when we consider that evidence of
monitoring failures is likely to have much greater public availability
and salience than evidence of monitoring successes, regardless of the
relative frequency of failures and successes. Indeed, one may venture
a guess that every business day numerous unpublicized instances oc-
cur in which the mere presence of corporate monitors serves to posi-
tively constrain the behavior of corporate officers (but this hypothesis
awaits empirical proof, as do the statements of Professors Coffee and
Bratton and others generalizing from Enron's example).
The scholar extending her Enron story to other cases may sin-
cerely believe that the causal circumstances of the Enron case hold in
other cases and may even possess some good evidence to support her
contentions. However, sincere belief absent any public display of em-
pirical proof amounts to little more than an appeal to the authorita-
tive status of the scholar. 7' "In the absence of data, anyone's word
may be advanced as a law of behavior."
172
C. Criteria for Evaluating Causal Stories Employing Thought Experiments
One reasonable response to the single-observation case study ap-
proach might be to reject it altogether, given its dependence on coun-
terfactual causal reasoning and its inability to generalize knowledge
about a single case to a class of cases. 1 3 Another response might be to
should not be blamed on the failure of the rules, but rather on the fact that Enron
strategically evaded the rules).
17' A respectable argument can be made for deference to the epistemic authority
of the expert under certain conditions. See, e.g., Robert Pierson, The Epistemic Authority
of Expertise, 1 PSA: PROC. BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. Sci. ASS'N 398, 403 (1994)
("[Wihen an expert is concerned only with claims that result from the control and
manipulation of her discipline's defining set of variables, then there is no rational
room for extra-systematic or lay evaluation of those claims."). However, in the face of
conflicting expert opinions, and absent objective measures of trustworthiness and ex-
pertise, it seems that an examination of the empirical and logical foundations of these
opinions would be a sensible place to start in adjudicating among the different find-
ings with regard to both Enron and its wider consequences. Furthermore, as the dis-
cussion of the validity of the Enron stories suggests, legal expertise does not guarantee
expertise at causal inference or empirical generalization.
172 Baruch Fischoff, Can Any Statements About Human Behavior Be Empirically Vali-
dated?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC. 336, 337 (1981).
173 See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 11, at 130 ("The cases of extreme selection
bias-where there is by design no variation on the dependent variable-are easy to
deal with: avoid them! We will not learn about causal effects from them."); YIN, supra
note 69, at 10 ("A second common concern about case studies is that they provide little
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accept that single-observation case studies have been, and are likely to
remain, a common research strategy within historical, legal, and scien-
tific research and to ask how such studies might best be used to ad-
vance our understanding of significant legal events such as the col-
174lapse of Enron.
If one takes the latter position, then one must develop a good way
of determining which counterfactual thought experiments stand out
as being better than others. From a learning standpoint, the primary
problem with causal stories generated through counterfactual means
is that they offer no obvious way to choose which stories are superior.
Critics are left to judge the relative plausibility or absurdity of the
stories. Thus, there is little way to tell which stories provide sound
bases for learning about causal relations in the world. This unsatisfac-
tory situation arises because single-observation case studies employing
thought experiments do not permit the usual types of "severe tests"
of causal hypotheses that conventional empirical research permits,
such as tests of increasing precision or stringency or confrontations of• 175
opposing theories using controlled and observable experiments.
basis for scientific generalization."); Lebow, supra note 85, at 550-51 ("[Flor most
members of our profession counterfactual arguments appear to have no scientific
standing. They are flights of fancy, fun over a beer or two in the faculty club, but not
the stuff of serious research.").
174 See, e.g., Lebow, supra note 85, at 558 ("Counterfactuals are an essential ingre-
dient of scholarship. They help determine the research questions we deem important
and the answers we find to them. They are also necessary to evaluate the political,
economic, and moral benefits of real-world outcomes. These evaluations in turn help
drive future research.").
175 Deborah Mayo offers one account of "severe tests" of hypotheses, MAYO, supra
note 127, at 178-83, and explains the logic behind the use of severe tests:
Although a single inquiry involves a network of models, an overall logic of
experimental inference emerges: data e indicate the correctness of hypothe-
sis H, to the extent that H passes a severe test with e. All the tasks of the inter-
connected models are directed toward substantiating this piece of reasoning.
To remind us, hypothesis H passes a severe test with e if e fits H, and the test
procedure had a high probability of producing a result that accords less well
with H than e does, if H were false or incorrect.
Id. at 445. She further explains:
The thrust of the "other hypothesis" objection is this: the fact that data fit
hypothesis H fails to count (or to count much) in favor of H because the data
also fit other, possibly infinitely many, rival hypotheses to H. The above char-
acterization of severe tests suggests how this objection is avoidable: mere fit-
ting is not enough! If hypotheses that fit the data equally well were equally
well supported (or in some way credited) by the data, then this objection
would have considerable weight. But the very raison d'etre of the severity
demand is to show that this is not so.
Id. at 187.
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Nevertheless, a set of normative criteria more severe than facial plau-
sibility or patent absurdity may be specified to test the products of
counterfactual thought experiments and thus help us to separate the
stronger from the weaker causal stories.176 These criteria not only may
serve a sorting function among existing stories, but also may guide fu-
ture research in a more positive direction.
1. Transparency
First and foremost is the transparency of the evidence selection,
causal inference, and generalization process. 17  The more particular-
ity with which a theory or hypothesis is stated, the more testable it be-
comes: "A theory is said to be testable to the extent that it can be con-
firmed if it is correct, and rejected if it is wrong. The more a theory
prescribes certain events and prohibits others, the more testable it
should be."01s Implicit in this notion of testability is that an explicit
176 Excellent starting points in the task of specifying normative criteria for causal
thought experiments are offered by Tetlock and Belkin, who extracted from the social
science and philosophical literature on counterfactuals a list of six normative criteria
for counterfactual arguments. See Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 18 (listing the
criteria as "[c]larity," "[liogical consistency," "[h]istoical consistency," "[tiheoretical
consistency," "[s]tatistical consistency," and "[pirojectability"). Lebow continues in
this direction by building on Tetlock and Belkin's work to propose eight norma-
tive criteria. See Lebow, supra note 85, at 581-85 (delineating the following criteria
"[c]larity," "[ l]ogical consistency," an avoidance of "[e]nabling counterfactuals [that] .
•. undercut the antecedent," "[h]istorical consistency," "[t]heoretical consistency," an
avoidance of "the conjunction fallacy," a recognition of "the interconnectedness of
causes and outcomes," and a consideration of "second-order counterfactuals"). As Tet-
lock and Belkin note, "the quest for a one-size-fits-all epistemology is quixotic." Tet-
lock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 16. Accordingly, the following discussion both ex-
pands on and simplifies in some respects the criteria proposed by Tetlock, Belkin,
Lebow, and other theorists in an attempt to provide guidance for evaluating counter-
factuals in legal scholarship.
177 Tetlock and Belkin suggest a similar but less encompassing "clarity" compo-
nent, which requires the counterfactual experimenter to "[s]pecify and circumscribe
the independent and dependent variables (the hypothesized antecedent and conse-
quent)." Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 18. Lebow concurs:
All causal arguments should define as unambiguously as possible what is to be
explained (the consequent in counterfactual arguments), what accounts for
this outcome (the antecedent), and the principle(s) linking the two. Good
counterfactuals should also specify the conditions that would have to be pres-
ent for the counterfactual to occur.
Lebow, supra note 85, at 581.
178 Brown Grier, Prediction, Explanation, and Testability as Criteria for Judging Statisti-
cal Theories, 42 PHIL. SCI. 373, 376 (1975); see also David Gooding, The Procedural Turn;
or, Why Do Thought Experiments Work?, in 15 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE: COGNrrIVE MODELS OF SCIENCE 45, 70 (Ronald N. Giere ed., 1992) ("The
demonstrative power of thought experiment depends on creating situations in which
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statement of the essential details entailed by a theory should be made
so that these details become susceptible to evaluation for their truth-
value.
1 79
With specific regard to Enron, the transparency norm directs at-
tention to three particular features of counterfactuals that should
be clearly specified in order to validate the thought experiment: (1)
the precise changes in the law, regulatory environment, or market
conditions that supposedly would have averted the disaster; (2) the
mechanism linking the antecedent to the consequent (e.g., if in-
creased criminal sanctions or heightened enforcement of criminal
laws is proposed as the antecedent, then the theorist should specify
that a deterrent effect is the proposed mechanism linking the antece-
dent to the consequent of greater compliance with the law so that the
proposal may be evaluated in light of existing research on deter-
rence); and (3) the details of the counterfactual world as it is pre-
sumed to exist after history has been rewritten to alter the result in
Enron, with particular consideration given to how proposed changes
in the law or market would likely affect other aspects of this new
most moves or manipulations are wholly transparent but in which certain moves are
impracticable, just as real-world experiments encounter anomalies and recalci-
trances.").
179 See, e.g., Mario Bunge, The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of
Scientific Theories, 28 PHIL. SCi. 120, 126 (1961) ("The basic predicates of a scientific
theory need not be observable or measurable in a direct way (few of them are). Only,
they must be open to public scrutiny by the method of science ... ."). More precisely,
we need propositions entailed by the details, which are also entailed by the theory, for
it is the truth or falsity of these propositions that is tested. As Alvin Goldman explains:
Beliefs are commonly said to be true or false, and so are assertions. But,
strictly, it is not acts of assertion, or states of belief, that are true or false. It is
the contents of these acts or states. Since we are taking propositions to be the
contents of beliefs and assertions, they have the role of bearers of truth or fal-
sity. What is primarily true or false is a proposition. A belief qualifies as true
only derivatively: when its content is a true proposition.
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGYAND COGNITION 17 (1986).
Jonathan Bennett discusses the difficulties that arise in designating those parts of
an event that are "essential" to a counterfactual analysis. SeeJonathan Bennett, Event
Causation: The Counterfactual Analysis, 1 PHIL. PERSPS. 367, 369-73 (1987) (reviewing
literature and a related example to illustrate the difficulties in establishing what is es-
sential). Suffice it to say here that the counterfactual analyst should at least specify
those features of the counterfactual world that must be altered and those that must not
be altered in order for the proposed causal relationship to hold (i.e., to provide the
means for others to test the empirical, logical, and intuitive appeal of the counterfac-
tual analysis). Specifying these essential features may be quite difficult, but proves
necessary nonetheless.
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world.' s° Absent an explicit statement of the causal chain proposed to
alter the outcome in the Enron case, the thought experiment should




2. Counterfactuality of the Proposed Antecedent
Once the terms of the thought experiment are made explicit and
specific, we are no longer confined to facial plausibility or intuitive
appeal in judging the validity of the experiment's results. As an initial
matter, this transparency leads to a simple check on the validity of the
thought experiment in the form of asking whether the proposed coun-
terfactual antecedent truly is counterfactual (i.e., does the value as-
signed to the proposed antecedent (causal) variable in the alternative
world really contradict the facts as they existed in the known world?).
If not, then this antecedent should not be assigned causal force in our
hypothetical world because the value given to the antecedent in the
hypothetical world existed in the actual world without causal efficacy.
For instance, if Enron's lawyers did advise Enron management not to
180 If the transparency demand is difficult to meet, and it may be very difficult to
meet in some cases, then that difficulty should be seen as negative feedback about the
viability of one's argument. For example, Professor Widen hypothesizes that a broad
move from more complex rules to general principles would challenge individuals and
organizations to make difficult decisions based on value judgments and ethics, rather
than on mechanical compliance with technicalities. Widen, supra note 44, at 1002. To
assess the likely causal efficacy of this change, however, we need much more detail
about the antecedents and the psychological mechanism(s) that will supposedly trigger
this greater caution and law-abidingness. We also need greater detail about the legal
changes proposed so that we can evaluate both the feasibility of such changes and the
ramifications of these changes in an alternative world.
Similarly, Professor Coffee submits that some "substantive reform of substantive
accounting principles" is necessary, and he likewise looks to the government for help
on grounds that "this shift cannot come simply through private action." Coffee, supra
note 4, at 1417. The help sought is not direct legislation, but rather, the legislative
creation of "a neutral and independent body to promulgate substantive accounting
rules." Id. at 1417 n.57. As to the shape of these substantive accounting reforms that
could have lessened the likelihood of or averted the Enron debacle, "reasonable per-
sons can disagree as to the best means of improving the quality of the financial stan-
dards with which the auditor measures compliance." Id. at 1417. So again, few specif-
ics of the proposed reform are offered, and concomitandy, little can be said about the
likely effects of these reforms.
'8' In addition, if the results of a thought experiment are generalized to other
cases, then the basis for such extrapolation should be revealed, whether that basis is
simply an analytical generalization or is an inductive inference based on evidence indi-
cating the similarity of the Enron case to other cases. If the basis is the latter, then the
sources of this evidence should also be identified because the revelation will again pro-
vide validity and the opportunity for repeat application of the extrapolation.
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pursue certain courses of action, and yet management ignored that
advice, then this information would bring into question a proposed
counterfactual antecedent that assigns causal force to the role of law-
yers' intervention in the prevention of Enron's demise. s2 This check
on the counterfactuality of the antecedent encourages care in the
gathering of facts to construct one's causal story. Furthermore, it il-
lustrates the importance of precision in specifying the antecedent, for
it may be that advocates of the causal role of lawyers have in mind
more active participation than that supposedly exhibited by Enron's
lawyers or a different type of advice than that offered by Enron's law-
yers. Assuming such intended differences, these advocates' causal
theory may retain some viability if they note the antecedent with
proper specificity. 1
3
3. Consideration of Competing Hypotheses
One of the primary problems with single-observation case studies
is their weak ability to separate true causal relations from spurious
relations (the methodological underdetermination problem) .4 We
gain confidence in a particular causal explanation to the extent that
alternative competing explanations for an event have been obviously
eliminated. Conversely, if a theorist ignores the role of serious com-
peting hypotheses and focuses only on confirming her pet theory,
then we should place little confidence in the results of this theorist's
experiment. Thus, good experiments anticipate variables that may
confound experimental results and either control these variables or
182 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (relaying Professor Wade's opin-
ion that the legal advice sought in Enron matters little as managers failed to follow it
anyway).
183 Thus, if Professor Wade is right about the facts and Enron's lawyers did counsel
against key actions, then Dean Rapoport's counterfactual world in which lawyers of
greater character made a difference remains a possibility. But the particular kind of
intervention envisioned needs to be specified and would need to go beyond a simple
recommendation for attorneys to provide more active intervention. Dean Rapoport
suggests that she has in mind a more persistent course of action than attorneys just ad-
vising against a course of action, but the level of additional intervention or persistence
by the lawyers that might have altered the outcome is not clear. See supra note 21 (ad-
dressing Rapoport's call for greater character among lawyers).
184 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (exploring the methodological
underdetermination problem).
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test their causal influence as compared to the influence of the theo-
retical variable of interest 8 5
Likewise, the stronger thought experiments and resulting causal
stories explicitly consider competing causal hypotheses and either ex-
plain why one hypothesis is more credible than another or explain
1816why multiple hypotheses remain credible. Just as our faith in the va
lidity of a causal story increases as competing causal hypotheses are
eliminated, our faith in the validity of a causal story should decrease to
the extent that competing causal hypotheses are ignored. Particularly
problematic for many of the Enron stories in this respect is Professor
Partnoy's "revisionist" story, in which he contends that many of the
Enron stories pay too little attention to the role of derivatives in the
Enron chronology.'87 If Professor Partnoy is correct, then many of the
existing stories omit an important causal factor from their explana-
tions and perhaps attribute causation to spurious causal factors.
4. Theoretical and Statistical Reasonableness of the
Proposed Causal Chain
If the purpose of a counterfactual thought experiment is to find
the best causal explanation of an event, not simply a plausible causal
explanation, then we need some way to evaluate the probability that a
particular antecedent could lead to the consequent in a counterfac-
tual world.18 One solution is to evaluate the probabilistic relation
185James Hampton explains the problem of confounding variables:
We want to arrange that the ... conditions are identical in all respects except
for the critical factor that we are testing-the value of the independent vari-
able. Where some other factor also differs systematically between the condi-
tions, then we call this a confounding variable or factor, and it undermines our
ability to interpret the results of the experiment. In effect we cannot tell
which of the two variables was responsible for any observed difference in the
dependent variable.
James Hampton, The Between-Subjects Experiment, in LABORATORY PSYCHOLOGY: A BEGIN-
NER'S GUIDE 15, 26 (Julia Nunn ed., 1998).
186 Professors Bratton and Coffee, for instance, consider competing explanations
for Enron, although they ultimately conclude that a multitude of factors contributed to
the outcome. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing Bratton's con-
sideration of multiple causal hypotheses); supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text
(discussing Coffee's consideration of legal versus market explanations for Enron's
fall).
'87 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing Partnoy's emphasis on
the causal centrality of derivatives).
188 That is, we must find some principled way to overcome the Cleopatra's Nose
Problem, supra note 103, the dilemma of so many plausible causes that each has a
small or indeterminable probability of being the true cause in any particular setting.
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between the proposed antecedent and the consequent in other, real-
world cases and then import this probability into our evaluation of the
thought experiment to the extent that it is theoretically reasonable to
do so. On this view, "the expectation of 'what would have happened'
[in our counterfactual world] must be a 'reasonable' one based on a
supportable statistical argument."' 9
While Robyn Dawes, the proponent of this view, contends that
"counterfactual inferences are normatively justified if and only if they
are embedded as instances in generally valid statistical relation-
ships,"'90 one need not commit to the strong form of this argument in
order to see its value as an evaluative tool.'9 ' The more theoretically
or statisticallyjustifiable the propositions in a thought experiment, the
more defensible the conclusions drawn from the experiment. Thus, if
legal scholars state their counterfactual propositions in terms that al-
low us to assess the fit of these propositions with known event prob-
abilities or behavioral regularities, then we are given some means be-
yond facial plausibility to assess the retrospective counterfactual. If
afforded these means in the Enron case, we could assess the justifiabil-
ity of the scholars' backward induction from evidence in other real
192
cases.
189 Robyn M. Dawes, Counterfactual Inferences as Instances of Statistical Inferences, in
COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 70, at 301,
305.
'go Id. at 306; see also id. at 307 ("[C]ounterfactual inferences are normatively justi-
fied only when they are embedded in a broader experimental or statistical context and
justified in terms of expectation, which may be applied to an individual instance.").
191 Tetlock and Belkin endorse a weaker version:
One need not, of course, accept the radical epistemological argument of
Dawes to agree with the more moderate mainstream view that canons of
sound statistical reasoning should constrain our judgments of counterfactuals
and, indeed, that we should be alert to the psychological fact that people are
flawed intuitive statisticians who fall prey to various biases in detecting and us-
ing covariation data.
Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 29 (citation omitted).
192 This argument is similar to that requiring the scholar to make explicit any cov-
ering laws (or covering theories, in Professor Fritz Rohrlich's modification) or founda-
tional assumptions from which counterfactual propositions have been deduced or
generated. Consider Professor Rohrlich's comments made in the context of scientific
claims generally, rather than of counterfactual claims specifically:
In its barest outlines, science seeks to identify the furniture of the world, its
properties, and the way it functions. Correspondingly, scientific explanation
must first identify this furniture of the world, i.e. it must first specify the per-
ception within which the explanation is to take place: its cognitive level and
its ontology. (Some philosophers speak of context dependence.) It requires
the choice of a scientific theory and a suitable model within that theory. Only
then can the explanation proceed to deduce from first principles the way
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This criterion serves a constructive function as well because it
forces the theorist to consider whether a causal relation would likely
appear under the circumstances of the Enron case in light of existing
empirical evidence. A positive example in this regard is Professor
Langevoort's behavioral explanation for Enron, which draws on or-
ganizational and psychological research about the interaction of per-
sonality, cognition, and organizational culture to argue that the Enron
culture fostered a "Machiavellian" type of senior management that was
prone to extremely risky and unwise courses of action under certain
high-stress conditions. A byproduct of this attention to existing so-
cial scientific evidence and the conditions under which particular be-
havioral phenomena may occur is that Professor Langevoort limits the
reach of his causal explanation for Enron to other highly competitive
firms in similar markets. 194 Thus, greater care about the internal valid-
ity of an argument may lead to greater care in the generalization of an
argument.
5. Cotenability and Counterfactual Minimalism
Professor Dawes's argument for statistical justification of counter-
factual propositions suggests another criterion that may be used to
evaluate retrospective counterfactuals: the cotenability of the coun-
terfactual antecedent with other features likely to exist in the imag-
ined world and with features already existing in the real world.9 5 The
cotenability criterion requires assessing whether the features of the
things are and the way things function on that level. And since every scientific
theory has its validity limits and every model its idealizations, these validity limits and
idealizations must be indicated in order for the questioner to decide on its credibility.
Rohrlich, supra note 10, at 76 (emphasis added). Thus, if the legal scholar relies on an
assumption of perfect rationality to supply contrary-to-fact propositions or to fill in any
gaps in the counterfactual world, the role of this assumption should be transparent so
that it and its application can be subjected to scrutiny. Cf Tetlock & Belkin, supra note
109, at 27 ("To prevent competing schools of thought from simply inventing counter-
factuals of convenience, we need reality constraints. Counterfactuals must not only fit
existing historical and statistical data[,] ... they must stimulate testable predictions
that hold up reasonably well against new data .. ").
193 See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 968-73 (providing background for this theory);
id. at 973-75 (speculating about this theory's applicability to Enron).
194 Id. at 968; see also supra note 56 (describing Professor Langevoort's delimitation
of the situations for which Enron can be generalized).
195 See Fearon, supra note 78, at 193 (building on the notion of cotenability as de-
veloped by Nelson Goodman).
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alternative world are logically and historically consistent. Accord-
ingly, the cotenability criterion directs attention (1) to whether the
scholar has changed only those parts of the alternative world that suit
the scholar's needs without considering whether these changes re-
quire additional changes in the alternative world 97 and (2) to whether
the scholar has proposed illogical or historically impossible changes
for the alternative world. If the counterfactual antecedent requires an
impossible alteration in history (e.g., the possibility of time travel or
the establishment of a communist system of government in America
during the recent past), then the counterfactual should be absolutely
rejected on lack-of-cotenability grounds.1°s
The cotenability criterion suggests the related criterion of coun-
terfactual minimalism: "The fewer the changes from the actual world
required by a counterfactual supposition, the easier it will be to draw
196 Lebow breaks logical consistency and historical consistency into separate nor-
mative criteria. He argues for cotenability or logical consistency on these grounds:
"Every counterfactual is a shorthand statement of a more complex argument that gen-
erally requires a set of connecting conditions or principles. The hypothetical antece-
dent should not undercut any of the principles linking it to the consequent." Lebow,
supra note 85, at 582. He argues for historical consistency on these grounds: "A
minimal rewrite that makes only one alteration in reality may not qualify as a plausible-
world counterfactual if the counterfactual is unrealistic or if numerous subsequent
counterfactual steps are necessary to reach the hypothesized consequent." Id. at 583.
I call Professor Lebow's historical consistency rule the "counterfactual minimal-
ism" rule, which states that the alternative world must resemble the real world as much
as possible. Given the similar focus of these criteria-a comparison of the counterfac-
tual to the factual world-and given that the cotenability criterion constrains what
minimal rewrites are credible, I combine the cotenability and counterfactual minimal-
ism criteria here. Tetlock and Belkin label what I call "counterfactual minimalism" the
"minimal-rewrite-of-history" rule. Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 23; see also id. at
23-25 (attributing the rule to previous scholars and describing its application).
197 Professor Fearon writes:
It is not appropriate to criticize a counterfactual argument by saying that the
antecedent could not have occurred. Rather, we need an explicit argument
saying that if the antecedent had been the case, other changes would be re-
quired in the counterfactual scenario that would have affected the outcome in
a different way.
Fearon, supra note 78, at 193.
198 In other words, "miracle counterfactuals" should not be allowed. Lebow en-
dorses the use of such miracle counterfactuals for some purposes, particularly to
evaluate settled theories. See Lebow, supra note 85, at 566 ("The value of miracle
counterfactuals derives not from their realism but from the analytical utility of consid-
ering alternative worlds."). However, where the goal of the counterfactual is to iden-
tify possibly true conditions under which Enron would not have failed, only "plausible
world counterfactuals" should be accepted.
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and support causal inferences, and the more defensible they will be." 99
The closer the counterfactual world is to the real world, the greater
the chance that the two worlds will be cotenable and the lesser the
chance that the theorist will overlook some consequence that follows
from a minimalist rewrite of history. The closer the two worlds, the
fewer the mental simulations required by the thought experiment
and, thus, the more psychologically manageable, transparent, and rep-
licable the experiment. The minimalism rule also provides an addi-
tional solution to the Cleopatra's Nose Problem:0 0 all other things be-
ing equal, always choose a causal chain that requires less counter-
factual changes over a causal chain that requires more counterfactual
changes.
The cotenability and counterfactual minimalism criteria give rise
to serious concerns about the use of counterfactual reasoning in a
case such as Enron, which arose in the context of a complex political,
201
economic, and legal system. Compared to a relatively simple coun-
terfactual claim such as, "I would not have been the winning bidder
had I not raised my hand near the end of the auction," which entails
few historical alterations to imagine (indeed, it may entail only the
199 Fearon, supra note 78, at 193-94. Geoffrey Hawthorn expresses a similar view:
All possibilities for a world.., whether they are suggested by our explana-
tions or by contrasts and comparisons with what we want to explain,
should... start from a world as it otherwise was. They should not require us
to unwind the past. And the consequences we draw from these alternatives
should initially fit with the other undisturbed runnings-on in that world.
GEOFFREY HAWrHORN, PLAUSIBLE WORLDS: POSSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING IN HIS-
TORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 158 (1991).
The philosopher David Lewis's similarity standard for counterfactuals is also rele-
vant here:
On [Lewis's] account, a counterfactual is true just in case the consequent is
true at worlds closest (most similar) to the actual world .... [T]he crucial
thing is to keep the past, prior to the time of the occurrence of the actual
(cause) event which is counterfactually absent, fixed (while minimizing viola-
tion of the relevant laws).
Wilson, supra note 56 (manuscript at 22) (citing David Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence
and Time's Arrow, 13 NOOS 455 (1979)).
200 Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
201 Under RobertJervis's definition, a system exists
when elements or units are interconnected so that the system has emergent
properties-i.e., its characteristics and behavior cannot be inferred from the
characteristics and behavior of the units taken individually-and when
changes in one unit or the relationship between any two of them produce
ramifying alterations in other units or relationships.
RobertJervis, Counterfactuals, Causation, and Complexity, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT
EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 70, at 309, 309.
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one plausible change of raising the hand at an earlier time in the auc-
202tion), proposed changes that undo Enron may be much more ex-
tensive in their historical effects or in the other simultaneous changes
necessary to enable the new hypothetical world in which Enron's col-
lapse is averted. As the complexity of the system encompassing the
target event increases, one's ability to imagine all of the changes nec-
essary to undo the event, and then to imagine all of the ramifications•• 203
of these changes, decreases greatly.
Consider counterfactual arguments about Enron along the co-
tenability/minimalism continuum to see the problems that arise when
theorists ascribe causation to any forces that also exist beyond the En-
ron setting. Near the strong cotenability end of the continuum, we
find arguments that require simple changes in personnel such as, "if
David Duncan had not been the lead Arthur Andersen accountant for
202 This example is adapted from Bennett, supra note 179, at 369. Even for this
simple counterfactual antecedent to have causal force and to avoid cotenability prob-
lems, we must assume at least one other bidder who will bid a price acceptable to the
seller after my earlier bid, and we must assume that my change in behavior is possible
or makes sense in the context of the situation (i.e., my later bid was not compelled by
other situational features).
203 AsJervis remarks:
[C]ounterfactuals are both useful and tricky when we deal with a system.
They can help us think through the connections we believe to be at work, but
cannot be employed to help us imagine a world that is like our own in all ways
except for one. A change will inevitably have many effects; often the change
itself is only possible if other factors change as well .... The use of counter-
factuals to test propositions or guide action can be designed to help us trace
consequences, but the complex interconnections involved are likely to make
the exercise a difficult one.
Jervis, supra note 201, at 316.
Professor Susan Bandes noted, for instance, the tremendous difficulty that she en-
countered in mentally undoing the events associated with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968):
It's a tough call whether to obliterate Terry. The question can't be whether
Terry was correct when decided, because there is no way, from our current
vantage point, to ignore more than thirty years of evidence about how it has
worked in practice. The rules of this game don't deprive us of our historical
knowledge ... so the question must be: in light of what we know now, would
we have been better off without the Terry decision? The question is compli-
cated by the fact that during the time we were accruing evidence about the ef-
fects of stop and frisk, we were also gaining a less linear, more sophisticated
understanding of the laws of cause and effect.
Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 491, 491-92 (1999); see also Grundfest, supra note 66, at 3 ("In a system as
complex as the securities markets, it is highly improbable that any single cause, such as
deregulation, can carry the weight of [Bill] Lerach's argument [about the cause of En-
ron].").
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Enron, then Enron's financial fraud would have been averted or less-
ened. '0 4 Near the weak cotenability end, we find arguments that re-
quire systemic changes such as, "if we had a standards-based set of le-
gal norms, rather than a rules-based set of norms, then Enron would
not have occurred., 2°5 While each of these arguments may have some
causal plausibility, the latter argument is surely less compelling given
its weak cotenability (i.e., given the many other changes in the world
needed to enable a wholesale switch to a standards-based system and
given the many hard-to-anticipate effects that may arise from these
first-order changes).
Even counterfactuals that involve changes somewhere in the mid-
dle of the cotenability/minimalism spectrum present difficulties in
the complex causal environment surrounding the Enron scenario.
For instance, Professor Cohen's suggestion that changes in Supreme
Court case law on deceptive accounting might have altered the result
in Enron"26 or Professor Wade's suggestion that modifications to offi-
cer and director fiduciary duties might have done likewise 0 7 raises the
question of what chain of other events these historical changes would
have set in motion. Most important is the second-order counterfac-
tual problem: in light of the lobbying power of accounting firms and
large public companies, would these first-order changes have led to
second-order changes that would have effectively undone the first-,- ,208
order reforms.2 That is, what is the potential for a work-around of
these more moderate reforms to legal and economic history by de-
termined actors who favored the previous legal and economic envi-
ronment?
The cotenability and minimalism criteria ultimately present a
paradox for the legal scholar seeking to draw broad causal lessons
from Enron using counterfactual analysis. The stronger the cotenabil-
ity of a counterfactual antecedent (because the historical mutations
required are less drastic), the weaker the counterfactual argument for
204 Professor Bratton, for instance, proposes an argument that places blame on
the Arthur Andersen accountants. See supra note 90 (reviewing Bratton's blame as-
sessments).
205 Professor Widen, for instance, submits this very argument. See supra text ac-
companying notes 44-45 (reviewing Widen's causal story).
206 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (describing Cohen's speculation that
the Enron scandal might have been prevented by Supreme Court criticism of the Fed-
eral Reserve).
207 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (describing Wade's argument that
weak corporate governance rules caused the Enron scandal).
208 See supra note 139 (discussing the problem of second-order counterfactuals).
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legal reform (because the need for wholesale reform concomitantly
lessens) .209 Legal scholars favoring reforms to the systems of corporate
governance and securities regulation are likely to reject personnel
changes as sufficient counterfactual antecedents (i.e., these scholars
are probably unwilling to explain Enron in terms of the unique per-
sonalities involved). Yet more extensive counterfactual antecedents
such as industry-wide accounting changes or market changes may not
be cotenable with other immutable historical facts. Indeed, at some
point the alternative world imagined will differ so much that Enron
itself will cease to exist. Although positing substantial changes might
be one sure way to avoid Enron's failure in a counterfactual world, it is
not a plausible route to explaining why the Enron that did exist in our
world failed.210
6. Projectibility
Finally, a theory drawn from a retrospective counterfactual should
generate valid predictions for other cases. This requirement is drawn
from Nelson Goodman's "theory of projection 2 1' and can be seen as
209 Cf Fearon, supra note 78, at 193 ("I expect that in practice, the cotenability re-
quirement will be more plausibly satisfied for small causes, such as specific policy deci-
sions, than for big causes, such as nationalism, imperialism, or a cult of the offen-
sive.").
20 Actually, if one believes that Enron is the unavoidable product of a capitalist
market system regardless of the extent to which private and governmental monitoring
of corporations occurs within this system, then one might employ a counterfactual in
which the U.S. switches to a government-controlled economic system to imagine
whether this change would undo Enron. Of course, such a counterfactual lacks co-
tenability and falls into the category of "miracle counterfactuals." See supra note 198
(contending that miracle counterfactuals should not be accepted if the goal is to iden-
tify true conditions that would have prevented Enron's failure).
211 See NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 87-120 (1955) (present-
ing his theory of projection); id. at 57 ("[T]he problem of making the projection from
manifest to non-manifest cases is... not very different from the problem of going
from known to unknown or from past to future cases. The problem of dispositions
looks suspiciously like one of the philosopher's oldest friends and enemies: the prob-
lem of induction."); id. at 90 ("Actual projection involves the overt, explicit formula-
tion and adoption of the hypothesis-the actual prediction of the outcome of the ex-
amination of further cases."); see also Bithe, supra note 11, at 489 ("[T] he ability of a
model to withstand the difficult test of application to different occurrences of the ex-
planandum without ad hoc alterations makes more plausible that it has captured the
central, generalizable dynamics rather than unique elements of a particular case.");
Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 109, at 30 (noting that, from Goodman's perspective,
"whether the generalization is bounded or unbounded by moderator variables and
whether the generalization is deterministic or probabilistic, it is subject to the same
acid test of scientific legitimacy: namely, its projectability or its ability to predict what
will happen in new, hitherto unobserved cases").
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the complement of the cotenability requirement, for a counterfactual
world that is more cotenable with the actual world should lead to
more valid predictions in the real world and other plausible counter-
factual worlds. The projectibility requirement serves two useful pur-
poses: (1) it forces the researcher to expose her theory to additional
tests of internal validity, and (2) it helps to identify the boundary con-
ditions on, or external validity limits of, the theory. Even more fun-
damentally, if the researcher cannot state her theory in such a way as
to make it testable in other settings, either using other counterfactual
thought experiments, real experiments, or comparative or quantita-
tive analyses of other real cases, then the theory should be rejected as
impermissibly vague. Thus, the projectibility requirement brings us
full circle to the initial requirement that a legal scholar state her the-
ory in as explicit and testable a form as possible.
7. Summary of Potential Normative Criteria for Causal Stories
Overall, then, in addition to facial plausibility, the quality of an
argument dependent on a counterfactual thought experiment should
be assessed along at least six dimensions: (1) the transparency with
which the evidence-selection, causal inference, and generalization
processes are described; (2) the "counterfactuality" of the proposed
causal antecedent; (3) the degree to which the favored causal hy-
pothesis has survived confrontation with competing hypotheses; (4)
the theoretical and statistical reasonableness of the counterfactual
propositions in light of known event probabilities and behavioral evi-
dence; (5) the cotenability and counterfactual minimalism of the
propositions in the thought experiment, with particular regard to the
complexity of the system in which the counterfactual mutations occur;
and (6) the projectibility of the thought experiment's results.
Considering the Enron stories along these dimensions reveals im-
portant ways that scholars could improve their analyses. Perhaps most
troubling is the lack of transparency and specificity in many of the
causal stories, both because this requirement is relatively easy to satisfy
and because failure to satisfy this requirement makes it difficult to en-
gage in any serious evaluation of the story's merit along the other di-
mensions. In counterfactual analysis, much of the necessary informa-
tion is private and not capable of independent discovery by the
reader, such as the precise rewrites of history undertaken in the
thought experiment and the evidence-selection procedures employed
in gathering information for the factual component in the causal
story. For example, were some news accounts of Enron rejected and,
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if so, why? Was any effort made to gather facts from diverse sources?
What fact-checking occurred, if any? Moreover, it is the obligation of
the scholar, not the reader, to find and produce evidence to support
the statistical reasonableness of a proposed causal antecedent and any
generalizations from Enron to other cases. The very acts of writing
down the details behind the creation of the causal story and disciplin-
ing oneself to make public one's evidence in support of inferences
contained in the causal story are likely to lead to improvements in the
story.
Perhaps most problematic for scholars who use counterfactual
reasoning from Enron to support their arguments for legal or market
reform is the weakness of these arguments when measured on the
cotenability/counterfactual minimalism dimension. Any Enron story
used to justify a systemic reform, whether it be one as extensive as
the broad move from legal rules to standards favored by Professor
Widen 2 or a more meager reform such as the requirement that ac-
counting firms not be allowed to provide both auditing and consult-
ing services to a client favored by Professor Bratton,2 5 suffers on this
dimension. This weakness proves so pervasive because any such re-
form in a system as complex as the one in which Enron was embedded
is likely to have so many unanticipated and unintended effects that it
becomes difficult to follow the causal chain from the reform to the
prevention of Enron and other business failures.
CONCLUSION
The use of the single-observation case study to develop causal ex-
planations for single events and for classes of events poses several chal-
lenges to the researcher. First, because this method does not allow
conventional empirical tests of causal hypotheses using experimental,
quantitative, or qualitative data, the researcher must construct a coun-
terfactual thought experiment to test her causal hypotheses. Second,
the researcher who uses such counterfactual thought experiments
must be vigilant so as to avoid the biases and fallacies that may intrude
on mental simulations. Third, even the best counterfactual thought
experiments will likely prove useful only in the testing of simple,
212 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (presenting Professor Widen's no-
tion that rules governing conduct and disclosure are better formulated as general prin-
ciples, rather than as technical rules, to avoid obviating the sense of right and wrong);
supra note 180 (same).
213 See supra note 32 (conveying Professor Bratton's argument for the prohibition
of coexistent auditing and consulting functions).
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rather than complex, causal theories. Fourth, assuming that the
thought experiment leads the researcher to a credible result, this re-
sult can be used only for analytical generalization and not as a basis
for empirical generalization. Therefore, additional empirical research
will always be necessary to determine whether the explanation gener-
ated for the single case has application to other cases.
Single-observation case studies pose challenges to the consumer
of such research as well. The most pressing problem for readers of
causal stories drawn from these case studies is that many of these sto-
ries, on the surface, appear compelling-even when the stories reach
opposing conclusions. When Professor Coffee explains why it is that
Enron's external gatekeepers, not Enron's board, failed, the reader
comes away agreeing that Enron really is "about the gatekeepers, stu-
pid [!] ,214 and that better regulation of the gatekeepers is in order.
Yet, on the contrary, when Professor Ribstein explains that the market
has not been allowed to do its work and that less regulation is impera-
tive, the reader comes away inspired by the power of markets. Pick up
Professor Partnoy's story about the underregulated derivatives market,
however, and one's enthusiasm for the market quickly fades. The
same sense of enlightenment follows the reading of Professor Brat-
ton's story about the role of corporate culture and accounting con-
flicts, the reading of Professor Langevoort's story about the interac-
tion of personality and organizational pressures in highly competitive
firms, and the reading of many other Enron stories-despite their dif-
ferent causal conclusions.
This causal indeterminacy results from the lack of stringent, nor-
mative standards for judging the validity of such stories. Unlike tradi-
tional empirical research, in which the reports of experimental and
quantitative research follow established normative standards for judg-
ing validity (such as the transparent and detailed reporting of infor-
mation about experimental design, rules for the sampling and selec-
tion of data, and the use of statistical tests to separate random from
nonrandom effects), there is no clear set of normative standards for
judging the validity of counterfactual thought experiments. This lack
of guidance leaves the consumer with only facial plausibility or intui-
tive appeal to judge the products of thought experiments. Yet, as a
reading of the Enron stories will quickly reveal, facial plausibility
amounts to only the weakest measure of validity.
214 See supra note 87 (quoting Professor Coffee's conclusion).
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To help overcome this causal indeterminacy problem, this Article
proposes a set of normative criteria that may be used to separate the
better counterfactual arguments about causation from the weaker ar-
guments. The primary goal in proposing such normative criteria is
not to argue that these particular criteria are the best measures of va-
lidity, but rather, to motivate consideration of what constitutes a good
thought experiment for causal analysis purposes. Consideration of
this issue seems particularly important because, if the normative stan-
dards advanced in this Article are appropriate measures of a good
thought experiment, then the causal stories being told about Enron
suffer from serious defects.
It is important to recognize that this Article's criticisms directed at
single-observation case studies and the telling of causal stories treat
this body of scholarship as serious empirical legal research that should
be scrutinized for its ability to lead to the growth of knowledge about
causal relations in the world. If we are unwilling to evaluate causal
stories for their analytical rigor and truth-value, then either we are
implicitly dismissing this research as meaningless or we are implicitly
endorsing a view that the tendentious use of "empirical" legal scholar-
ship is inevitable or acceptable. In the latter case, causal stories in le-
gal scholarship become synonymous with what Professor Deborah
Stone calls causal stories for political-agenda-setting purposes:
In politics, causal theories are neither right nor wrong, nor are they
mutually exclusive. They are ideas about causation, and policy politics
involves strategically portraying issues so that they fit one causal idea or
another. The different sides in an issue act as if they are trying to find
the "true" cause, but they are always struggling to influence which idea is
selected to guide policy. Political conflicts over causal stories are, there-
fore, more than empirical claims about sequences of events. They are
fights about the possibility of control and the assignment of responsibil-
. 215lty.
From this perspective, legal scholars interested in regulatory re-
form must package Enron's collapse in a way that makes it amenable
215 Stone, supra note 68, at 283. Stone goes on to state that "the competition over
causal theories in problem definition is bounded not only by the usual political condi-
tions that constrain agenda setting, but also ly law and science, two social institutions that
are each in their own fashion charged with arbitrating disputes about causal theories."
Id. at 299-300 (emphasis added). What Stone has in mind with respect to the law is the
use of litigation to parse causal claims, rather than legal scholars' seeking to influence
public policy. See id. at 294-95 (discussing how "the rules of the game in law are crucial
determinants of the political success of causal theories, even theories with the stamp of
approval of science").
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to, and serious enough for, governmental action. This task can best
be accomplished by associating Enron with the causal ideas of market
failure and deregulation run amuck. Opponents of governmental ac-
tion then put forth their competing causal stories of overregulation or
isolated occurrences of fraud to counteract the calls for legal or mar-
216ket reform. There is nothing troublesome about using Enron sto-
ries in this way if one sees history as consisting of multiple, equally
valid stories, or if one sees value-driven empirical analyses as com-
pletely inevitable or as legitimate means to an end.
The tendentious use of causal stories is troublesome, however, if
one believes that there are better and worse ways of learning about
causal relations in the world and that false causal stories may be mis-
leading to lawmakers."' This critical view does not require that em-
pirical legal researchers achieve perfection in their research methods.
It simply requires that they strive for the greatest rigor possible in light
of the constraints on their resources and methodological training and
216 See, e.g., Edward D. Herlihy et al., Improving the Clarity of Disclosures in the Post-
Enron Environment, CORP. BOARD MEMBER MAG. (Sept. 2002) ("We should all be mind-
ful of the fact [that] a few bad practices by [isolated] companies does not mean that
the current reporting system is fundamentally flawed or that investors have been de-
prived
of meaningful information in many instances."), at http://www.boardmember.com/
network/index.pl?section=1097&articleid= 1I112&show=article; cf Burton G. Malkiel,
The Market Can Police Itself WALL ST.J.,June 28, 2002, at A12 ("But in the final analysis,
the immediate punishment doled out by the market itself will be the most powerful
deterrent to future corporate wrongdoing. And eventually the stock market will react
to the increase in economic activity instead of the growth in corporate scandals.").
Former Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill's statement that Enron's failure evi-
denced "the genius of capitalism" is probably the most prominent example of an op-
posing view being offered by pro-market advocates. Enron's Fall Shows 'Genius of Capital-
ism,' BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2002) (quoting Secretary O'Neill), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/business/1 759033.stm.
217 Consider these comments by Professor Beaver:
At this stage, there has been a great deal of rhetoric and outrage but rela-
tively little analysis. There has been pressure for rapid responses in the ab-
sence of fully understanding the causes of the problems and how they are
linked to structural defects in the financial reporting-corporate governance
environment. Without these links, it is possible that, in spite of an increase in
legislation and regulation, the same problems will reappear.
Beaver, supra note 2, at 168; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of
Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309, 1318 (2002) ("Ul-
timately, the greatest danger of the Enron debacle is our possible overreaction, and
consequent over-regulation."); Strine, supra note 4, at 1401 ("Enron and corporations
like it are dangerous not only for the obvious harm they cause to their own constituen-
cies and confidence in the capital markets in general, but also because they generate
the potential for overreaction by policymakers, to the overall detriment of our eco-
nomic well-being.").
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that they not overstate the completeness, accuracy, or reach of their
2181
empirical claims.
Perhaps the most important step toward achieving greater rigor
and appropriate humility in empirical legal scholarship is to recon-
sider the emphasis placed on prescription within legal scholarship in
general. If legal scholarship's "basic nature is to structure its state-
ments as recommendations to [legal] decision-makers,, 219 then the
Enron scholars were simply following the norm to discuss the impor-
tance and possible legal ramifications of their analyses of the Enron
matter. Operating under such a norm, the best route to publication is
not to express the epistemic and prescriptive humility that should ac-
company causal stories, but rather, to portray Enron as the very "story
of human behavior itself."
20
In keeping with legal scholarship's demand for bold claims, this
Article ends with a prospective counterfactual of its own: an attitude
that places timeliness and stated importance over accuracy and humil-
ity will continue to dominate empirical legal scholarship indefinitely,
218 I do not mean to suggest that none of the Enron scholars expressed reserva-
tions about their stories. Some did qualify parts of their stories and articulated caution
about their causal conclusions. For instance, Professor Bratton notes that evidence of
events at Enron was incomplete at the time of his article's publication. See, e.g., Brat-
ton, supra note 4, at 1302 (qualifying his claim as based "on the present state of the re-
cord"); id. at 1360 n.302 (qualifying his claim as based on "present public knowledge").
And Dean Rapoport forthrightly indicated the likelihood of multiple causes of Enron
before selecting lack of character as a key cause. See supra text accompanying note 20
(quoting Rapoport's statement expressing doubt that Enron can be traced to a "single
root cause"). Others expressed reservations as well. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at
1408 n.28 (observing that "the empirical evidence is limited" regarding the quality of
recommendations by independent analysts as opposed to the recommendations by
analysts associated with an issuer's underwriters).
219 Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1835, 1851 (1988); see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2001) ("In the case of legal
scholarship, the reasons [for the emphasis that it adopts] are its essentially prescriptive
stance and, more importantly, its unity of discourse with the judiciary, which creates a
mentality that tends to assimilate the style of legal analysis to arguments before a
court."); supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing legal scholarship's purpose
and methodology as providing courts with prescriptions for legal issues).
220 See supra text accompanying note 62 (quoting Professor Flatt's memorable line);
see also supra note 65 (pinpointing the error of generalizing from specific behavior ap-
parent in Professor Widen's work); cf Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem
with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921, 930 (2001) ("In short, the
quickest route to publication-and thence to fame and fortune-for legal academics is
to be dazzlingly clever and propose some completely novel thesis."). For a contrary
view, positing that mainstream legal scholarship is (or at least previously was) "drearily
responsible in tone" (if not in its substance and effects on the legal system), see Pierre
Schlag, The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV. 917, 927 (1987).
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given the incentive structure within the discipline. The present mate-
rial benefits of performing rigorous empirical research appear to
be no greater than performing less rigorous research, while the cost
of doing rigorous empirical research-both in terms of monetary
expense and in terms of the amount of time necessary to bring an ar-
ticle to publication-may be high. Yet the professional benefits of do-
ing less rigorous empirical work, such as causal storytelling, may be
substantial-in the form of good, quick journal placements and a pos-
sible influence on courts, agencies, and legislators-while the profes-
sional cost of telling such stories is likely to remain low.2 2' As someone
22! Professor David Bryden offered a similar assessment of empirical legal research
more than a decade ago:
Now of course empirical research has its limitations, and they are much
more severe than some enthusiasts acknowledge. But those limitations, it
seems to me, are not the main reason why most of us shy away from it. The
main reason, I believe, is an accurate calculation of self-interest. As one who
used to do empirical research, let me explain some of the problems. I found
that it usually took me at least a year of hard work to come up with a research
plan and obtain the requisite financial aid. One must spend considerable
time dickering with foundation officials about details ("you should study five
states, notjust two") over which conventional legal scholars have absolute con-
trol. It often takes another year or two to do the research and write an article
analyzing the results.
... [F]ew law professors know enough about empirical research methods
or social and behavioral science theory to conduct methodologically complex
projects. So even if enough money were available, and time were not a prob-
lem, most of us would hesitate to venture into this alien territory, no matter
how many critics of legal scholarship urge us to do so, unless we perceived
unique rewards at the top of the empirical mountain.
David P. Bryden, Scholarship About Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 641, 645-46 (1992);
see also William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHL L. REv.
167, 168 (2003) ("In the academic marketplace, scholars select research projects based
on a comparison of returns and costs. It follows, therefore, that law and economics
scholars are more likely to choose theoretical projects because they hold out the pros-
pect of greater rewards and lower costs than empirical projects."). I suggest that the
incentive structure remains largely as it was when Bryden wrote, and I predict that it
will likely remain the same for a good time to come. However, there is some potential
counterevidence on the horizon in the christening of the new Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies by Cornell Law School. Blackwell Publ'g, New Journal from Cornell Law School':
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies; at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/joural.asp?
ref=1740-1453 (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). The emergence of empirical research pro-
grams at a few law schools supplies further counterevidence. See, e.g., Harv. Law Sch.,
Program on Empirical Legal Studies, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pels/ (last
modified Oct. 13, 2000) (providing information about the Program on Empirical Legal
Studies at Harvard Law School); Nw. Univ., Center for Legal Studies, at http://www.
northwesterm.edu/legalstudies/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2004) (providing information
about the Center for Legal Studies at Northwestern University); UCLA Sch. of Law, The
Empirical Research Group, at http://wwwl.law.ucla.edu/-erg/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2004)
(providing information about the Empirical Research Group at the UCLA School of
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concerned about the empirical validity of legal scholars' claims and
the influence these claims may have, I can only hope that my counter-
factual reasoning on this point turns out to be no better than much of
the counterfactual reasoning about Enron.
Law); USC Law Sch. & Cal. Inst. of Tech., Center for the Study of Law and Politics, at
http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2004) (providing information about
the Center for the Study of Law and Politics, ajoint venture between the University of
Southern California Law School, the California Institute of Technology, and the Initia-
tive and Referendum Institute).
